Planning and decision making : implementing an integrated approach to development in the Potosi region of Bolivia by Evans, Hugh Emrys
PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING:
IMPLEMENTING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
IN THE POTOSI REGION OF BOLIVIA
by
HUGH EMRYS EVANS
Dip.Arch. University of Cambridge, England
(1974)
M.Arch. University of California, Berkeley
(1975)
M.C.P. University of California, Berkeley
(1977)
Submitted to the Department of
Urban Studies and Planning
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for
the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
September 1983
Hugh Emrys Evans 1983
If- /I /
Signature of Author
Dep
Certified by
/-. 1 , 1 1
artment of /Trban -t1 dies/ andflanning, September 1983
Accepted by r
rqff. Lloyd Rodwin, Thesis Supervisor
Prof. Lawrence Susskind, Head PhD Committee
OF TECHNULOGY
AUG 101984
L5AIVA 14E 3
gotch
j
PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING:
IMPLEMENTING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
IN THE POTOSI REGION OF BOLIVIA
by
HUGH EMRYS EVANS
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
in September 1983 in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Urban and Regional Planning
ABSTRACT
Policies for integrated rural or regional development were conceived
originally as a response to earlier development programs which tended to
ignore the links between one sector and another. They call for complex
planning procedures and extensive inter-agency coordination, which is
hard to achieve in countries where political and economic conditions are
unstable, and where the administrative and planning capability of local
institutions is weak. In recent years the concept has been increasingly
criticised as results have not lived up to initial expectations. This
enquiry asks whether the concept of integrated development itself is
unfeasible, or whether the manner of implementation is at fault.
To examine the issues, the enquiry looks at the case of a spatially
integrated approach to development which has recently been applied in
the Potosi region of Bolivia by CORDEPO, the development corporation for
the Department of Potosi. The approach adopted there derives in part
from a project sponsored by the US Agency for International Development,
entitled Urban Functions in Rural Development, and in part from concepts
developed at Rehovot in Israel.
A detailed analysis of the spatial dimensions of the local economy led
to the preparation of a Regional Plan for Potosi. A review of CORDEPO's
annual operating plans for the period 1979 through 1983 shows clearly
that at an aggregate level planned spending shifted in conformance with
broad policy directives in the Plan for boosting agriculture, decentral-
ising investments, and later for improving rural roads. At a more
detailed level there is little evidence of individual projects being
selected according to criterla for consolidating the settlement hier-
archy and strengthening linkages. On the other hand several internat-
ional agencies have picked up proposals for area-based program packages.
In terms of implementation, two attempts to establish region-wide chan-
nels for inter-agency coordination came to nothing, and a proposal to
reorganize CORDEPO to facilitate the execution of area-based programs
was abandoned. Due to a national economic crisis, actual spending by the
Corporation during the period 1979 to 1981 amounted to only 35% of what
was planned. A detailed analysis shows that conventional projects for
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physical infrastructure consistently outperformed all others, while the
execution of projects in agriculture and manufacturing lagged far
behind.
As a means of interpreting the evidence in Potosi, the author adopts a
model of planning as a decision making process, in which decisions are
determined by the interplay of three considerations. Technical criteria
weighed most strongly at the level of broad policy directions, especial-
ly in the sectoral allocation of funds, but were largely ignored in the
selection of individual projects. Political considerations entered
chiefly into the selection of projects, in response to demands from
community delegations, and in the deliberations of CORDEPO's Board .of
Directors, who eschewed any explicit commitment to specific policies for
fear of provoking controversy or losing popular support. But the most
pervasive influence on decisions was exercised by factors arising from
the characteristics of the institution itself, particularly its origins
as a public works committee. This is reflected in the continuing prefer-
ence for physical infrastructure projects, and explains why CORDEPO is
more efficient at executing such projects than those related to agri-
culture and manufacturing.
Despite the uneven record, the author argues that spatially integrated
approaches to development should not be abandoned. Evaluations of
failure too often are based on the questionable premise that outcomes
should necessarily match original intentions. This represents a mis-
understanding of the nature of planning and decision making in the real
world, and the diverse ways in which an organization's behaviour can be
changed. The failure is not in the concept but in the application of it.
The study concludes with several suggestions for making planning and
execution more effective. First, the planner should be a strategist,
concerned primarily with the decision making process involved in
translating plans into actions, specifically with the preparation of
annual budgets, and the selection of individual projects. Second, the
planner should be an educator, not only by disseminating concepts and
ideas, but also by demonstrating the utility of a spatially integrated
approach to those engaged in sectoral planning. Third, the planner
should be an entrepreneur, disaggregating programs for integrated
development into replicable components that can be applied through
existing bilateral agreements with special-purpose line agencies.
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PART I:
INTRODUCTION
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
This enquiry starts with a simple question: are integrated approaches to
regional or rural development a snare and delusion? Just as in the 1960s
the cry was for comprehensive or global planning 1, so in the 1970s
commentators called for integrated planning. In response, many executive
agencies concerned with development evolved their own versions of such
2
an approach . More recently, however, there are signs that people are
becoming disillusioned with the notion as results have not matched
initial expectations. Some agencies have even abandoned the idea,
3reverting instead to simpler and more conventional sectoral policies
Is this trend only to be expected - just one more planner's delusion
thrown on the scrap heap of development failures - or is the judgement
premature, based on faulty evaluation?
Although there are almost as many definitions of the term as there are
writers who use it, an "integrated" approach to development is taken
here to mean coordinated inter-sectoral planning to ensure concerted
actions in the same area or sub-region, with the aim of maximising the
effectiveness of investments, and of ensuring that the benefits of an
integrated program amount to more than the sum of its separate parts
Whether the starting point is a program for exploiting natural
resources, for increasing agricultural production, or for broader rural
development, integrated development depends crucially on complex
planning and sophisticated administration to secure the collaboration of
many public and private organizations in providing the necessary funds,
personnel, and material inputs at the right time in the right place.
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The experience of the past two decades, however, amply demonstrates
there is a wide gap between intent and achievement, between plans and
outcomes. The literature is replete with studies documenting the limi-
tations of planning - many would say the failures - especially in less
developed countries, where the necessary conditions for effective
5
planning are rarely fulfilled5. Several authors have commented in
particular on the difficulties of implementing spatially integrated or
area-based programs in face of the dominant practice of vertical
planning oriented to agriculture, industry, transportation, and other
sectors of the economy . If these writers are to be believed, strategies
for integrated development which rely on complex inter-agency coordina-
tion are most unlikely to succeed, are perhaps even doomed from the
7
start to failure
The notion of success or failure in planning depends of course on what
is being measured and what results are expected. In the longer term,
administrators need to know whether their programs are achieving
intended objectives. Do the actions prescribed actually lead more or
less to the projected results, to something else, or perhaps to nothing
much at all? But in the shorter term planners need to know whether a
proposed policy or program is operationally feasible; can it - or enough
of it - be implemented in the manner envisaged to permit the prescribed
actions to take effect? In this enquiry, we are concerned not with the
longer term impacts, but with the more immediate question of the
operational viability of planning integrated development.
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The conceptual framework that we adopt in order to answer this question
will bear directly on the conclusions we reach. One way of evaluating
the viability of integrated development - the way most planning is
evaluated - is simply to compare plans or initial statements of intent
with the outcomes that followed. Invariably the two bear little resem-
blance to each other, and this leads many evaluators - even those with
knowledge and experience - to conclude that the planning exercise was a
"failure", or to use a common euphemism, was "not noticeably success-
ful". This kind of evaluation provides the ammunition for more cynical
critics who claim that planning in such circumstances is largely a waste
of time and resources, which might be better spent on budgetting or
project evaluation . It also leads to the often false conclusion that
the strategy itself is faulty, rather than the manner in which it is
being implemented.
Behind our initial question of the viability of integrated development,
therefore, lies another set of questions about the nature of the
planning process. The method of evaluation outlined above, for example,
implicitly treats planning as a purely technical or scientific process;
it either ignores factors which enter during implementation, or treats
them as extraneous distortions. Although this notion of planning as a
technical process has been widely discredited in academic circles 9, it
persists among practitioners everywhere, especially in many less
developed countries. Among theorists an alternative view has latterly
gained more prominence, in which the balance is reversed, and planning
is treated essentially as a political process in which technical
10
considerations play a relatively minor role
~1I~
However, neither of these views are very satisfactory when applied in
the context of a poor country. While the deductive theories suffer from
the limitations of being based on rational logic, the inductive theories
are formulated primarily on empirical observation in more developed
countries, and embody a number of assumptions that do not necessarily
hold elsewhere. Among these are a set of underlying conditions conducive
to effective planning: namely political stability, a sound economy, and
continuity in public administration. The political or pluralistic view
of planning also implies the existence of channels for democratic
representation and participation in the decision making process, an
assumption which sadly is all too rarely met in many parts of the world.
Furthermore, like the first view, it emphasizes factors which shape
policy, rather than those which enter afterwards during the stage of
implementation.
Given these reservations, we have adopted for the purposes of this
enquiry an alternative view of the nature of planning. Taking clues from
Bolan , who stresses the importance of the mechanisms and actors
involved in decision making, we treat this as the focus of our
attention. Hence, we define planning as a decision making process, in
which decisions are influenced by three sets of factors: technical
inputs, political concerns, and institutional considerations. This
allows us to examine not only the policy formulation stage, but also
more importantly the events which occur along the way between the
initial conception of policies and programs and the actions that
ultimately get carried out.
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Throughout the enquiry which follows, we intend to examine the roles
played by these three sets of factors in swaying decisions, not just
during the stages of policy formulation and project selection, but
equally importantly during the crucial stages of implementation.
Since we are interested here in the validity of a particular policy
approach, our concern is to trace the evolution of a strategy for
spatially integrated development as it was formulated in the field, its
impact on investment decisions and ongoing actions, and the transitions
that occurred between plans and outcomes. This means paying attention to
the impact of technical inputs on decisions.
Pluralistic models of decision making place great emphasis on the role
played by political factors in molding policy. However, in Bolivia,
where military dictatorship is the norm, and channels for public
participation are weak if not proscribed, we need to ask in what ways
political interests from both national and local sources exert an
influence on policy making, and how strong these are relative to other
factors.
Another focus of our enquiry concerns the planners' effectiveness in
controlling outcomes. As Lipsky puts it: "Who makes policy? The captain
12
or the cop on the beat?"1. To answer this we also need to take into
account the work structure or environment in which implementors prac-
tice. Hence the third component of our planning model relates to the
institutional characteristics which impinge on decision making, inclu-
ding sources of funding, the professional orientation of staff, and the
internal structure of the organization.
-6-
These questions concerning the nature of planning are not of academic
interest alone. Behind them lies a very practical concern: how can
planning be made more effective? Many authors suggest that certain
conditions must be fulfilled before planning becomes viable. Dyckman,
for example, mentions three in particular: adequate data, suitably
trained personnel, and a political-cultural tradition that is conducive
13to planning and public intervention . Indisputably, these conditions
are desirable, but it is somehow irrelevant to say they are necessary
preconditions: planning has to be practised regardless of current
circumstances. The more relevant question is: how can planning be made
more effective under adverse conditions, which in many less developed
countries is more often the case than not?
Integrated Development Planning: A Case Study in Potosi.
In order to examine these several questions - the feasibility of an
integrated approach to development, planning as a decision making
process, and clues towards more effective planning - we look at the case
of a project in the Potosi region of Bolivia. This project, entitled
Urban Functions in Rural Development, represented a pilot application of
a spatially integrated approach to development by CORDEPO, the
development corporation for the Department of Potosi.
A pilot project in Potosi was first proposed by the Office of Urban
Development of the United States Agency for International Development
14(USAID) in 1977 . However, it was not until 1979 that formal contracts
were signed between USAID Bolivia, the Ministry of Planning and
Coordination of the Bolivian government, and an independent firm of
-7-
consultants. The long term adviser assigned to CORDEPO for the purposes
of providing technical assistance arrived in Potosi in November 1979,
and early in 1980 a project team was set up composed of staff from
CORDEPO's planning department. Additional technical assistance was
provided by several short term consultants and the senior author of the
original UFRD concept paper, who provided ongoing advice and support to
the resident adviser throughout the duration of the project.
After a fast start with a workshop on the principles and concepts of the
UFRD approach to spatially integrated development, the project abruptly
ground to a temporary but prolonged halt, caused by the absence first of
team members, then by the resident adviser. Not until late August of
1980, did work on the project begin once again in earnest. After hiring
and training additional assistants, three field surveys were hastily
carried out in a five week period during September and October before
the onset of the rainy season. These covered over one hundred settle-
ments with a minimum population of two hundred inhabitants, the twenty
largest markets, and nearly two hundred households in rural and urban
areas throughout the entire Department. The main body of analysis was
completed during the next five months prior to a second workshop in
March 1981, at which preliminary results of the study were presented.
Over the following six months these results were updated and revised,
and published in final form for presentation to a national planning
workshop in La Paz in September 198115
At the same time, team members together with staff from other depart-
ments of CORDEPO started work on elaborating the details of a spatial
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policy for regional development, identifying projects, and designing and
evaluating program packages. These tasks were completed in April 1982
with the publication of a Regional Development Plan for the Department
16
of Potosi covering the five year period 1983 to 1987 . This Plan was
circulated among local and national agencies, and attracted particular
interest in the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, since it rep-
resented a rare example in Bolivia of an explicit spatial approach to
development planning. Even though the five year Plan was not released
for circulation until the spring of 1982, information and preliminary
conclusions from the spatial studies started to enter into the prepara-
tion of the Corporation's sectoral and annual operating plans from the
end of 1980 onwards, and to filter into decisions affecting ongoing
programs and projects.
The formal adoption of the Plan by the Corporation's Board of Directors,
and the subsequent implementation of the proposed development strategy,
was seriously jeopardised by the departure of the three people most
closely associated with its preparation. In October 1981, the long term
resident adviser completed his two year contract and returned to the
United States. In April 1982, after seeing the Regional Deelopment Plan
through to completion, its chief architect, the director of planning,
decided for personal reasons not to renew his contract with CORDEPO and
left for a new post elsewhere. Finally in September 1982, following the
resignation of the military government, the President of the Corpora-
tion, an army officer, was replaced by his predecessor, a civilian
engineer. Meanwhile, members of the original team formed for the pur-
poses of the UFRD project effectively ceased working as a unit, and were
-9-
either assigned to other duties, or lost their jobs as a result of poli-
tical reshuffles following the reinstatement of a civilian government in
October 1982 under President Siles Suazo.
Despite these events, the Corporation of course continued operations. In
this enquiry, we ask the question: how did the attempt to introduce an
integrated approach to development affect decisions concerning CORDEPO's
activities; and to what extent were the proposals in the Regional
Development Plan carried out in practice?
The Sequence of Enquiry.
This study is arranged in four parts. Following this introduction, part
II comprises four chapters which trace CORDEPO's attempt to apply a
spatially integrated approach to development during the period 1979
through 1982. After a preliminary account of the context in which
planning takes place in Bolivia, chapter 2 explains the broad outlines
of the Urban Functions approach to integrated development which was
adopted initially in Potosi. This derives essentially from empirical
observation that the spatial structure of a region is a major deter-
minant of the diffusion of growth and economic development there. The
UFRD approach therefore advocates a strategy of integrated development
based on a spatially articulated system of cities, towns and villages,
effectively connected to each other and to their rural hinterlands by
strong physical, economic, and transportation linkages.
Chapter 3 describes the technical criteria that were taken into account
in the process of evolving and elaborating details of the development
-10-
strategy. It details the analytical studies that were undertaken, and
the picture of the region that emerged. This helps to understand the
policies and programs that were elaborated for the Regional Development
Plan. These are compared in chapter 4 with the annual operating budgets,
to see what happened as the process of translating plans into actions
started to get under way. Then in chapter 5 we compare actions proposed
with those that were actually carried out, and attempt to explain the
discrepancies between them. We look first at measures for inter-agency
coordination, and second at actual spending for the three years 1979-81
compared to planned expenditures laid out in the annual budgets.
The third part of the study returns to the issues raised at the outset.
Chapter 6 reviews the literature on planning theory alluded to a moment
ago, beginning with a summary of the conventional rational-deductive
model of planning and its limitations, followed by latter day attempts
to shore up this approach, chiefly by systems analysts. Next, we present
an alternative view of planning, loosely referred to as the pluralist
model, in which planners are seen as intermediaries whose primary role
is to facilitate the resolution of conflict among competing factions.
Each of these views implies different tasks for the planner, and in the
final section of the chapter we examine how the three people who led the
planning work at CORDEPO viewed their own roles and the objectives of
the project.
Chapter 7 examines the evidence presented in the four chapters of the
second part, to decipher what this tells us about the nature of the
planning process. Drawing from the views presented in the previous chap-
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ter, we adopt a model of planning as a decision making process, shaped
by technical, political, and institutional considerations. Based on our
observations in Potosi, we describe the nature, form, and content of
decision making, and explore the ways in which each of these considera-
tions colors decisions concerning policies, programs, and projects.
The last chapter draws conclusions about the viability of an integrated
approach to development planning under adverse conditions, spells out
the implications for practitioners, and proposes a number of ways to
improve implementation, and to overcome the problems of coordination.
-12-
Footnotes.
1. For one account see Waterston (1965) pp 64-68.
2. For a review of integrated rural development policies of the World
Bank, the United Nations, and the United States Agency for
International Development, see Rondinelli and Ruddle (1978).
3. Personal communication from Eric Chetwynd of the Regional and Rural
Development Division of the United States Agency for International
Development, September 1982. See also Chetwynd (1983), p 15.
4. For a concise and clearly articulated example, see Weitz (1979).
5. For two general surveys see Waterston (1965) prepared for the World
Bank some years ago but still relevant, and more recently Moris
(1981); a briefer review of the problems of implementation is given
in Friedmann (1972).
6. See for example Friedmann op. cit. (1972).
7. For three cautionary views, see Morss and Gow (1981), Overseas
Development Institute (1979), and Ruttan (1979).
8. This is the main theme of Caiden and Wildavsky (1974).
9. See Rittel and Webber (1972).
10. A colourful example of this view is provided by Bromley (1983) from
Cali in Colombia.
11. Bolan (1967).
12. Lipsky (1978) p 394.
13. From a lecture presented to Fellows of the SPURS program at MIT,
February, 1983.
14. McNulty and Conroy (1977).
15. CORDEPO/USAID/PCI (1981).
16. CORDEPO (1982).
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PART II
IMPLEMENTING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT
IN THE POTOSI REGION OF BOLIVIA
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CHAPTER 2: THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN POTOSI
This enquiry started out by asking whether policies for integrated
development are feasible in countries where basic conditions are not
conducive to orderly administration and planning. To examine this
question we look at a case in Bolivia, where CORDEPO, the regional
development corporation, recently introduced a spatially integrated
approach to development in the Department of Potosi.
The underlying conditions in Bolivia are certainly not those normally
thought of as conducive to orderly planning. The three key assumptions
which underlie most models of the planning process - political
stability, administrative continuity, and a sound economy - are
flagrantly violated. In the first instance, the country is reknowned for
endemic political instability: in the 180 odd years since it gained
independence, it has had over 160 governments. From the autumn of 1979
through 1982, when the Corporation was most actively engaged in devising
and implementing its policy of integrated developent, the country
1
witnessed no less than eight different Presidents
The frequent rotation of the country's chief executive is accompanied by
a constant shuffle of Ministers and top administrators, which ripples
down to subordinates - and sometimes quite junior levels - throughout
government bureaucracies. While the turn-over of personnel is most
evident among government institutions in La Paz, it also affects public
entities at the regional level, especially in the politically more
sensitive parts of the country. Since Potosi is in this respect a back-
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water, the changes there were mainly confined to senior officials, such
as the Prefect of the Department and the President of the Corporation.
During the period covered by this study, there were four different
Presidents of CORDEPO, six directors of regional planning in the
Ministry of Planning and Coordination, and ten Ministers of Planning.
During the same period, the national economy deteriorated steadily. With
the resignation of President Banzer in 1978 after an unusually long
incumbancy of six years, the country was confronted with a large foreign
debt accumulated duing the years of illusory abundance. As payments for
this debt began to rise, investment declined, imports increased, the
private sector started losing confidence, and the currency weakened,
being devalued in late 1979 from twenty to twenty-five pesos to the US
dollar. Strife between the government and the trade unions and
campesinos over the introduction of austerity measures further
undermined the fragile economy. The military coup of July 1980 by
General Garcia Meza only made the situation worse by incurring
worldwide opprobrium for its leaden-footed trampling over democratic
institutions, and its thinly veiled involvement in illegal drug
trafficking, which resulted in the freeze of much needed international
aid. Added to this, the price of tin - Bolivia's staple export commodity
- started a steady and prolonged decline on the world market. By 1982,
inflation was rampant, reaching an estimated annual rate of 200%, and
the currency was successively devalued to 211 pesos to the dollar 2
rising to over five hundred on the black market.
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Needless to say, planning under these circumstances was, to put it
mildly, problematic.
CORDEPO: The Development Corporation for Potosi.
At the center of this case study, the agency primarily involved in
applying the integrated approach to development planning was CORDEPO,
the regional development corporation for the Department of Potosi. It
was originally established in 1962 as a public works committee to
provide urban infrastructure for the City of Potosi, and later other
larger cities of the Department . At this time it enjoyed the status of
a more or less independent satellite of the Ministry of Housing and
Urban Affairs. In the mid 1970s a series of new laws were introduced
setting up a national planning system, culminating in 1978 with the law
for Regional Development Corporations. This law greatly expanded the
functions and responsibilities of the public works committee to cover
the social and economic development of the entire Department. At the
same time it was assigned the task of coordinating development
activities of the public sector throughout the region.
Numerous other public agencies are of course operating in the Depart-
ment, most of them local offices of national Ministries, such as
agriculture, mining or education, but also a few public utility
companies such as CORPOAGUAS for water, TAP for telephones, and SEPSA
for electricity, not to mention the passenger airline LAI. Two features
sharply distinguish the regional development corporation from these
other public agencies: first the Corporation is multi-sectoral, not
limited to any one field of activity; and second it is the only agency
that is seriously concerned with planning.
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Since most of the others are subordinate offices of central organiza-
tions, their main function is to carry out orders issued from head-
quarters, rather than to engage in planning. A typical example is the
Unidad Sanitaria, an offshoot of the Ministry of Health, whose chief
responsibility is to administer and manage the network of rural health
clinics in the Department. Though they may be required from time to time
to prepare sectoral plans for their region, most local offices lack the
resources of money and manpower, let alone the technical skills needed
for the task. Even the independent local utility corporations do little
planning themselves, but tend instead to turn for longer term guidance
either to the relevant central Ministry - as for example TAP, which took
its cue from the Ministry of Posts and Communications in developing the
micro-wave telephone system in Potosi - or to CORDEPO.
To all intents and purposes, therefore, it is the Corporation that
effectively assumes primary responsibility for planning the development
of the Potosi region. This is not to say that other agencies are not
involved, or may not in fact be making crucial decisions with more far-
reaching implications. Indeed, when we remember that the CORDEPO's
budget represents no more than 20% of total public spending in the
region, it becomes clear that it is not as influential as the previous
paragraph may have suggested. Investments made or initiated by central
Ministries and other national entities, such as COMIBOL and QUIMBABOL,
sometimes dwarf the efforts of the Corporation. Most notable in this
regard are the investments in two new mineral processing plants near the
city of Potosi involving substantial loans from the Soviet Union and a
Belgo-German consortium, the latter amounting to nearly ten times
CORDEPO's annual budget
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Nevertheless, in 1979 at the start of the period under study, the
internal organizational structure of the Corporation, and the composi-
tion of its professional staff dominated by civil engineers, still
reflected its origins as a public works agency. However, with the
appointment in the spring of 1979 of a new President of the Corporation,
and shortly afterwards a new head of planning, an economist with
experience in Peru with the Andean pact, steps were taken to initiate
the transition to a regional development corporation. The organization
was restructured, the department of planning was assigned greater
responsibilities, and its staff was strengthened with economists and
sociologists. At the same time work started on the preparation of a five
year development plan for the region - the first the Corporation had
undertaken.
In 1978, prior to the start of this new regime, CORDEPO had been
approached by the Office of Urban Development of the US Agency for
International Development, who were looking for a site to carry out the
third of three pilot projects designed to test new concepts and methods
of integrated regional planning, entitled Urban Functions in Rural
Development (UFRD). The first of these projects had started in 1977 in
the Bicol River Basin of the Philippines, and a second was launched the
next year in Africa in Upper Volta. After comparing alternative loca-
tions in Bolivia and Paraguay, USAID settled on the Department of Potosi
as their preferred choice. There were several reasons for this, one of
them being that the spatial structure of the region, containing a rela-
tively large number of towns and villages, was particularly suitable for
the UFRD approach.5
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By the time USAID next approached CORDEPO in the summer of 1979 with
more concrete proposals, the new leadership had just taken over, and
they responded positively. Not that they necessarily understood what the
Urban Functions project was all about; on the contrary, at that stage
CORDEPO officials involved in negotiations with USAID probably were not
too concerned with the niceties of integrated development planning. What
did interest them, however, was the offer of long term technical assis-
tance, since it was clear that it would be needed in the preparation of
the five year plan, and in working out the transition from public works
committee to regional development corporation. In return, CORDEPO agreed
to contribute the staff and resources necessary for the project, and to
embrace the experiment as part of its planning activities.
The Urban Functions Approach to Integrated Development.
The origins of the UFRD approach to integrated development date from the
mid 1970s and stem from a rejection of earlier approaches which stressed
the role of cities in regional growth. Typical of these were policies
based on growth poles, which had been widely advocated in the 1960s, yet
6
which had failed to generate the local multiplier effects anticipated
Conscious of the limitations of these urban-oriented policies, and in
response to new directives from Congress, USAID's Office of Urban
Development began to search for alternative approaches to regional
development that would contribute instead to a more widespread and
equitable pattern of development, and that would benefit not just those
living in the largest cities, but more particularly the poor majority in
rural areas. Recognizing the important role played by market centers,
small towns and villages in the rural economy, they looked for ways to
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strengthen the system of settlements and to link them with their
surrounding areas in such a way as to provide better access for the
rural population to markets, farm supplies, social services and other
necessary facilities located in urban settlements.
As part of this search, the Office of Urban Development commissioned
Dennis Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle to prepare a state-of-the-art paper
covering current thinking on regional development policy. The result of
this commission was a seminal report on the concept of integrated
regional development, entitled "Urban Functions in Rural Development",
7
whence came the name for the subsequent project . Three characteristics
collectively distinguish this approach to regional planning from others.
First, it focuses on the spatial dimensions of the regional economy
rather than the sectoral dimensions, which is conventionally the case.
Second, UFRD avoids the often arbitrary distinction between the urban
and rural sectors, and instead treats the two as mutually reinforcing
elements of a regional economy. Third, the UFRD approach incorporates a
detailed methodology for bridging the gap between idea and action, for
translating the concept of integrated regional development into specific
plans and projects.
Conventionally, regional development plans tend to be made up of sec-
toral components, for agriculture for example, industry, road-building,
or education. All too often those engaged in the preparation of plans
for one sector are largely unaware of what is being discussed elsewhere.
But even where a so-called integrated development project calls for
inter-sectoral planning and coordination, it is rare that anything more
-22-
than superficial attention is paid to the urban-rural system, and the
geographical location of projects. The Urban Functions approach, on the
other hand, takes the spatial dimensions of the regional economy as its
starting point, and works towards the preparation of plans for the
integrated development of selected areas of the region.
This concern with the spatial dimensions of the region's economy is
founded on the premise that the spatial structure of the region - the
relationship betwen urban and rural areas - is closely related to the
pattern of development which occurs there. Empirical evidence in many
parts of the world shows clearly that the network of settlements and
links to their hinterlands is a key factor in determining how the local
economy functions and the manner in which developmental impulses are
transmitted across geographical space .
The diffusion of innovations, such as new methods of production, new
forms of communication or medical treatment, tend to be introduced in
the principal city, and from there to be adopted gradually in secondary
cities, intermediate centers and eventually smaller settlements. At the
same time, the constant migration from rural areas to urban centers
tends to concentrate in those places where there are new opportunities
for employment and better services and infrastructure. Nevertheless, if
there are gaps in the urban-rural system - large areas where there are
no important settlements with adequate infrastructure - the diffusion of
developmental impulses is impeded, those areas fall behind, and the
population gradually abandons them.
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In the same way, spatial linkages between producers and consumers,
between inputs and outputs, influence the growth of economic activity.
Farmers, for example, need access to agricultural supplies to improve
their productivity, and to markets in order to sell their produce. The
lack of access in more isolated areas inhibits the adoption of more
appropriate methods of farming, and reduces the incentive to increase
production. Similarly, the location of new shops and small factories is
determined to a large extent by the size of the local market, costs of
transport, and agglomeration economies which derive from the proximity
of complementary services and activities. These factors are all related
to the pattern of urban settlements, and the linkages between them and
their rural hinterlands.
The third distinguishing characteristic of the UFRD approach is the
emphasis placed upon devising practical methods for translating the
concept of integrated development into an investment plan for specific
projects. The original paper by Rondinelli and Ruddle included a
vocabulary of techniques for spatial analysis which has evolved in light
of subsequent experience into a ten step planning methodology based on
9five general principles
The first principle declares that any attempt at integrated planning
should aim not so much at producing a particular plan, but rather at
establishing an ongoing planning process, capable of generating the
information that decision-makers need in order to make informed
judgements about alternative investment opportunities. Second, the
scope of the spatial analysis to be undertaken, and thus the range of
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data to be collected, should be determined with a clear objective in
mind: namely, to facilitate the formulation of policy and the selection
of projects. Third, the methods and techniques employed for planning
purposes should be those that can be easily applied by local planners
who may not necessarily have advanced technical training in regional
science, and which can be clearly understood by those who have to make
decisions about the choice and location of projects. Fourth, studies
should maximise the use of existing information, and restrict the
collection of additional data only to those instances where it is
essential for the purposes of analysis. Finally, given the inevitable
constraints on the availability of data at the regional level in
developing countries, planning staff should be encouraged to be innova-
tive in adapting techniques for gathering and analyzing information to
shed light on pertinent problems.
These principles guided the design of the planning methodology, which
has gradually evolved during the course of field experience. While
particular details vary from case to case, the overall framework is now
clearly established. In Potosi this took the following form:1 0
Analysis 1) Analysis of Basic Resources;
2) Analysis of the Settlement System;
3) Analysis of Linkages;
4) Study of Accessibility;
5) Analytical Mapping;
6) Interpreting the Existing Spatial Structure;
Plan-making 7) Elaborating a Strategy of Integrated Regional
Development;
8) Design and Selection of Program Packages;
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Implementation 9) Implementation, Monitoring and Evaluation;
10) Creating a Continuous Planning Process.
The first six steps are concerned with analysis, which is used in steps
seven and eight for the preparation of plans and projects. Step 1 is
intended to provide a quick preliminary overview of the region based on
existing information. Steps 2, 3 and 4 examine the three main charac-
teristics of the spatial system - its settlements, the linkages between
them, and the population's accessibility to urban functions - and the
fifth step is devoted to mapping the resulting data and information.
Step six draws conclusions from the preceding analyses about the
existing spatial structure of the region, and identifies the constraints
and opportunities for development. These form the basis in step 7 for
tailoring the details of the UFRD strategy of integrated development to
fit the specific characteristics of the region in question, and in step
8 for selecting projects and drawing up an investment plan. Steps 9 and
10, as their names imply, are concerned with institutionalizing the
process of planning integrated regional development, although in
practice these have never been given the detailed attention they need.
Footnotes.
1. The following is a list of Presidents of Bolivia since the summer of
1979:
Walter Guevara Arce August 1979
Col. Natusch Busch November 1979
Lidia Guelier November 1979
Gen. Garcia Meza July 1980
A military troika July 1981
Gen. Celso Torrelio August 1981
Gen. Guido Vildoso March 1982
Hernan Siles Zuazo October 1982
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2. The Bolivian peso was devalued officially three times between 1979
and 1982: prior to November 1979 one US dollar bought 20 pesos; in
November 1979, 25 pesos; in March 1982, 44 pesos; and in November
1982, 211 pesos.
3. In 1967 the name was changed from Obras Publicas de Potosi (Potosi
Public Works) to Comite de Desarrollo de Obras Publicas (Committee
for the Development of Public Works), and its scope was enlarged to
include the larger cities and towns throughout the Department of
Potosi.
4. These include a plant at La Palca, sixteen kilometers north of the
city of Potosi for refining low grade ores, which opened in 1982,
and a silver and lead refining complex at Karichipampa, five
kilometers east of the city which is due to open in late 1983.
5. Bolivia was chosen in preference to Paraguay as the site for the
UFRD project for two other key reasons. First, the government there
had already recognised the need to improve spatial integration among
regions in order to achieve a more widespread pattern of economic
development. Second, the UFRD approach fitted in well with a nation-
wide Rural Development Planning Program, which the AID Mission in La
Paz had already organised in collaboration with the Ministry of
Planning and Coordination and five (later seven) Regional Develop-
ment Corporations.
6. For an account of growth pole strategies see Hansen (ed) (1972).
For one explanation of why they failed, see Conroy (1973).
7. Dennis A. Rondinelli and Kenneth Ruddle (1976) Urban Functions !a
Rural Development, Office of Urban Development, U.S. Agency for
International Development, Washington. Subsequently published as
Urbanization .anD Rural Development: A Spatial Policy fQ= Equitable
Growth, Praeger, New York, 1978.
8. The classic work on this subject, to which the authors of the UFRD
approach make frequent reference, is Johnson (1970).
9. Dennis A. Rondinelli (1980).
10. The evolution of the methodology is documented in Evans (1982), vol
II, pp 40-43.
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CHAPTER 3: TECHNICAL CRITERIA FOR EVOLVING A STRATEGY OF SPATIALLY
INTEGRATED DEVELOPMENT
The UFRD approach presented in the previous chapter provides both the
outlines of a strategy for integrated rural development, as well as a
methodological framework for organizing planning activities. This
provided the starting point for the application in Potosi, and the
planning team, under the direction of the resident adviser, adopted the
framework as their initial guideline for defining the studies to be made
and the data to be collected. Needless to say, however, as the project
advanced and members of the team became more familiar with the subject
matter, the UFRD concepts and methods were substantially amplified. As
will become evident in the next chapter, the development strategy
proposed in the five year Plan for Potosi clearly owes its origins to
the UFRD approach, but several additional elements have been introduced
in the course of evolving it. At the same time, the methodology was
modified to fit the goal of producing the Plan, and new steps were
introduced to address specific problems encountered along the way
The UFRD strategy for integrated development is of course only a first
approximation, based on two components for articulating the spatial
structure. The first of these is designed to consolidate and broaden
the hierarchy of central places, while the second aims to strengthen the
linkages among the main settlements, and between each center and its
rural hinterland.
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The precise form of this strategy for a given region, however, can only
be elaborated in light of more detailed technical studies which reveal
existing constraints to development and potential opportunities. In
Potosi, these studies focused on the main characteristics of the spatial
system - settlements, linkages, and accessibility - with the purpose of
providing information on three topics. First, the hierarchy of urban
settlements was analysed to identify the central places in the region,
and potential candidates for upgrading to higher level centers. Second,
a range of economic linkages were examined to find out which parts of
the region were weakly integrated into the urban-rural system, and to
identify key points in transportation, marketing, and production net-
works that needed improving. Third, a study of accessibility, combined
with the previous analyses, made it possible to delineate existing
functional economic areas of the region. This revealed which rural areas
were poorly served at present, and was later used as the basis for
defining viable areal units for planning and program design.
These technical studies form the subject of this chapter. After a short
note on the field surveys carried out to obtain the required data, we
provide a quick sketch of the Potosi region compared to other parts of
the country. We then summarize the main findings of each section of the
study, and conclude with an interpretation of the existing spatial
structure of the region. The next chapter shows how these technical
studies were used in the elaboration of the development strategy for
Potosi, and in the design of program packages for component areas of the
region.
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Data sources and field surveys.
One of the principles underlying the UFRD approach stressed the maximum
use of existing data. However, in Potosi there was little information on
the spatial dimensions of the regional economy, so the collection of
extensive original data was unavoidable. The project team carried out
three surveys simultaneously during a five week field trip. The first
embraced 112 settlements, which included virtually every place in the
Department with more than 200 inhabitants and even a few smaller ones.
In each settlement a survey team of two people interviewed a group of
knowledgeable community leaders, to obtain information on the principal
economic activities of the locality, the range of services and facili-
ties located there, and the extent of the area served by those estab-
lishments. This information was used for the analysis of the system of
settlements and their linkages.
The second survey covered the twenty largest markets in the region, and
was based on interviews with some thirty buyers and sellers in each one,
and a simple count of traders' stalls, which yielded information on the
market's area of influence, the range of goods traded there, and modes
of exchange. In the third survey, two hundred families in urban and
rural areas were interviewed to provide information for the accessi-
bility study on the frequency of visits and journey times to a group of
twenty five urban functions.
Baseline Resource Analysis.
The first of the analytical steps of the UFRD methodology was devoted to
preparing a socio-economic, demographic and physical profile of the
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region. This provided a quick preliminary overview based on existing
information, and was intended to be gradually amplified as further data
became available, so that later it could serve as a baseline for moni-
toring and evaluating changes over time in the region's economy and
spatial structure. This profile consisted of two parts: an lite-
reginal analysis in which the principal socio-economic characteristics
of Potosi were compared with the other eight Departments of Bolivia; and
an intra-regional analysis, based on a comparison of the provinces of
the Department to reveal variations within the Potosi region.
(a) Ih. inter-regional analysis.
A comparison of Potosi with other Departments of the country yields a
clear illustration of a familiar paradox: a region which for two
centuries provided the greater part of the wealth of the Spanish empire,
and more recently much of Bolivia's foreign earnings, is today the most
2
backward area of the country and falling still further behind2. The
source of the wealth comes from mining the rich and abundant mineral
deposits, originally silver and later tin and other metals, only a small
part of which even today has been surveyed, still less exploited. But as
is often the case, mining in Potosi is an enclave activity that has
created great wealth for some in distant places, but meager benefits for
the local population. Since the largest mines were nationalized in 1952,
the sector has suffered from poor management and underinvestment, to the
point where many mines are no longer profitable, and production declines
steadily.
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As may be deduced from the location coefficients in table 3.1, which are
based on the value of production in 1976, the mining sector dominates
the economy of Potosi. However, until recently, it had generated few
forward linkages to related activities, with the result that the indus-
trial sector was practically non-existent but for a few small food and
drink establishments. Currently, there is substantial investment from
abroad for the construction of large mineral processing plants using
capital intensive technology, although despite the large sums of money
involved, the local multiplier effects are again likely to be small.
While rich in minerals, the agricultural potential of this high moun-
tainous region, most of which lies at over 10,000 feet, is limited,
though far from fully exploited. The cold temperatures, low rainfall and
thin topsoil of the altiplano makes stock-raising difficult, while the
cultivation of crops is restricted to more fertile plains and temperate
valleys located in the east of the Department. Nevertheless, despite
these natural constraints, the agricultural sector in Potosi has
suffered most from negligence, disinvestment and lack of government
support. Output per worker in this sector is the lowest in the country
3
and in the period 1970-77 investment actually declined 3.0% each year
With the productive sectors of its economy in such poor shape, it was no
surprise to learn that the Department of Potosi exhibits all the
characteristics of a backward and lagging region. In 1976, per capita
income as measured by value of production was the lowest in the country
- at US$458, compared to highs of $802 in Oruro, $767 in Santa Cruz and
$637 for the country as a whole - and in the period 1970-77 output was
-32-
TABLE 3.1: SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF THE DEPARTHMENTS OF BOLIVIA.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Department P 76 %PR dP %M Y/P dY Ag Min Ind
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Potosi 657.7 71.0 0.99 -0.64 458 2.3 0.64 3.00 0.27
Chuquisaca 358.5 78.4 1.23 -0.59 515 5.8 1.82 0.40 0.73
La Paz 1465.0 52.4 2.07 -0.11 619 5.6 0.58 0.80 1.26
Cochabamba 721.0 62.3 1.79 -0.12 694 7.1 1.29 0.10 1.20
Santa Cruz 710.7 47.3 4.09 +1.49 767 8.0 1.23 0.80 1.00
Oruro 310.4 48.9 1.84 -0.51 802 6.0 0.41 2.30 0.93
STarija 187.2 61.1 2.28 +0.74 681 11.7 1.58 0.50 0.80
Beni 168.4 51.8 3.28 -0.61 595 13.0 2.41 0.00 0.40
Pando 34.5 89.4 2.88 +0.96 698 12.8 1.23 0.00 0.60
Nation 4613.5 58.3 2.05 - 637 6.3 - - -
P 76: Population 1976 dY : % annual growth of product 1970-77
%PR : % of population in rural areas (< 2000) Location quotients measured by value of product
dP : % annual population growth rate 1950-76 Ag : location coefficient for agriculture
%M : % annual migration rate 1970-76 Min: " mining
Y/P : GDP per capita in US$ 1976 Ind: " industry
Source: CORDEPO, Funciones Urbanas .l Desarrollo Rural: Resultados del Estudio .en Potosi, Vol. 1,
CORDEPO, Potosi, 1981.
growing at a laggardly 2.3% per annum compared to 6.3% for the nation
and over 10.0% in the frontier regions of the Pando and Beni. Faced with
such poor prospects, people have been leaving Potosi faster than any
other Department in search of jobs elsewhere in the country, a net
annual exodus of 6.4 people per thousand between 1971 and 1976, most of
them going to Santa Cruz, Cochabamba and Tarija.
This heavy out-migration, coupled with high mortality rates, resulted
in a population growth rate for Potosi of barely 1.0% p.a. during the
twenty six year period between censuses, which compares with 2.05% for
the country, and is again the lowest of all Departments. Thus, as a
proportion of the national total, the population of Potosi declined
from nearly a fifth in 1950 to a seventh in 1976. With only 15.3% of
its 658,000 inhabitants living in urban areas, defined as those with
more than 20,000 people, and a further 13.7% living in towns in the
category of 2,000 to 20,000, Potosi also emerges as one of the least
urbanized regions of Bolivia, some 71.0% remaining in small villages or
rural areas, which again reflects the almost total absence of manufac-
turing industries, and the general scarcity of alternative job oppor-
tunities in urban areas.
(b) la2& intra-regional analysis.
Within the Department of Potosi, the principal mining centers are
located in the north in the province of Bustillos around Llallagua and
Siglo XX; in the center around the city of Potosi and the famous Cerro
Rico, site of the original discovery of silver in 1545; and in the
southern provinces of Nor and Sud Chichas in the mountains around
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Atocha. (See map 3.1.) The cultivation of crops is confined to a tran-
sitional area of temperate valleys between the highlands to the west and
the lowlands further to the east, chief among which are wheat, potatoes,
corn, other vegetables and some fruits. On the altiplano itself and the
mountains which bound it - together the greater part of the Potosi
region - farming is restricted to the raising of sheep and llamas, and
to a lesser extent the growing of quinua, an indigenous and highly
nutritious cereal. Given the distribution of natural resources, few
people have settled in the western provinces, as few as one person to
five square kilometers in Sud Lipez, while most of the population is to
be found in the east of the Department, particularly Bustillos (41
inhabitants per square kilometer), Frias (36), and Saavedra (23).
As part of the intra-regional analysis, a series of fourteen development
indicators were calculated for the fifteen provinces, covering housing,
health, education, employment, income , transport and communications.
Most of these were derived from the population census or other published
statistics; a few were based on information later collected in the
survey of urban centers. Provinces were ranked according to each
indicator, and an index representing the relative level of development
was estimated on the basis of a weighted sum of the ranks5
The evidence shows a close relationship between the level of development
and the level of urbanization. (See columns 5 and 3 of table 3.2.)
This is hardly surprising, since it is easier and cheaper to provide
infrastructure to people concentrated in towns than to those dispersed
in the country. Furthermore, city dwellers have greater access to better
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G_ bt.
TARE 3.2: -- E CHARACTERISTI &F THE PROVIES OF POTSI
Population Density % Populn in Income Development
1976 people urban areas per cap. Index
Province /km2  (>1000) US$ 1976
Frias 122,810 35.9 63.0 678 78.4
Oniste 20,651 9.1 60.7 861 72.6
Bustillos 91,418 40.9 61.3 609 66.6
Sud Chichas 51,115 6.5 54.9 688 73.3
Quijarro 38,723 2.7 31.6 580 58.2
D. Campos 5,567 0.5 18.4 410 66.0
Nor Chichas 47,965 5.3 16.2 389 50.8
Ibanez 22,635 10.9 6.0 156 41.5
Chayanta 88,969 12.7 4.3 231 36.9
Linares 53,481 10.4 4.2 207 48.9
Saavedra 54,113 22.8 4.1 270 48.6
Sud Lipez 4,149 0.2 0.0 473 41.8
Nor Lipez 9,162 0.4 0.0 384 46.8
Bilbao 9,683 15.1 0.0 217 49.4
Charcas 32,302 10.9 0.0 191 34.5
Department 657,700 5.6 31.1 477
Source: CORDEPO, Funciones Urbanas 2. Desarrollo Rural: Resultados A
Estudio M Potoi, Vol. 1. Potosi, CORDEPO, 1981.
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health and education facilities, and to town-based jobs in manufac-
turing, commerce and other service industries that pay higher wages than
agriculture. In Potosi, residents of more urbanized areas tend to be
better paid, better housed, better educated, and in better health than
those who live in rural areas.
A breakdown of migration patterns at the provincial level confirmed the
general drift from the poorer, more backward, rural provinces to more
urbanized areas. In the period 1971-76, the five provinces with the
highest proportion of urban population were the only ones to register a
net gain in the inter-provincial exchange of migrants, as farmworkers
sought new jobs in the mining centers and larger towns. On the other
hand, in terms of migration to and from Departments outside Potosi,
only the frontier province of Omiste showed a net gain, no doubt due to
the position of Villazon as a staging post and point of departure for
Argentina, a pattern also found among the towns of northern Mexico along
the border with the United States, such as Tijuana, Mexicali and Ciudad
Juarez.
The Settlement Hierarchy.
In order to identify the principal central places in the region, and
spatial gaps in the distribution of these places, an analysis was made
of the hierarchy of urban settlements. This analysis was also used to
determine the kind of services, facilities, and other urban functions to
be found at each level of the hierarchy; to pinpoint missing functions
that might be impeding development; and to locate towns and villages
that might be suitable candidates for upgrading to higher level
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centers in those parts of the region which lacked them. This analysis of
settlements also included a review of the growth of urban centers, and
an overview of basic infrastructure in urban areas.
(a) Ib& growth 21 settlements.
Although Potosi is one of the least urbanized regions in Bolivia, it
possesses numerous settlements. Between 1950 and 1976 the number of
towns with more than 500 people almost doubled from 32 to 60, twenty of
which have upwards of 2,000 inhabitants, more than are to be found in
the Departments of Cochabamba and La Paz, which have larger populations.
The pattern of growth and decline among these settlements is remarkably
consistent: with few exceptions, the gainers are the mining centers and
the losers are farming towns. An important exception, however, is
Pulacayo, which in 1950 was the third largest town in Potosi with a
population of 7,700. Over the next twenty six years, it lost 70% of
its residents as the profitable mineral deposits were gradually ex-
hausted: a sharp reminder of the changing fortunes of such towns, many
of which have short lives.
(b) Ie urban hierarchv.
The definition of the urban hierarchy and the classification of settle-
ments at each level of the hierarchy was based on three criteria. The
first of these was simply the number of different functions to be found
in a given place, which gives a first approximation of the diversity of
activities to be found there. The second criterium was an index of
centrality, which provides another measure of functional complexity, in
which functions are weighted in inverse proportion to the number of
-39-
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settlements in which they occur in the region as a whole. Thus a
university, for example, which might be found only in the regional
center, receives a far higher weight than a junior school, which is
located in almost every settlement of any size.
The third criterion taken into account looked explicitly at the type of
functions to be found at each level of the urban hierarchy. Higher level
centers obviously contain certain facilities that are not to be found in
lower level settlements, such as banks, for example, technical insti-
tutes, or long distance telephone service. Based on the evidence in the
scalogram, groups of functions were selected as being representative of
different levels of the hierarchy. (See table 3.3) A town at one level
would normally be expected to contain most if not all of the amenities
of towns at lower levels. For a settlement to be classified at a given
level of the hierarchy, it had to possess a minimum number of functions
corresponding to that level or higher levels.
In each case the scalogram was used as the method of analysis. This is
essentially an inventory in the form of a matrix, which shows the func-
tions to be found in each settlement, the data for which was collected
through the survey of urban centers. As a preliminary step in construc-
ting a scalogram, settlements are ranked by size of population to the
left of the matrix, while functions are grouped by sectors such as
infrastructure, social services, and commercial activities, along the
top. The presence (or absence) of a given function in each place is
indicated in the matrix itself. The number of functions in each settle-
ment is found by summing the rows, while the frequency of occurrence of
-40-
each function is calculated by summing the columns. This done, a
revised version of the scalogram is prepared in which settlements are
this time ranked according to the number of functions they possess, and
7
functions are ordered from left to right according to their frequency
A reduced version of the scalogram for the Department of Potosi, which
includes the more representative functions but only half of the 112
settlements, is reproduced in figure 3.1. An examination of the data
suggests that the urban hierarchy consists of five tiers. (See table
3.3.) At the top is the regional center, the city of Potosi, with a
population in 1976 of 77,000 which possesses almost the full range of
the 58 functions listed, including several which occur only once in the
region, such as the university, the Prefecture, editorial offices of a
newspaper, a television station and regular air service.
At the second level are five towns with an average population of 12,500,
which effectively make up three sub-regional centers: Llallagua and
Uncia to the north, which may be treated as a single urban area; Uyuni
to the west; and Tupiza to the south. Subsequent analysis showed that
Villazon, on the border with Argentina, functioned less as a service
center for the surrounding population, more as an international trading
post. Counting Llallagua/Uncia as a single entity, these towns possessed
a similar range of between 43 and 46 functions, typical of which are
hospitals, daily markets, manufacturing industry, commercial banks, rail
service, long distance telephone service, and depositories of the Mining
Bank, where independent mining concerns can sell their output to the
government.
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TABLE 3.3: CHARACTERISTICS OF SETTLEMENTS AT EACH LEVEL OF THE URBAN
HIERARCHY.
Level Function Index Typical Functions Average %P
range range population
I Regional 56 675 Prefecture 77,334 11.7
center university
air service
television station
newspaper office
II Sub- 35-46 209-381 rail service 12,522 9.5
regional long distance telephone
center daily market
hospital
manufacturing industry
banks
farm suply stores
III Rural 20-28 87-156 inter-urban bus service 3,238 5.4
center newspaper delivery
radio communication
weekly market
health center
pharmacy
vehicle repair workshop
gas station
IV Local 13-23 46-92 post and telegraph office 1,371 5.2
doctor's clinic
high school
clothes store
V Villages 0-12 0-84 junior school 457 4.8
(non-central grocery store
places) drinking water
----------------------------------------------------------------
5P =percentage of the departmental population living in settlements
at level i
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source: CORDEPO, Funciones Urbanas =t _l Desarrollo Rural: Resultados
dl Estudio =i Potosi, Vol. 1. Potosi, CORDEPO, 1981.
In terms of functional complexity, there is a wide gap between the
second and third tiers of the hierarchy, the so-called rural service
centers, which include only eleven settlements with a mean population
size of 3,200, and a range of between 20 and 28 functions. Characteris-
tically these settlements contain weekly markets, health centers,
vehicle repair shops, some kind of training center, and a daily bus
service to other towns. At the fourth level, some 26 places with an
average population of 1370 meet at least two of the three criteria for a
local service center, containing anywhere from 13 to 23 functions, most
typically a post office, high school, doctor's clinic and clothing
store. The remaining 70 settlements fall into the fifth category of non-
central places, having twelve functions or less, usually those that
serve only the immediate residents, such as drinking water, electricity,
a food store or junior school.
A closer examination of the scalogram reveals a weak relationship bet-
ween the size of a settlement, measured by population, and its func-
tional complexity. Uyuni, for example, with barely a quarter of the
30,000 population of Llallagua/Uncia, has the same number of functions,
while Llica and Cotagaita with around 1,000 inhabitants each, have more
functions than Catavi, which has seven times the number of residents. A
look at the map quickly explains part of the reason: the distance from a
given center to its nearest lrger-sized neighbor. Thus Uyuni has no
competition for miles around, while Catavi is a mere five minute bus
ride from Llallagua. Another explanation stems from the favored treat-
ment of mining centers, which are often equipped with basic infra-
structure, health and education services, subsidized provision stores
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and other facilities, occasionally financed by the large private mining
companies, but usually by the semi-autonomous state mining corporation,
COMIBOL. A further factor is the low level of urbanization. With the
majority of Potosinos scattered in small villages and rural areas, the
population of a settlement is a poor guide to the number of people from
roundabout who use its services and facilities.
These results also reveal the presence of two overlapping urban hierar-
chies, one serving farmers and their families, the other the mining
population. At the top two levels of sub-regional and regional centers,
these two hierarchies coincide, but among the lower level centers they
become quite distinct, with few settlements serving both roles. The
majority of the mining towns are fairly new settlements, having been
formed since the population census of 1950. Compared with farming towns,
the mining centers tend to be equipped with better and more compre-
hensive services and facilities. Most of these are provided by COMIBOL
or other large mining companies, and their use is generally restricted
to company employees and their dependents. Thus they cannot be con-
sidered as service centers for the rural population.
Analysis of Linkages.
Empirical evidence in many parts of the world shows clearly that the
diffusion of social and economic development is closely related not only
to the form of the urban hierarchy but also to the network of linkages
which tie settlements together and connect them to their rural hinter-
8
lands . In addition to the foregoing analysis of the hierarchy of urban
settlements, a number of physical, economic, and service link-
ages were examined in order to reveal which components of the spatial
system were better articulated, which were poorly integrated or largely
isolated, and which parts of these networks needed to be strengthened.
Chief among the linkages to be examined were road and rail links; pro-
duction and marketing linkages; those related to the delivery of health
and education services; technological linkages associated with energy
and communications; and public administration linkages related to local
government offices. Information about physical linkages, such as roads,
long distance telephone lines, or electric power, was usually available
from the responsible public agency. But the main source of information
for most of the other kinds of linkages - those for production,
marketing, or services - came from the field surveys of urban centers
and the principal markets. Depending on the function in question, res-
pondents were asked where sellers were located and where their buyers
came from; and similarly, for producers and consumers, teachers and
students, doctors and patients.
The main picture to emerge from this analysis, was that the Department
is made up of four quite distinct sub-regions, centred on Llallagua/-
Uncia in the north, the city of Potosi in the middle, Uyuni in the west,
and Tupiza in the south. This was consistent with the findings of the
scalogram analysis, with the exception of the fifth second tier town,
Villazon, which is here shown to be less important as a service center
for the surrounding population due to the proximity of the more con-
veniently located town of Tupiza.
-46-
As expected, given the severe physical terrain of the region, the one
factor that influenced more than any other the intensity and direction
of linkages between places is the highway system. There are no paved
roads in Potosi, and few all weather dirt roads: the main ones connect
Potosi with Oruro to the northwest, Sucre to the east, and Villazon to
the south; and Llallagua/Uncia with Oruro and Sucre. The linkages
between towns lying along these routes are clearly stronger, while those
areas of the Department with poor road connections to the city of
Potosi, are likely to depend more on other regional centers - the
northwest on Oruro, the northeast on Cochabamba and Sucre.
Another feature which emerged from the linkage analysis is that despite
poor roads, limited public transport and the widespread reliance on
llamas and mules for shipping goods, people travel enormous distances.
To some extent this is due to the absence of facilities in nearby towns,
especially agricultural supply stores, for example, which are found in
only half a dozen places in the entire Department. But it is also due
to the poor standard of services in smaller centers, particularly
education and health care. It is commonplace for children in rural
areas to move far away from home in search of a full curriculum high
school. Similarly, while doctors and nurses clinics are scattered
liberally in all parts of the region, few are functioning properly due
to the lack of staff, supplies, or equipment. Thus, prospective
patients prefer to travel farther to a city with a larger facility in
order to ensure better attention.
Accessibility Study.
The analysis of settlements and linkages provided the overall dimensions
of the urban-rural system of the region. In an attempt to define with
greater precision the effective service area of a town, a new step in
the UFRD methodology was introduced in the Potosi study. This was an
accessibility model designed to measure the level of access of the
population in different zones of the region to specific services and
9functions . This model was also intended to be used to evaluate
alternative solutions for improving physical access, for example by
building facilities in new locations versus upgrading roads to existing
facilities.
The level of access is measured in terms of two factors. The first rep-
resents the convenience of travelling to a given service or facility,
which is high in those zones where there are many establishments within
easy reach, and declines as the number of establishments falls and the
travel time increases. The second factor represents the relative impor-
tance of the function, on the assumption that some (for example markets)
are more crucial than others (say a civil registrar's office) in the
daily life of the local residents. Relative importance is based on
observed travel patterns, and is estimated in terms of the average
frequency of visits, the average time of travel, and the proportion of
the population that normally uses that function. For the purposes of
evaluating alternative solutions for improving access, the model
includes a third factor - population - to arrive at the zone's total
accessibility.
Construction of the model required a fair amount of data. Much of this
was culled from existing sources, some came from the survey of settle-
ments, but the need for information on travel patterns led to the
separate survey described above of some two hundred families in urban
and rural areas.
This household survey yielded a wealth of information on the relation-
ship between journey times and frequency of visits to twenty-five func-
tions, including health and education facilities, several kinds of shops
and stores, public offices, and services for mining and agriculture.
Not surprisingly, schools emerged as the function visited most often -
informants almost invariably claimed that their children never missed a
day during the term - at an average journey time of fifteen minutes.
(See table 3.4) Next most frequent are visits to the grocery store, once
or twice a week with an average travel time of about half an hour; to
markets, nearly three times a month with a mean two hour journey time;
and for cooking and heating fuel, twice a month at about an hour and
twenty minutes.
Among different functions the distance decay relationship, reflecting
the drop off in frequency of visits as journey time increases, varied
widely. It fell off most rapidly in the case of grocery stores, more
gradually for other kinds of shops and stores, still less for markets,
and hardly at all for hospitals, health centers,. and agricultural supply
services. Based on the method adopted here, the most important function
turned out to be the market, followed by the grocery store, fuel store,
pharmacy, junior and junior-high schools, and post offices. By this
TABLE 3.4: FUNCTION WEIGHTS FOR THE ACCESSIBILITY MODEL
Function Number of NJ Tj Pj Weight
observations
Market 179 32 2.15 1.00 68.8
Grocery store 100 73 0.54 1.00 39.4
Cooking and heating fuel store 151 24 1.39 1.00 33.4
Radiocommunication and t'phones 17 15 1.33 1.00 (20.0)
Pharmacy 141 5 2.03 1.00 10.1
Junior school 159 200 0.27 0.16 8.6
Banks 11 12 1.34 0.49 (7.9)
Junior-high school 82 196 0.29 0.13 7.4
Post and telegraph office 94 10 0.73 1.00 7.3
Mineral processing plant 6 44 1.22 0.13 (7.0)
Shoe and clothing store 180 2 3.04 1.00 6.1
Silo or farm produce storage 3 2 4.40 0.60 (5.3)
Mining Bank depository 8 12 3.24 0.13 (5.1)
High school 43 200 0.25 0.10 5.0
Training center 6 200 0.30 0.08 (4.8)
Hospital or health center 224 3 1.56 1.00 4.7
Domestic appliance store 103 1 3.80 1.00 3.8
Farm produce processing plant 48 3 1.95 0.60 3.5
Hardware store 65 1 3.32 1.00 3.3
Farm tools and equipment store 60 1 4.85 0.60 2.9
Seeds and fertilizer store 51 1 4.61 0.60 2.8
Prefect/mayor/civil registrar 133 2 1.03 1.00 2.1
Doctor's clinic or nurse's post 146 2 0.92 1.00 1.8
Police station or magistrate 84 4 0.35 1.00 1.4
Nj -average number of visits per year to function j
Tj = average time in hours of journeys to function j
Pj = proportion of the population that normally uses the function j
Weighting factor Wj = Nj x Tj x Pj
Figures in (parentheses) should be interpreted cautiously due to the
limited number of observations.
Source: CORDEPO, Funciones Urbanas a I Desarrollo Rural: Resultados del
Estudio a Potosi, Vol. 2, CORDEPO, Potosi, 1981.
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reckoning local health facilities and agricultural supply stores appear
among the least important functions, due to the small number of visits.
However this probably reflects the existing scarcity of such establish-
ments, more than an estimation of their inherent value.
While the results varied widely among different functions, two con-
clusions are clear. First, overall accessibility throughout the Potosi
region is extremely poor: if "effective " service is defined as 50% or
more of the level of access that is observed in urban centers, then less
than 20% of the population is adequately served. (See map 3.2) Second,
the better served areas with higher levels of access are those lying
adjacent to the main roads within close reach of the larger urban
centers. As roads deteriorate and distances increase, levels of access
fall off sharply, to the point where many areas have little or no access
at all to some functions, such as markets, hospitals and high schools,
especially in the northeast and much of the west of the Department.
Interpretation of the Existing Spatial Structure.
The whole purpose of the spatial analysis was to reach conclusions about
the existing settlement structure of the region, and what this implies
for planning future development. In order to elaborate the details of a
strategy of spatially integrated developmnet, planners need to know
specifically which areas of the region are better articulated, and which
others are weakly integrated into the urban-rural system, or have poor
access to town-based services.
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In this respect, it is helpful to borrow loosely some ideas from central
place theory, particularly the notion of a hierarchy of urban settle-
ments, each with its surrounding market area 10. In a region such as
Potosi, where assumptions of a flat plain and homogeneous distribution
of resources are so obviously violated, the real world situation is
unlikely to bear much resemblance to the neat regularity predicted by
theory. Nevertheless, the concept of a hierarchy of central places and
graduated market areas, or functionally economic areas, matched against
empirical findings, helps to identify spatial and functional "gaps" in
the system: areas which lack urban service centers where the model
suggests they might be expected; and functions which are absent in
towns where the scalogram analysis suggests they might be found.
An interpretation of the spatial structure of the Potosi region is
represented in map 3.3. For planning purposes the region was taken to
be synonomous with the political unit of the Department. However, in
terms of its functioning as an economic unit, many peripheral areas of
the Department are more closely tied to adjacent regional centers,
particularly the northwest with Oruro, the extreme north with
Cochabamba, the northeast with Sucre, and parts of the west with Calama
in Chile. Within the region, as was noted earlier, four sub-regions are
clearly discernible. However, due to the large distances involved, the
influence of Uyuni as a sub-regional center in the west weakens to the
south and on the far side of the salt flats in the province of Daniel
Campos.
-53-
Map 3.3 EXISTING SPATIAL STRUCTURE
2:
At the third level of the hierarchy, the situation becomes patchy. Many
areas adjacent to good roads have reasonable access to rural service
centers, and thus may be regarded as integrated into the urban-rural
system. However, many other areas lack rural service centers, including
some of the more densely populated parts of the north and middle, and
hence should be defined as poorly integrated, in some cases not at all.
At the fourth level of the hierarchy, the local areas, the system is
particularly weak, due to the dearth of small towns equipped with
adequate facilities to perform the role of local service centers.
In short, while it may be said that some elements of an articulated
spatial system are in place in the Potosi region - principally along
the main roads - many pieces are missing. Large areas are poorly inte-
grated: some are quite isolated. The process of urbanization is still at
an early stage and few towns possess the infrastructure necessary to
function as service centers. Most serious of all, the widespread lack
of adequate secondary roads means that most towns are weakly linked to
their rural hinterlands.
Footnotes
1. For a more detailed account of the adaptations made to the UFRD
methodology in Potosi, see Evans (1982) vol II, ch 3.
2. During the mid 1600s Potosi was the largest city in the western
hemisphere and one of the richest mining centers in South America.
For a description of the city at the peak of its power and wealth,
see Hanke (1956).
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3. Cupe (1981) table 7.
4. Estimates were made of per capita income levels in each of the
provinces based on output per unit of labor in each sector at the
departmental level, and sectoral employment in each province. This
assumes that labor productivity is constant across all provinces,
which is obviously untrue, but in the absence of alternative data it
provides at least a first approximation. Thus, income per capita in
province i, Y , is calculated as follows:
1 n
Y =---- N. x y ; with y. = Y /N.
P. j=1
where P = population of the province i
N = labor in sector j in province i
Y9 = output in sector j in the Department
N = labor in sector j in the Department
5. To arrive at a development index, the results were aggregated in the
following manner. For each indicator the difference between the top
and bottom score was divided into three equal parts, and the
provinces were classified accordingly as more developed, less
developed, and least developed. Since the number of indicators for
each aspect under consideration varied from one to four, depending
on available data, they were assigned different weights to balance
the importance attached to each variable. Provinces were then ranked
according to the weighted sum of their scores.
6. For an explanation of how to calculate centrality indices, see
Rondinelli (1980) pp 29-30.
7. For the purposes of defining the urban system it is important to
take into account only those functions that are representative of a
settlement's role as a service center. The first version of the
scalogram prepared in Potosi included the complete inventory of
information collected from the survey of urban centers, covering
over 120 functions in 112 settlements. This was useful as a reference
base, but in order to define the settlement system a second version
of the scalogram was prepared, in which many less significant items,
such as basketball courts, billiard saloons and cafes were elimina-
ted, and the list was reduced to the 58 functions considered to be
the best indicators of functional complexity.
8. See for example Stohr (1974).
9. The accessibility model is described in more detail in Evans (1982)
vol I, ch 5, and vol II, appendix.
10. For the classic formulation of central place theory, see Christaller
(1966); for a survey of central place studies, see Berry and Pred
(1967).
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CHAPTER 4. POLICIES, PLANS, AND BUDGETS
The last chapter described the technical studies that were made prior to
the elaboration of policies and the identification of projects. In this
chapter we focus on the plans and budgets prepared during the period
1979 through 1982. Our concern is to record how policies were evolved,
to identify the main elements of the strategy for integrated develop-
ment, and to trace the transition of these policies into the annual
operating plans. In the next chapter we will document the execution of
these plans, comparing intent with action, or what was planned with what
was actually carried out.
In examining this application of an integrated approach to development,
we want to see to what extent it was implemented, and how it changed the
Corporation's behaviour. We will do this first by looking at the poli-
cies which emerged from the technical studies, and then by tracing their
transition into ongoing activities of the Corporation. In effect we will
be comparing the formal expression of policies for integrated develop-
ment as set down in the Regional Development Plan published in the
spring of 1982, with the annual operating budgets for the years 1979
through 1983, which show projected income and intended expenditures.
At first blush, it might be thought that if the five year plan was only
released in 1982, not enough time would have elapsed for its impact to
be registered on the Corporation's annual operating plans. In some minor
respects this may be true, but in terms of major policy directions, this
is not the case. The Plan's contents were more or less determined in the
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fall of 1981, and the broad outlines of policy had been taking shape
since the appointment of the new planning director in the spring of
1979. Thus policy directions were feeding into annual budgets from 1980
onwards, and by the time the 1982 budget was prepared in the fall of
1981, details of program packages for selected areas of the region were
already well advanced.
Evolution of the integrated development policy in Potosi.
As the reader is no doubt aware, there are almost as many versions of
integrated rural development as there are projects by that name. In the
Department of Potosi, for example, a UNICEF-funded program in two or
three of the smallest settlements in one corner of the province of
Saavedra occupied a large team of technicians from local agencies in
translating the communities' felt needs into realizable projects, mainly
for drinking water, housing, nutrition and health care. Another program,
PNDRI, funded by the United Nations Development Program, never got off
the ground, but its intention was to start with whatever small project
the community identified as a priority, and to use that as a way of
1
building up the community's capability for self-help and self-reliance
Both these projects, and many like them, take a bottom up perspective,
ignoring the larger spatial and economic dimensions of regional
development.
However, the variant of integrated development which gradually evolved
at CORDEPO can be traced back to two main sources, one being the UFRD
approach, which stresses the spatial dimensions of development, and the
other being a more conventional view of area-based intersectoral
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2development, best represented by the Rehovot school2. From the UFRD
approach came a focus on integration at the level of the region, through
the articulation of the spatial structure and the incorporation of
outlying or peripheral areas into the urban-rural system, to be achieved
through the consolidation of selected urban service centers, and the
strengthening of the links among those central places and their rural
hinterlands. From the Rehovot approach came the emphasis on developing
the economic base of the area in question, especially agriculture, and
establishing appropriate institutional mechanisms to facilitate
coordination among the many public agencies involved.
The Potosi approach to integrated development, therefore, represented a
top down perspective, and stressed the spatial articulation of the
urban-rural system, coupled with the comprehensive development of
selected areas based on productive potential. In this approach, the sub-
region, and even the larger region beyond, provided the spatial context
for defining the component areas to serve as basic units for planning
development and designing programs. Instead of looking at projects
piecemeal, or from a multi-disciplinary standpoint, the main thrust or
innovation in Potosi was the spatial dimension of development, stressing
the location of activities and the consolidation or creation of urban
service centers. Instead of each government agency going its own way,
the Potosi approach tried to introduce a broader framework that would
facilitate collaboration among those working in the same area, such that
the cumulative impact of the separate actions might be maximised.
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Elements of the Potosi strategy of integrated development.
At the level of the region as a whole, the Regional Development Plan
specifies two objectives to be accomplished, both of which are concerned
with equity: to maximise the growth of the local economy in order to
reduce the gap in income levels between the region and the rest of the
country; and to reduce the even wider gap within the region between
3
urban and rural areas
To accomplish these objectives, the plan proposes a strategy of inte-
grated development made up of five key elements. In global terms, it
proposes that (1) agriculture should form the cornerstone of development
policy, and that (2) investments should be distributed more evenly
throughout the region - rather_ than being concentrated in the city of
Potosi, as had traditionally been the case. In spatial terms, the Plan
proposes a two-pronged strategy for articulating the urban-rural system,
(3) through consolidating the hierarchy of urban settlements, and (4)
through strengthening key linkages connecting larger centers, and tying
them more closely to their rural hinterlands. In addition the Plan
proposes that (5) development should be organized on the basis of
geographical areas, rather than by sectors, which had previously been
the practice.
In order to trace how this strategy of integrated development has been
implemented in Potosi, and to measure the impact it has had on the
ongoing activities of the Corporation, we will examine the evidence
related to each of these policy elements in turn. We will first review
the specific recommendations included in the Regional Plan, and then
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look at the annual operating plans and other sources to determine the
extent to which each component has been addressed or implemented, or is
likely to be implemented given past experience. In each case our objec-
tive is to document the transition from plans and policies into budgets
and actions, to identify factors which intervene along the way, and to
explain why outcomes diverge from original intentions.
Agriculture as the cornerstone of development policy.
Shortly after his appointment in the spring of 1979, the director of
planning announced the intention of shifting the focus of Corporation
investments away from public works to directly productive activities. At
that time it was anticipated these would be industries related to the
processing of minerals, which historically had always been the region's
- and the country's - greatest natural resource . However, as work on
the development plan progressed, and partly as a result of his atten-
dance at a seminar in Rehovot, Israel, in the fall of 1980, the director
of planning became convinced that the emphasis would be better put on
agriculture.
The choice of agriculture as the cornerstone of development policy is
not so obvious in a region where the principal economic activity has
always been mining, and the agricultural potential of the region is not
rich in comparison with other parts of the country. The reasons,
however, have to do with efficiency, equity, and political expediency.
Public intervention in the mining sector is virtually the exclusive
preserve of the national mining corporation, COMIBOL, which acts to all
intents and purposes as an autonomous fiefdom, impervious to outside
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control. The more important mineral processing industries are handled by
agencies of the central government such as QUIMBABOL and FNEM. Further-
more, the size of the funds required for many processing plants are far
beyond the resources available to the Corporation. Thus, even had it
wanted to intervene in these sectors, CORDEPO's scope for action would
have been restricted to small scale, largely peripheral activities.
The economic reasons for stressing agriculture, however, are more
compelling. As was pointed out in the previous chapter, there is ample
historical evidence to show that mining in Potosi is a classic example
of an enclave activity: while it has produced great wealth for national
and foreign enterprises, it has generated few benefits for the local
population in Potosi itself. _Moreover, even though the agricultural
potential of the region may not be as great as elsewhere, it is often
under-estimated, and has only been partially exploited. Due to the
widespread lack of roads in many areas, much farming is at subsistence
levels, yet there are considerable opportunities for producing surpluses
to be marketed in nearby cities and towns. Moreover, the principal means
of livelihood for the majority of the workforce is still agriculture,
and given the policy objective of improving the welfare of the rural
poor, the plan seeks to focus development efforts on the farming
population.
Apart from the equity argument, there were other considerations relevant
to longer term national objectives for economic development. Bolivia is
a poor country with a small population and an incipient industrial
sector. Efforts to encourage domestic manufacturing have foundered in
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the past because of the lack of a local market sufficiently large to
permit significant economies of scale. Before Bolivian industry can
grow, or create new employment opportunities to absorb surplus labor
from agriculture, it is essential to raise income levels of the majority
of the population in order to expand effective domestic demand. Since
most of the population is still living in rural areas, this can only be
accomplished by a broad-based policy of rural development, which is thus
not merely desirable from from an equity standpoint, but an essential
precondition for the longer term economic prosperity of the country.
Stressing agriculture as the basis of regional development policy is one
thing: translating this into practice turns out to be quite another.
Looking at the figures from the five year plan for projected total
investment, we find that other sectors take precedence. (See table 4.1)
The largest share, 26%, goes to mining, followed by transportation
(22%), and industry (16%), much of which is highly capital intensive,
and only then comes agriculture with 15%. These figures, of course,
reflect investment from all sources, including not just CORDEPO, but
other public agencies, especially those of the central government, as
well as private investments, both national and foreign. As such, the
distribution among sectors conforms to historical patterns and national
priorities, since mining in Potosi is the country's largest single
source of foreign exchange earnings.
Projected investment by CORDEPO for the five year period amounts to only
10% of the total from all sources. Some of the largest projects - for
mining, mineral processing, and other heavy industries - are funded by
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TABLE 4.1: PROJECTED INVESTMENT BY SECTORS DURING THE FIVE YEARS OF THE
REGIONAL DEVELOPHENT PLAN 1983-1987.
(Millions of 1981 Bolivian pesos.)
All
Sources % CORDEPO % C/A%
A B C D E
Agriculture 2350.3 14.9 300.2 18.3 12.8
Mining 4148.8 26.2 67.7 4.1 1.6
Industry 2611.4 16.5 237.2 14.4 9.1
Construction 372.2 2.4 - - 0.0
subtotal 9482.7 60.0 605.1 36.9 6.4
Energy 429.2 2.7 30.4 1.8 7.1
Transport and 3523.0 22.3 907.8 55.3 25.8
Communications
subtotal 3952.2 25.0 938.2 57.1 23.7
Commerce and Finance 419.7 2.6 -- - 0.0
Government 1120.5 7.1 98.3 6.0 8.8
Housing finance 749.2 4.7 - - 0.0
Other services 82.6 0.5 - - 0.0
subtotal 2372.1 15.0 98.3 6.0 4.1
Total 15807.0 100.0 1641.6 100.0 10.4
Source: CORDEPO: Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo Regional, table XX-13.
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agencies of the central government often with substantial contributions
from foreign enterprises and international development organizations.
These investments swamp the small sums available to local entities, and
emphasise that CORDEPO's ability to influence the overall direction of
regional policy is strictly limited.
Nevertheless, even when we come to the Corporation's own investment
plan, we find that emphasising agriculture does not mean allocating the
most funds to it (table 4.1, col C). The largest share, a massive 55%,
is absorbed by transportation and communications, representing for the
most part the construction and improvement of highways and byways. Agri-
culture comes a distant second with 18%, followed by industry with 14%.
Though this appears inconsistent with stated policy, the reason is quite
straightforward. As was explained in the previous chapter, the Depart-
ment of Potosi suffers from appalling roads, lacking highways to some of
the areas with the best potential for development, and adequate rural
links almost everywhere. It was argued that this represented one of the
chief obstacles not only to raising farm incomes, but also to diffusing
growth to smaller towns and rural areas. The plan thus recognizes that
an essential preliminary to any strategy for rural development must be
the establishment of an adequate road network.
The attempt to convert the public works committee to a regional develop-
ment corporation only really becomes apparent when we look at the change
in the pattern of CORDEPO investments over the duration of the Plan.
(Table 4.2) True, transportation and communications receives over 50% of
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TABLE 4.2: PLANNED INVESTMENT OF CORDEPO FUNDS BY SECTORS FOR THE FIVE YEARS OF THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PLAN 198 3-198T.
(Millions of 1981 Bolivian pesos)
1 9 8 3 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 5 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 7
Sectors planned % planned % planned % planned % planned %
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Agriculture
Mining
Industry
Construction
sub-total
Energy
Transport & Communs
sub-total
Commerce & Finance
Government
Housing Finance
Other services
sub-total
Total
28.1 10.77
20.5
39.4
0
88.0
4.7
145.9
150.6
0
22.2
0
0
22.2
260.8
7.86
15.11
.00
33.74
1.80
55.94
57.75
.00
8.51
.00
.00
8.51
100.00
46.0 15.37
18.6 6.22
29.5 9.86
0 .00
94.1 31.45
6.0 2.01
181.2 60.56
187.2 62.57
0 .00
17.9 5.98
0 .00
0 .00
17.9 5.98
299.2 100.00
Source: CORDEPO: Plan Quinquenal de Desarrollo Regional, table XX-18.
0~
0~
63.4
10.9
57.8
0
'132.1
5.9
169.7
175.6
0
16.8
0
0
16.8
324.5
19.54
3.36
17.81
.00
40.71
1.82
52.30
54.11
.00
5.18
.00
.00
5.18
100.00
70.8
8.5
53.6
0
132.9
6.5
205.8
212.3
0
20.9
0
0
20.9
366.1
19.34
2.32
14.64
.00
36.30
1.78
56.21
57.99
.00
5.71
.00
.00
5.71
100.00
92.0
9.1
56.9
0
158.0
7.3
205.7
213.0
0
21.0
0
0
21.0
392.0
23.47
2.32
14.52
.00
40.31
1.86
52.47
54.34
.00
5.36
.00
.00
5.36
100.00
total spending in each of the five years, dropping only slightly towards
the end. On the other hand, investment in directly productive activities
moves up towards 40%, rising steadily in agriculture from 11% in the
first year to 23% in the fifth year. Spending on industry hovers around
the 15% mark, mainly for processing agricultural products, but in line
with the decision to leave mining to other government agencies,
CORDEPO's investments in this sector fall from 8% to around 2%.
Meanwhile, urban infrastructure, which traditionally used to get 25% of
the budget or more, is cut right back to around 5%.
When we look at the operating plans for the years 1979 to 1983, we can
discern an attempt to translate these policies into practice, albeit
with mixed success. (See table _4.3) Figures for the period 1979 through
1981 indicate that projected spending in the transportation sector
declined from 43% of the total to 23%, while the share devoted to
agriculture increased from 10% to 23%. Treating tourism as one of four
productive activities, projected spending on these sectors in this
period rose from 30% to 49% of the total, all of which is well in line
with the policy of switching from public works to directly productive
activities.
Then in 1982 a big shift occurs in the opposite direction, apparently
contradicting stated policy and returning to a situation far more
extreme than in 1979. In part this reflects the realization, recorded
earlier, that rural transportation links are an essential prerequisite
for boosting agricultural productivity and output, as a result of which
the budget for rural roads in 1982 was tripled from the year before.
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TABLE 4.3: PLANNED INVESTHENT OF CORDEPO FUNDS BY SECTORS 1979-83.
(Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
197 9
Sector planned %total
198 0
planned %total
1981
planned %total
198 2
planned %total
198 3
planned %total
Agriculture
Industry
Tourism
Mining
Commerce
sub total
Energy
Transport
Communications
sub total
Urban works
Water & sewage
Education
Health
Others*
sub total
195774 100.00 300160 100.00 315076 100.00 610145 100.00 1175601 100.00
*Mainly for area-based integrated development programs.
Source: CORDEPO: Planes ODerativos for 1979 through 1983.
I~
19877
16322
6391
13175
3000
58765
2849
79243
2226
84318
12677
31341
1381
390
6903
52691
10.15
8.34
3.26
6.73
1.53
30.02
1 .46
40.48
1.14
43.07
6.48
16.01
.71
.20
3.53
26.91
38667
23907
15930
10434
1170
90108
14433
69611
17518
101561
26180
52904
7480
4981
16947
108491
12.88
7.96
5.31
3.48
.39
30.02
4.81
23.19
5.84
33.84
8.72
17.63
2.49
1.66
5.65
36.14
72336
40587
23549
16371
2500
155343
16439
50878
4706
72023
19555
40428
6417
3494
17815
87710
22.96
12.88
7.47
5.20
.79
49.30
5.22
16.15
1.49
22.86
6.21
12.83
2.04
1.11
5.65
27.84
41436
1800
11149
23345
0
77730
12960
414394
0
427354
24056
35550
2365
20000
23090
105062
6.79
.30
1.83
3.83
.00
12.74
2.12
67.92
.00
70.04
3.94
5.83
.39
3.28
3.78
17.22
TOTAL
119725
0
23573
31541
0
174839
23680
444177
0
467857
28633
241545
21506
8380
232841
532905
10.18
.00
2.01
2.68
.00
14.87
2.01
37.78
.00
39.80
2.44
20.55
1.83
.71
19.81
45.33
The main explanation, however, for the sharp increase in planned
spending on transportation arises from the changing fortunes of the two
largest projects in the budget: the airport improvement program, and the
Potosi-Tarapaya highway link. Between them, they accounted for one fifth
of total projected spending in 1979, one sixth in 1980, and only a small
fraction in 1981. Although this appears consistent with the newly
emerging policies favoring productive activities and the rural sector,
an important contributing factor was that Corporation chiefs were less
successful in raising funds for these projects, due in part to the
departure in July 1980 of the two people most closely involved with
them. Following the military coup of that year, the President of the
Corporation was replaced, and the managing director decided the moment
was opportune to pursue further studies abroad. Both had been ardent
advocates of these two projects, and the President was instrumental in
launching an airline company the previous year offering passenger
service between Potosi and La Paz. The airport improvement program was
needed to permit year round operations at Potosi for the small aircraft
of the newly established airline.
However, during the course of 1981, Corporation chiefs once again
managed to raise funds for these two projects. Being close to the City
of Potosi and therefore very visible, they had by then attracted
considerable criticism from city residents who were loudly complaining
about the lack of progress and the repeated postponement of projected
completion dates. In the case of the Potosi-Tarapaya link, a large loan
was secured from Fonplata, the river Plate fund set up by Bolivia,
Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay and Argentina, which amounted to a hefty 39%
of the already inflated 1982 budget.
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To sum up, we can say that while the operating budgets do reflect
ongoing shifts in policy emphasis, the larger goals of redirecting the
Corporation's efforts to productive activities, and the attendant
strategy of making agriculture the cornerstone of development, has yet
to be translated convincingly into a consistent longer term pattern. In
part this is because it was decided that the construction and upgrading
of the main roads and rural feeder links should precede concerted
efforts to boost agricultural production. But to a larger extent, the
major oscillation in the sectoral allocation of funds reflects the
continuation of two expensive, high-profile transportation projects, to
which considerable prestige is attached by Potosinos, and which in many
ways are regarded as a test of the Corporation's ability to contribute
to the advance of the region.
Spatial equity in the allocation of investments.
In attempting to make the transition from a public works committee to a
regional development corporation, the CORDEPO leadership was concerned
not only to shift resources from urban infrastructure into more directly
productive activities, but also to reduce the concentration of spending
in the city of Potosi and other larger towns, and to spread investments
throughout the region.
At the same time, one of the major objectives stated in the five year
plan was to achieve a more equitable pattern of development within the
region by reducing the gap in income levels between the inhabitants of
urban and rural areas. As we saw from table 3.2 in the previous chapter,
this ranges from a high of US$861 per capita in the province of Omiste
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in the south on the border with Argentina, which includes the frontier
trading town of Villazon, to a low of only US$156 in the province of
Ibanez in the northern corner of the region, which is virtually cut of
from elsewhere by the absence of roads5
In one sense of course, nearly all the actions proposed in the Plan are
oriented one way or another to the goal of raising income levels in the
more backward parts of the region, most obviously through the emphasis
on agriculture. In addition, the underlying and implicit goal behind the
UFRD strategy of spatially integrated development is the raising of the
standards of living of the rural population. This is intended to be
achieved by strengthening the spatial articulation of the urban-rural
system, which is assumed to beinstrumental in improving access of the
rural population to urban based services for agricultural production and
marketing, and specifically to the generally better facilities found in
larger towns for education and health care. Furthermore, the integration
of outlying rural areas is designed both to expand potential demand for
town-based activities, and at the same time to open up new opportunities
for subsistence farmers living in those parts of the region hitherto cut
off from markets for their produce.
It is of course far too early to attempt to measure the impact of these
policies on the incomes of rural families. However, a more direct and
immediate measure of the Corporation's progress in advancing towards its
newly assigned task of overall regional deveopment, and the goal of
spatial equity, is given by the areal allocation of planned investments.
Whereas the previous section examined shifts in the distribution of
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resources among sectors, here we investigate, therefore, shifts among
areas of the region.
There are two ways we can do this, both of which have their limitations.
As the basis for the areal disaggragation of spending, we can use either
the standard administrative unit of the province, or areal planning
units delineated on the basis of the spatial studies as approximating
functional economic areas of the region. In both cases, the size of
population varies widely, from over a hundred thousand in the province
of Tomas Frias - or area of Potosi - to a low of barely four thousand in
the sparsely populated south western corner of the Department. Of the
two, the planning units are preferable as the basis of comparison,
partly because they vary less in geographical size, but mainly because
it relates to the discussion later on concerning the strategy of area-
based development. We will not at this point, however, go into the
procedure or reasoning behind the delineation of these areal units,
6
since this is discussed more appropriately in a later section
Table 4.4 shows planned spending in each of the seventeen areas of the
Potosi region for the period 1979-82 . The additional category marked
"Department" includes all investments that are not area specific or
which cannot easily be attributed to particular locations, for example
surveys of natural resources, minerals and soils, and projects for
region-wide afforestation, and the hire of mining and agricultural
machinery to small scale family concerns.
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TABLE 4.4: PLANNED INVESTMENT OF CORDEPO FUNDS BY AREAS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI 1979-1982.
(Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
1979 1980 1981 1982
Area B$ % B$ % B$ % B$ %
1 N. of Potosi
2 Bustillos
3 Chayanta
5* Potosi
6 Betanzos
7 Quijarro East
8 Vitichi
9 Cotagaita
10 Atocha
11 Tupiza
12 Villazon
13 Rio Mulatos
14 Uyuni
15 Daniel Campos
16 Nor Lipez
17 S.P.de Lipez
18 Sud Lipez
Department
Total
3080 1.6 3909 1.3 8482 2.7 5000 0.8
10592 5.5 13109 4.4 9405 3.0 12091 2.0
1856 1.0 7377 2.5 4602 1.5 1047 0.2
92146 47.9 120104 40.7 94062 30.5 369654 60.9
6852 3.6 16145 5.5 16162 5.2 12229 2.0
3280 1.7 7140 2.4 5471 1.8 2333 0.4
2259 1.2 10405 3.5 12781 4.1 10550 1.7
5736 3.0 _ 5132 1.7 7817 2.5 5842 1.0
1414 0.7 5089 1.7 11754 3.8 5680 0.9
860 0.4 12407 4.2 10570 3.4 16755 2.8
8654 4.5 3538 1.2 0 0.0 41 0.0
6096 3.2 9224 3.1 16971 5.5 15130 2.5
8045 4.2 12666 4.3 8354 2.7 2953 0.5
223 0.1 2455 0.8 5038 1.6 10827 1.8
380 0.2 0 0.0 0 0.0 1645 0.3
0 0.0 78 0.0 0 0.0 23 0.0
2744 1.4 2533 0.9 4750 1.5 3568 0.6
38204 19.8 63496 21.5 92100 29.9 131924 21.7
192421 100.0 294807 100.0 308319 100.0 607292 100.0
*Area #4 was subsequently absorbed into area #5 Potosi.
Source: CORDEPO: Planos Operativos for 1979 through 1982.
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Taking the first issue of deconcentrating investments from the city of
Potosi, the pattern that emerges is similar to what we saw in the
sectoral analysis, and for much the same reasons. During the period 1979
through 1982, planned investments in the area of the departmental
capital, area #5, did indeed decline proportionately in accordance with
policy intentions, falling quite markedly from 48% in 1979 to 30% two
years later. But, as was the case with the sectoral allocation of
resources, the picture reverses dramatically the following year in 1982,
rising to 61%, far above what it had been at the start. This is due
primarily, as before, to the wide oscillation in the fortunes of the two
prestige projects for airport reconstrucion and the Potosi-Tarapaya
highway link, both of which are located in this area.
The second issue of achieving a more equitable spread of investments
among other parts of the region is of course directly related to the
first. For the period 1979 through 1981, the areas that were scheduled
to benefit most from increased spending include: Betanzos, for a rural
development project sponsored by UNICEF; Vitichi, for hooking it up to
the national electricity grid; Tupiza, for urban infrastructure; and
Atocha, for new rural roads. The only areas where spending was scheduled
not to increase much, or to be cut, where those with the larger towns:
Uyuni, Villazon, and Bustillos in the north with Llallagua and Uncia. In
1982, however, despite a substantially larger budget, spending outside
the Potosi area was planned to rise only in Bustillos, Tupiza, Daniel
Campos, and Nor Lipez, while it was reduced in all others.
To conclude, we can say as before that although operating plans do
reflect shifts in ongoing policy, this was totally upset by the reverse
in 1982 arising from the funding upturns of the two major projects.
However, even after these are accounted for, there still remains a
significant reversal of the trend in previous years, as witnessed by the
fall in spending scheduled for all but four of the areas outside the
Departmental capital. Once again, while some progress was made in the
years from 1979 to 1981, this has yet to be consolidated into a
consistent and enduring pattern.
The Consolidation of the Urban Settlement Hierarchy.
In spatial terms, CORDEPO's five year Plan adopts the notion embodied in
the UFRD approach to integrated development, of a two-pronged strategy
for articulating the urban-rural system, the first part of which is
aimed at consolidating the hierarchy of urban settlements. This is based
on concepts borrowed from central place theory, which postulate that
settlements in a region conform to a hierarchy, with different types of
service functions at each level. The aim here, therefore, is to
reinforce what is regarded as the natural evolution of the urban-rural
structure, by concentrating the provision of key services and facilities
in selected centers at the appropriate level of the hierarchy. This is
intended to enhance the growth potential of those towns, to rationalize
the distribution of service facilities, such as schools and health
clinics, and to optimise accessibility for rural inhabitants within the
constraints of financial resources and minimum population thresholds
necessary for a given service to be economically viable.
-75-
Based on the analysis of the settlement system and other studies des-
cribed in the last chapter, CORDEPO's five year plan includes a list of
towns and villages selected to fulfill the role of service centers at
each level of the hierarchy. Rather than allowing new services and
facilities to be set up haphazardly among many towns and villages, the
Plan proposes that development efforts should be concentrated in these
centers, in the belief that this would generate modest agglomeration
economies to attract further activities. At the same time the Plan
recommends that the selected urban centers be used as the basis for
rationalizing the provision of health care and education, in an attempt
to improve the provision of these services to the rural population.
Within this hierarchy of selected central places, the regional and sub-
regional centers are already well established, and with one exception
were adopted for the purposes of the Plan as they stand. The exception,
Villazon, was treated not as a sub-regional center, but as a rural
center, since further analysis indicated that the population of that
part of the region tend to use Tupiza as their main market town.
Villazon functions more as a frontier trading town and staging post for
migrants between Bolivia and Argentina - much as Tijuana, Mexicali, and
Ciudad Juarez on the Mexican-US border.
However, in many parts of the region there were no obvious candidates
for the role of service centers at the third and fourth tiers of the
hierarchy, particularly since access to many facilities in mining towns
is restricted to company employees. At the third level of the hierarchy,
the first criteria to be taken into account in selecting rural centers,
-76-
was the productive potential of the settlement and its surrounding area,
since a sound economic base was considered essential for longer term
prosperity and growth. The second criteria was location vis-a-vis the
population it was intended to serve, and its linkages to higher level
towns in adjacent areas. This tended to favor settlements located on the
principal highways, rather than those off the track, which would be
harder to reach. The third criteria concerned the range of functions
found in the settlement, although this was not regarded as a critical
consideration, since it was argued that those which were lacking could
be installed, and over the long term a flourishing town would attract an
increasing range of new activities. The selection of local centers at
the fourth level of the hierarchy - those with a more modest range of
functions - was based primarily on the single criteria of accessibility
to the hinterland population.
Table 4.5 lists the settlements included in the Regional Plan which were
designated as service centers at each level of the urban hierarchy. As
is explained below, the Plan also includes a list of urban functions to
be provided in each of these centers, many of which are related to the
productive activities of the surrounding area. In addition, based partly
on information from the scalogram analysis, the planning staff proposed
a range of more general facilities to be located in service centers
according to their level in the hierarchy.
To what extent has this element of the strategy of integrated develop-
ment been implemented, or influenced the selection and location of
projects? To answer this question we compare the proposals in the
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TABLE 4.5: SUB-REGIONAL, RURAL, AND LOCAL CENTERS AS PROPOSED IN THE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI
Sub-region Sub-regional Rural center Local center
center
Llallagua/Uncia 1 Acasio
2 Llallagua/Uncia
3 Colquechaca
City of Potosi 5* Potosi
6 Betanzos
7 Punutuma
8 Vitichi
9 Cotagaita
10 Atocha
11 Tupiza
12 Villazon
13 Rio Mulatos
14 Uyuni
15 Llica
16 Colcha 'K'
17 S.P. de Lipez
18 none
North
*Rural area #4 was subsequently absorbed into rural area #5, Potosi.
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Arampampa
Sacaca
Toro Toro
San Pedro de B.V.
Caripuyo
Colluma
Chayanta
Chuquiuta
Senajo
Pocoata
Macha
Ocuri
Ravelo
Tinquipaya
Colavi
Agua de Castilla
Puna
Millares
Turuchipa
Kilpani
Caracota
Caiza 'D'
Tumusla
Otavi
Ramadas
Vichacla
Rosario Tazna
Cerdas
Tatasi
Chilcobija
Esmoraca
Talina
Villa Pacheco
Yuruma
Quehua
Tomave
Colchani
Pulacayo
Chacoma
Abra de Napa
S.P. de Quemez
Alota
Culpina
S.A. de Esmoruco
Soniquera
Central
South
West
Tupiza
Uyuni
Regional Plan, with the location of four kinds of services and facili-
ties included in CORDEPO's annual operating budgets for the years 1979
through 1982. These include projects for drinking water, electricity,
schools, and health clinics.
Piped systems for distributing drinking water were found in only 70 of
the 112 settlements included in the 1980 survey. As part of its policy
of consolidating the hierarchy of central places, the Regional Plan
proposed that towns and villages selected as service centers should be
equipped with a range of basic infrastructure, including drinking water.
Table 4.6 shows the location of drinking water projects included in the
annual operating plans for 1979 through 1983.
Though the pattern is patchy, the figures suggest a slight shift in 1981
in favor of the proposed service centers, which is reversed the
following year. However, a closer analysis reveals that the choice of
projects is largely unrelated to the policy of concentrating investments
in selected urban centers. Many of the projects are carried over from
earlier years due to non-completion or postponement, and the apparent
reverse in 1982 arises from the signing of a contract between CORDEPO
and CARE (Catholic Relief Services) for thirteen new projects, only four
of which are located in the designated service centers. The selection of
projects to receive financial assistance from CARE was arrived at by
reviewing CORDEPO's waiting list of client communities, and picking out
those that most closely matched CARE's priority for working in smaller
villages, presumed - in this case correctly - to be largely ignored by
other agencies.
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TABLE 4.6: LOCATION OF DRINKING WATER PROJECTS ACCORDING TO TYPE OF
SETTLEMENT. 1979-1983.
Type of settlement 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Regional center - - - - -
Sub regional center 1 1 3 2 2
Rural center 4 3 3 3 4
Local center 7 3 5 4 2
Central places 12 7 11 9 8
Non-central places 11 6 7 14 14
Total 23 13 18 23 22
Source: CORDEPO: Planes ODerativos from 1979 through 1983.
-80-
In the energy sector, the main actors are SEPSA and INER. The former is
responsible for local commercial and domestic distribution of electrical
energy from the national grid supplied by the generating authority,
ENDE. INER is concerned with the provision and maintenance of local
generating equipment (usually diesel plants) in rural areas beyond the
reach of the national grid. In this case, as is evident from table 4.7,
we can discern a more direct relationship between policy and annual
operating plans inasmuch as projects in smaller settlements have been
dropped in favor of rural and local centers at the third and fourth
levels of the hierarchy.
In practice, however, few of these planned investments have been made,
since more detailed financial- feasibility studies revealed that the
small populations of many towns, coupled with their low incomes, would
not create sufficient demand to recover the costs of extending the local
grid and generating the energy. As it is, SEPSA has adopted what amounts
to a marginal tariff rate in the communities which it is currently
serving, based on the relative costs at each destination. Though this is
in accordance with pricing policies advocated by such influential bodies
as the World Bank 9, it has provoked widespread controversy among rural
communities, which find themselves paying up to twice the rate charged
in larger cities.
Perhaps the clearest impact of policy on the Corporation's activities
may be seen in the health and education sectors, although not perhaps in
the way expected. (See Table 4.8.) At the end of the 1970s, when the
public works agency became a development corporation, it embarked on a
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TABLE 4.7: LOCATION OF PROJECTS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR ACCORDING TO TYPE
OF SETTLEMENT. 1979-1983.
Type of Settlement 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Regional center - - - -
Sub regional center - 1 1 -
Rural center 3 1 2 5 1
Local center 6 3 3 5 4
Central places 9 5 6 10 5
Non-central places 4 1 1 1 2
Total 13 6 7 11 7
Source: CORDEPO: Planes Operativos for 1979 through 1983.
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TABLE 4.8A: LOCATION OF PROJECTS IN THE HEALTH SECTOR ACCORDING TO TYPE
OF SETTLEMENT. 1979-1983.
Type of Settlement 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Regional center - - - 1 -
Sub regional center - - - -
Rural center 1 - 1 - 1
Local center 1 1 2 - 2
Central places 2 1 3 1 3
Non-central places - 5 5 - 2
Total 2 6 8 1 5
TABLE 4.8B: LOCATION OF PROJECTS IN THE EDUCATION SECTOR ACCORDING TO
TYPE OF SETTLEMENT. 1979-1983. -
Type of Settlement 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Regional center - - - - -
Sub regional center 1 2 1 1-
Rural center 2 1 1 1 -
Local center 2 1 1 - 1
Centra' places 5 4 3 2 1
Non-central places 6 3 3 1 11
Total 11 7 6 3 12
Source: CORDEPO: Planes Operativos for 1979 through 1983.
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construction program to provide school buildings and health clinics,
many of them sited in response to community pleas in some of the
smallest villages. However, the field survey of urban centers in 1980
confirmed what had long been suspected, but never quantified: namely,
that despite the large number of health care clinics, a large proportion
of these were inoperative due to lack of staff, equipment, or supplies.
Though not quite so bad, the situation was similar for elementary
schools. It became obvious that the construction of buildings was
pointless unless the responsible agencies had adequate financial and
human resources to operate them.
The Plan therefore proposed a thorough rethinking of the provision of
such services, recommending in the case of health care that limited
funds should be concentrated on providing properly functioning
facilities located in rural centers, staffed by a team of doctors
equipped with vehicles to provide outreach services to surrounding rural
communities; all other smaller facilities were to be closed down. The
reaction from the line agencies involved has apparently been mixed,
ranging not unexpectedly from outright opposition to muted agreement.
But, apart from a few larger projects, such as a new hospital in the
City of Potosi, and a couple of vocational training establishments, the
operating plan for 1982 shows that the Corporation has unilaterally
withdrawn at least temporarily from the business of constructing school
buildings and health clinics. The projects included in the 1983 budget
all refer to refurbishing and modernizing existing buildings.
To summarise, the policy of concentrating resources for urban infra-
structure in the towns and villages selected as central places, with a
view to consolidating the urban hierarchy, has not so far produced many
tangible results. Projects for drinking water included in recent annual
operating plans reflect in part a continuation of previous proposals and
in part the priorities of a donor agency. The location of poposed
projects in the energy sector - extension of the main grid, and local
generating plants - does indicate a more direct relation to policy, but
many of these have not been implemented since subsequent feasibility
studies show that the small size of the population and their low income
levels render the proposals economically unviable.
A more serious threat, however, to this policy of establishing a hier-
archy of selected service centers comes from COMIBOL, the national
mining corporation, which has its own extensive program of providing
urban infrastructure and social services to mining towns, the planning
of which is done without reference to CORDEPO. As was pointed out in the
analysis of settlements 10, there exist in the Potosi region two parallel
systems of service centers: one serving farmers, the other mining
communities. The lack of coordination between the major providers of
urban infrastructure and social services obviously jeopardises any
attempt to rationalise the provision of these amenities.
The strengthening of linkages.
The second part of the strategy for improving the articulation of the
spatial structure concerns the strengthening of the linkages connecting
larger towns, and tying them to their rural hinterlands. This is heavily
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stressed in the original UFRD concept paper, and derives from empirical
observation in other countries that a well articulated spatial structure
is associated with an increasing flow of people, goods, and information
through a wide range of channels among central places and their
surrounding areas11.
The analysis of linkages referred to in the last chapter concluded that
the road network was far and away the most important. This is hardly
surprising, especially in a region where other forms of communication
and transportation are poorly developed, if at all. The study found that
economic activity and overall development were closely associated with
the degree to which a community was linked to higher level settlements.
The road network, more than any other, influenced the intensity and
direction of flows between settlements, and interactions were most
intense between towns lying along the main highways. At the same time,
the existing road system in the Department of Potosi was described as
severely deficient: although it is extensive, not one kilometer is
paved, and apart from the few trunk roads connecting the City of Potosi
to other Departmental capitals, few of these are all weather roads
passable the year round. Furthermore, the study observed that many well
populated areas of the region are effectively isolated from the prin-
cipal markets for lack of local feeder roads linking them to existing
highways. (See map 4.1)
Given these observations, the Regional Plan places strong emphasis on
the improvement of the road network, and the construction of rural
feeder links. The objective is to increase levels of access of the rural
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Map 4.1 ROAD NETWORK IN POTOSI
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population to urban-based amenities, particularly of farmers to city
markets, and in complementary fashion to expand potential demand for
urban-based manufacturing and commercial establishments.
At the level of the primary road network, the plan specifically identi-
fies three stretches to be improved: those connecting the City of Potosi
to the sub-regional centers of Llallagua/Uncia to the north, and Uyuni
to the west, to be extended later to Llica on the far side of the salt
flats, plus a third stretch linking Uncia through the northern provinces
of Ibanez, Charcas and Bilbao to Anzaldo in the Department of Cocha-
bamba, thus opening up extensive farming communities in that area to
major urban markets in Llallagua/Uncia and the city of Cochabamba. At
the level of local feeder roads, numerous links were identified to
connect rural centers to surrounding local centers in each area. Given
the urgency of road improvement and construction, the five year plan
projects that 20% of total investment should be devoted to these activi-
ties, 28% of which is to come from CORDEPO, representing over half its
12
own budget
Turning to the annual operating plans, we find that total planned
investment for building and improving roads and bridges fell from 28% of
the Corporation's budget in 1979 to only 14% in 1981, which accords with
the initial policy shift in favor of productive activities. (Table 4.9.)
Then in 1982, it increases sharply to 54%, which appears to fit neatly
with the revised thinking of the five year Plan that road improvement is
a necessary precondition for the development of agriculture and raising
incomes in rural areas.
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TABLE 4.9: INVESTMENT IN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ROADS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF POTOSI. 1979-1983.
(Thousands of Bolivian pesos.)
Category 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
B$ % B$ 5 B$ 5 B$ 5 B$ %
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Primary roads 39,917 34,824 13,414 255,214 225,624
(Potosi/Tarapaya) (27,400) (25,462) (4,213) (238,214)
2 Bridges. 4,604 8,887 ,800 16,213 110,000
co 3 sub-total 44,521 70.6 43,711 82.9 22,214 48.9 271,427 81.7 335,624 75.6
4 Secondary roads 18,529 29.4 8,398 17.1 23,163 51.0 60,864 18.3 108,552 24.4
5 All roads 63,050 100.0 52,109 100.0, 45,377 100.0 332,291 100.0 444,176 100.0
6 CORDEPO budget 221,847 300,160 315,076 610,145 1,175,602
7 5 as 5 of 6 28.4 17.4 14.4 54.5 37.8
Source: CORDEPO: Planes Operativos for 1979 through 1983.
In terms of the primary roads, the Regional Plan was merely reiterating
proposals which had long been on the books. The operating plan for 1979
includes funds both for upgrading the Potosi-Uyuni stretch, and also for
building a major through-route connecting the City of Potosi to the
north of the Department, by way of Tarapaya and Maragua, Colquechaca and
San Pedro de Buena Vista. But, when we look closer, we see that nearly
three-quarters of this spending - some 73% between 1979 and 1982 - is
for just the one link between Potosi and Tarapaya, a village some
twenty-four kilometers to the north on the highway to Oruro and La Paz.
The large sum budgetted for this short stretch is due to the high design
standards adopted, standards more appropriate to far wealthier
countries. This has been defended on the grounds that it is to be used
by heavy trucks transporting raw materials from the mines of the Cerro
Rico outside the city to the large new processing plant at La Palca, and
that it will provide rapid access for tourists and Potosinos to a
recreation resort nearby. But the consequence is that other priority
stretches of highway scheduled for upgrading have been virtually starved
of funds.
The construction of~ secondary roads in Potosi, defined here as short
feeders connecting smaller towns and villages to existing highways, is
intended to be funded through programs between CORDEPO and ALDE on the
one hand, and USAID on the other. In the past, when CORDEPO was a public
works committee, the selection of rural roads to be funded each year was
the responsibility of the Corporation engineers in charge of project
design and execution. With the change to a development corporation, it
might have been expected that this task would have been transferred to
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the planning department, but evidently this situation has remained more
or less as before.
Road projects tend not so much to be selected, as requested by community
delegations, and added to the long list of previous requests. Engineers
then conduct physical surveys, prepare designs, and estimate costs.
Cost/benefit evaluations tend to be perfunctory, for lack of a practical
method of estimating benefits, though to some extent this situation
began to improve with the introduction of the USAID rural roads program,
where a standard evaluation procedure was set down and required for
project appraisal by the Mission representatives in La Paz.
In the case of secondary roads,. however, it cannot be said that current
projects reflect the broader policy concern with strengthening the links
between urban centers and their hinterlands. Where there is a match, it
is due more to coincidence than intention. Moreover, it is unlikely that
the picture will change much in the immediate future, partly because of
the long lead time involved in preparing road projects, and the accumu-
lated backlog of projects for which surveys, designs, and estimates have
already been prepared. Furthermore, as was mentioned earlier, the Cor-
poration is loath to tarnish its public image by reneging on unofficial
commitments to the communities involved.
Another factor, not to be overlooked, is the underlying rivalry between
the engineers and planners, stemming from the reorientation from a
public works agency to a development corporation. Engineers tend to see
planners' proposals as meddling in what they regard as traditionally
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their territory. While not averse to proposals from planners, or anyone
else, they are not keen to abandon projects already in the pipeline
which don't fit policy outlines. Having invested much time and energy in
preparing these studies, those involved in designing and executing road
projects are reluctant to see their efforts wasted, especially if
preparatory work is already far advanced. With the support of the
managing director, who is primarily concerned with day to day management
decisions, and who is usually an engineer himself, project managers have
been able to ensure that funds are provided for ongoing road projects in
the operating plans for each year. Thus while a few road projects in the
pipeline conform to policy recommendations, it will be some time before
the rural roads programs are likely to be reoriented more in line with
policy priorities.
Development Based on Areas.
The fifth component of the policy for integrated development put forward
in the Regional Plan proposes that development efforts be organized on
the basis of defined areas, rather than in terms of sectors, which had
traditionally been the case. Although this is implied to some extent in
any spatially oriented approach to development, the notion was not
elaborated explicitly in the UFRD concept paper, nor the methodology
which provided the planning guidelines in Potosi. Neither was the idea
adopted in the earlier pilot application of the UFRD approach in the
Bicol River Basin in the Philippines. In that instance the technical
studies concluded with recommendations for the selection of settlements
as service centers, and proposals for a range of urban functions to be
located in each type of center.
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Although in retrospect the idea of organizing development programs based
on component areas of the region may seem to the reader quite obvious,
it was not present at the outset in the minds of those directing the
planning exercise, but evolved gradually during the course of the
spatial analyses. The crystallization of the idea occurred during the
visit of an agricultural adviser from the Ministry of Planning and
Coordination about a month or so before the second training workshop in
March 1981. At that time the spatial analysis had just been concluded
and final reports were being prepared prior to the presentation of the
results at the workshop. The study team had just completed the
delineation of the existing functional economic areas of the region,
based primarily on measurements of accessibility, and in this way had
identified the more isolated -and poorly served areas. (Map 3.3) In
thinking about how these could be integrated into the urban-rural
system, staff had already started to identify candidate towns and
villages to function as service centers, and had tentatively begun to
sketch out the corresponding areas to be served by these settlements.
In the course of discussions to ensure compatibility between agricul-
tural sector plans and spatial policies, it emerged that the visiting
adviser from the MPC was also advocating an area-based approach to the
design of agricultural programs, to replace CORDEPO's then current
practice of designing projects around specific crops or livestock. He
argued that most farmers grow not just one crop but several, and that
the support and inputs needed for one product - such as technical
assistance, irrigation, storage, and credit - were usually needed for
others too. Moreover, in less fertile agricultural areas such as Potosi,
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where the main objective of agricultural programs was to improve living
standards and income levels for the rural population, it was more
appropriate to think about them in a broader development context,
focused on the farming communities they were intended to benefit. This
exchange of coincident approaches proved the catalyst in generating the
notion of the area as the basic planning unit for all sectors, and once
this point was reached, it was quickly reformulated in line with global
policies to make productive activities the starting point of program
packages.
As one of its key policy elements, therefore, the Regional Plan speci-
fically advocates the integrated development of constituent areas of the
region based on productive potential, and adopts the third tier of the
spatial hierarchy, the rural areas, as the basic unit for development
planning. It was thought that these were the appropriate scale of
operation, since they were large enough to support a number of more
specialised activities serving several communities, yet small enough for
the cost of program packages to be viable for prospective funding
organizations, and to permit effective coordination among the many
agencies involved.
Based on the interpretation of the existing spatial structure, the five
year Plan divides the Department into seventeen planning areas, some of
which are already more or less functioning as an economic unit, while
others are thought to have the potential to do so. A comparison of map
4.2 with map 3.3 shows that a number of these approximate existing rural
areas, such as Cotagaita (No.9) and Atocha (No.10) in the southeast;
Map 4.2 AEREAL PLANNING UNITS
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others are expanded to include communities that at present are peri-
pheral, for example Chayanta (no.3), Betanzos (no.6), and Tupiza
(no.11); and a few constitute what at the moment are largely isolated
parts of the region, such as the north of Potosi (no.1), the east of
Quijarro (no.7), and Nor Lipez (no.16). In one instance, two rural areas
have been combined: the one centred on Puna, which otherwise would have
been an anomaly because of its small size, was absorbed into its
neighbor based on the City of Potosi.
In line with the policy of emphasising productive activities, CORDEPO's
staff set about designing packages of projects for each of these seven-
teen rural areas, aimed in most instances at exploiting agricultural
potential. A typical example of one of these program packages is shown
in table 4.10. Two or three key agricultural activities were proposed
for each area as the focus of production efforts, and crude estimates
were made of current and potential output. Preliminary calculations were
made of the need for inputs to support these activities, such as the
extent of irrigation systems, the number of extension agents, the
capacity of storage facilities, the amount of credit, and the provision
of agricultural supplies. From this starting point, proposals were
drafted for the infrastructure to support the principal agricultural
activities, and agro-related manufacturing, such as plants for sorting
and packing, mills, slaughterhouses, and other small scale labor-
intensive food processing operations.
Needless to say, the total cost of all these program packages greatly
exceeded an optimistic projection of anticipated resources during the
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SUMMARY OF PROJECT PACKAGE FOR AREA #1 NORTE DE POTOSI
Location Organization Y e a r s
Project 1 2 3 4 5
Agriculture
Irrigation
Extension service
Credit
Construction
Farm supplies
Wheat
Corn
Potatoes
Sheep raising
Mining
Machinery hire
Industry
Mill
Animal feed plant
Dried oca plant
Tourism
Resource survey
Craft workshop
Transport & Comms
Highways
Feeder roads
Telephones
Post Office
Energy
Grid extension
Local generators
Education
High schools
Training center
Literacy program
Health
Health center
Clinics
Infrastructure
Drinking water
Sewerage
Market
Institutions
Producers coop
Marketing coop
Field office
various
"f
RC
various
RC
Arampampa
Acasio/Aram
Acasio/Aram,
Sacaca
various
RC
RC
RC
CORDEPO
IBTA
BAB
CORDEPO
MACA/CORDEPO
MACA/CORDEPO
"f
"f
INFOL/MACA/CORD
CORDEPO/BAMIN
MinInd/CORDEPO
"f
various IBT/CORDEPO
San Pedro B~ "
Uncia-AnzaldoSENAC/CORDEPO
RC to LCs ALDE/CORDEPO
RC ENTEL
RC MinTC
various
RC & LCs
RC & LCs
RC
various
RC
LCs
RC & LCs
RC
RC
various
RC
RC
ENDE
CORDEPO
MinEd/CORD
MinEd
MinEd
UnSan/CORD
UnSan/CORD
CORDEPO
CORDEPO
CORDEPO
IPTK/MACA
IPTK/MACA
CORDEPO
RC = rural center Acasio;
LC = local centers Arampampa, Sacaca, Toro Toro and San Pedro de BV.
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TABLE 4.10:
---------------
---------------
----------
---------------
---------------
----------
----------
----------
---------------
---------------
----------
period of the five year Plan. To evaluate and rank these packages in
order of priority, a set of criteria was drawn up reflecting efficiency
and equity considerations, as well as a geo-political factor, often
stressed by the national government, reflecting a long felt preoccupa-
tion with populating sparsely settled frontier zones. In practice these
criteria were not rigorously applied, since in the course of preparing
the development plan, negotiations were started with several inter-
national aid organizations, each of whom were interested in working in
particular parts of the region.
Instead, therefore, the choice of areas for priority funding was deter-
mined in part by the promise or prospect of funding from these sources.
At the same time the details of the budget for the five year plan was
arrived at through a complicated iterative process of alternately
working from the bottom up based on the aggregation of estimated project
costs, and from the top down based on global policies for the sectoral
and spatial distribution of resources. As a result, program packages
for some priority areas were included almost in their entirety, whilst
others were reduced to a few key activities, and others again had to be
postponed to later years.
At one level then, this policy of area based development has produced
dramatic results in attracting a sudden surge of interest from inter-
national agencies to the Department of Potosi. Although CORDEPO has
received assistance from international donors in the past, it has always
been hard to obtain for rural development, partly because of the lack of
obvious agricultural potential in the region. The negotiations currently
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under way between CORDEPO, central government ministries, and interna-
tional agencies, relate to new programs in four areas of the Department.
In the north of Potosi (area 1), a Canadian firm of consultants, hired
with funds provided by INALPRE from the Inter-American Development Bank,
is preparing detailed feasibility studies of preliminary proposals
prepared by CORDEPO staff based on the spatial analysis described in the
previous chpater. In the west of the Department, in the province of
Daniel Campos (area 15), similar studies are due to start soon, funded
by the Andean Pact's program for rural development technology. In the
center, funds totalling five million dollars have been approved for an
integrated program in the plains of Lequezana in the province of
Saavedra (area 6), part of which is coming from the Interamerican
Institute for Agricultural Cooperation. The largest project, however,
and the one that is most advanced, is in the south of the Department, in
the valley of San Juan de Oro in the province of Sud Chichas (area 11).
Fifteen million dollars have been earmarked for this, mainly from the
International Fund for Agricultural Development, and implementation is
scheduled to start in March of 1984. While the starting point for each
project was quite different, all the agencies involved are interested in
some variant of an area-based approach to rural or agricultural
development.
Judging from the annual operating plans, evidence suggesting that the
area-based approach is being translated into concrete actions is not yet
convincing. Apart from the UNICEF project, which started some time ago
and is essentially a variant of small scale community development, the
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funds which appear in the budget for area-based programs refer only to
preliminary feasibility studies for the four projects mentioned a moment
ago. Moreover, despite the systematic presentation of investments by
sector and area in both the Regional Plan and an earlier summary report
of the three year period 1982-84, which was done with the intention of
stressing the notion of development according to areas, the annual
operating plans for 1982 and 1983 follow exactly the same format as in
earlier years. With the above exceptions, they make no reference to the
program packages designed for each area which appear in the regional
development Plan.
Nevertheless, on closer analysis the 1982 operating plan does reflect
the start of one program package, in the province of Daniel Campos,
which is the subject of the agreement with the Andean Pact. The evidence
is hardly overwhelming, but of more than a dozen projects proposed as
part of a program package for this area, and scheduled to be carried out
in the first year of the Regional Development Plan, five have found
their way into the 1982 operating budget. However, as was mentioned
before, it is really too early to expect to see any comprehensive shift,
even assuming this was attempted. It takes time to reorient spending
patterns in conformance with new policies, not least because of the
residue of earlier obligations and works in progress.
Sumary.
Although little time has elapsed since the completion of the Regional
Plan, there is ample evidence of broader policy directions filtering
into the preparation of the Corporation's annual budgets. In the three
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years 1979 through 1981, this was most evident in the initial shift of
emphasis towards agriculture, and the increased share of funds allocated
to areas outside the immediate environs of the city of Potosi. The 1982
budget also reflects the subsequent priority for spending on rural
feeder roads as a preliminary to developing agriculture in the more
remote areas. However, the progress made in these directions has clearly
been savagely compromised by the massive fluctuations in funds allocated
to the two prestige projects for reconstructing the airport and up-
grading the highway from Potosi to Tarapaya.
On the other hand, the evidence suggesting the implementation of poli-
cies associated with the more detailed aspects of a spatially integrated
approach to development is harder to detect. Though projected spending
on local feeder roads is up in accordance with policy, the location of
the roads to be funded reflects earlier commitments more than an attempt
to improve accessibility in priority areas. Furthermore, there is little
sign of any .concerted emphasis on those settlements designated as
service centers, nor - with the single exception of the province of
Daniel Campos - is there much to be seen in the way of focussed spending
in particular areas.
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Footnotes
1. This approach is described in Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Rural
Integrado (1980).
2. See Weitz (1979).
3. CORDEPO (1982), ch XVIII.
4. USAID (1979), Annex II, Exhibit A (7), p 1.
5. According to this analysis, the per capita income level in the
province of Tomas Frias, which includes the city of Potosi, comes
only third. This is mainly due to the method used for estimating per
capita income, which assumes that labor productivity in each sector
is uniform across all provinces of the region. This assumption is
clearly not true, and probably results in an underestimation of the
income level of the urban population of the city of Potosi.
6. See section entitled "Development Based on Areas", p 91.
7. Though areas are numbered 1 through 18, there are in fact only 17,
since #4, originally proposed as the Tinguipaya area in the north of
the province of Tomas Frias and parts of Chayanta, was not con-
sidered a viable unit as an economically functional area. For a map
of these areas, see map 4.2.
8. See Berry (1967).
9. World Bank (1975), pp 44-46.
10. See chapter 3, section entitled "The Settlement Hierarchy", p 37.
11. See Rondinelli and Ruddle (1976), ch 8.
12. CORDEPO (1982), unnumbered table, "Programa de la Inversion y Fuente
de Financiamiento del Sector de Transportes y Comunicaciones".
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CHAPTER 5. EXECUTION: COORDINATION AND SPENDING.
The key issue in the debate about the feasibility of policies for inte-
grated rural or regional development in poor countries is whether
implementing organizations have the ability to carry out complex
programs requiring inter-agency collaboration. In this chapter, we first
look at the measures proposed by CORDEPO planners for multi-sectoral and
inter-agency coordination, and what happened to these when attempts were
made to put them into practice. Next, we examine past evidence in the
form of planned and actual spending as a guide to the likelihood of the
Corporation being able to carry out plans for integrated development as
envisaged. Already we have seen in the previous chapter how the policies
set down in the five year plan were compromised when translated into
annual operating budgets. Here, we compare planned spending as projected
in the annual budgets with actual spending in the field.
In making this comparison, we will examine a number of propositions in
an attempt to explain why the implementation of some projects is more
effective than others. Does this depend on the project's relative
importance as a regional or national priority? Is it related to the kind
of institution collaborating in the project - for example, autonomous
local entity or regional office dependent on central Ministry? Is it a
function of the number of agencies involved: do projects which are
funded or executed by CORDEPO alone advance more rapidly? Or is it
ultimately a question of institutional learning and practice?
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Integrated development, intersectoral and inter-agency coordination.
As is evident from the discussion in the previous chapter, the policies
for integrated development evolved in Potosi, and as formulated in
almost any context, inevitably require the participation of numerous
public and private bodies for the provision of program inputs. As
indicated in the example of a program package described above, an
integrated approach implies the timely provision of these inputs in
accordance with a programmed schedule of development activities. This
calls for complex planning procedures, and extensive coordination
between sectors and among agencies, which is hard enough to achieve in
more developed countries, let alone in countries where political and
economic conditions are more unstable, and where the resources available
to planning institutions are more restricted. In short, it is this need
for complex inter-agency coordination during the implementation stage
that critics claim undermines integrated approaches, that makes them
most liable to come undone, and thus ultimately that renders them
inoperational as a viable alternative for development planning in poor
countries.
The coordination issue receives widespread attention in the literature,
and proponents are unanimous in stressing how crucial it is to the
successful outcome of an integrated approach, yet few authors offer much
guidance beyond mere platitudes on how to achieve it. In part this is
inevitable when the specific circumstances of the context in which an
integrated approach is being applied are not known. But it also reflects
in part the difficulty of making recommendations which are appropriate
or applicable in general, and in part the lack of attention which the
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subject has received in the literature, possibly because academics, who
do much of the writing, are not necessarily the ones who have good
advice to offer based on experience as practitioners or implementors.
The issue was addressed at great length in the original UFRD concept
paper, but in subsequent field reports of the application in the Bicol
River Basin in the Philippines, and in papers outlining the methodology
of steps to be carried out, procedures for facilitating the effective
implementation of plans received only cursory attention.
In examining the issue of coodination in the Potosi case, we will trace
the fate of certain measures which were taken, or recommended, in
anticipation of the need to improve collaboration between CORDEPO and
other local agencies for the implementation of the integrated approach
to development advocated in the Regional Plan. In the first instance,
the Plan itself was prepared almost exclusively by the staff of the
Corporation, with little input from other regional agencies. This was a
conscious decision, since, as was explained before, most local organiza-
tions are more preoccupied with the administration and management of
ongoing programs than with planning. Besides, the director of planning
at CORDEPO preferred instead to present them with specific proposals to
which they could react, rather than to go through what he feared would
be a prolonged, laborious, and largely unproductive exercise of con-
tinuing discussion and exchange with all the other people concerned.
Nevertheless, a number of steps were proposed for improving coordination
both within the Corporation itself, and between the Corporation and
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other local agencies. In the first place, in anticipation of the need to
ensure the active collaboration of other government bodies in the
execution of the Plan, a Departmental Advisory Council was established
composed of representatives from the regional offices of the principal
Ministries involved - agriculture, mining, industry, education, health,
transportation and communications, as well as the Ministry of Planning
and Coordination - together with other relevant local groups. The
purpose of this council was to bring about a common approach to develop-
ment of the region, and to facilitate the coordination of plans and
programs by providing a mechanism for speeding the flow of information
between the agencies involved, and expediting joint efforts in planning,
financing, and implementation.
This council was originally set up in the summer of 1980, but was sus-
pended after only two meetings, though the reason for its suspension is
not entirely clear. When questioned, senior CORDEPO officials explained
that the timing was premature, since work on the Regional Plan had not
at that time advanced very far, and there was little to discuss. This
may be the case, but then why were the same officials so keen to set it
up in the first place?
Other events at the time suggest that two other factors may have been
involved. First, after the Garcia Meza junta captured the Presidency
through a military coup in July that year, numerous representative
bodies were suspended by presidential decree, including Congress and all
trade unions. A complete listing of the proscribed organizations was not
published in the censored press, so it is difficult to determine if the
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Departmental Advisory Committee was one of them, but judging by the
range of other bodies outlawed, it is quite possible. Second, after the
coup there was also a widespread change of personnel in public offices,
affecting several of the representatives participating in the Council.
Since it had only just been launched and was still not well established,
it may be that it was quietly allowed to be forgotten in the shuffle:
earlier proponents may have decided to maintain a low profile for the
time being, until events stabilized and the political complexion of the
newly appointed officials became clearer.
As a complementary measure, proposals were also included in the five
year Plan to divide the Department for planning purposes into four sub
regions, and to set up advisory committees for each of them, answerable
to the Departmental Council. It was intended that these committees
should again be composed of nominated representatives from the same or
similar organizations and prominent local interest groups, to provide
more knowledgeable and detailed expertise on each sub region, and to
facilitate inter-agency collaboration in the field for the execution and
monitoring of program packages in specific areas. Work was started in
the fall of 1981 on preparing the necessary legal documents to establish
these committees, but a few months later the idea was all but dropped, a
casualty of a larger argument within the Corporation which is explained
below.
A third measure for improving coordination was aimed at the reorgani-
sation of departments within the Corporation itself, in an attempt to
improve the effectiveness of planning by addressing some of the inherent
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contradictions which have been alluded to above, and to facilitate
inter-sectoral planning and coordination for area-based programs. The
director of planning, now promoted to planning advisor to the President
of the Corporation, put forward in the summer of 1981 proposals for a
new organizational structure for the Corporation which involved
regrouping departments and reallocating responsibilities.
First, it was proposed to formalize the activity of spatial planning, by
setting up a third section within the planning department, according it
the same status as global and sectoral planning, with the task of
facilitating inter-disciplinary teamwork and the design of program
packages for selected areas. Second, some tasks which had been retained
by the department in charge of.executing projects, such as the selection
of roads, sewage and drinking water projects, were to be transferred to
the planning department to consolidate their responsibilities and
improve consistency between plans and annual operating budgets. But the
most controversial component of the reorganization plan concerned the
setting up of local offices of the Corporation in each of the areas
where integrated development programs were to be implemented. These were
to be staffed by technicians responsible for project execution from the
main office in the city of Potosi.
Institutional reorganization is problematic at the best of times. As
might have been expected, when these proposals were first presented to
department chiefs, they were opposed by those most affected, although at
the time they were not regarded as a serious threat, since they were
only preliminary ideas. However, in the fall of 1981, the managing
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director of CORDEPO, who was responsible for supervising day to day
operations, particularly the management of projects, resigned for health
reasons. As an interim replacement, the President of the Corporation
appointed his planning advisor, and gave him instructions to do all that
was necessary to implement the policies of the Regional Plan.
When, however, the reorganization proposals were later presented for
formal consideration by the leaders of the Corporation, opponents staged
a massive counter-attack led by those who were most directly affected,
namely the engineers from the department in charge of project implemen-
tation. We have alluded before to the underlying tension between the
staff of the older division responsible for executing programs and
projects and the newer planning division, stemming from the reorgani-
zation of the public works agency into a development corporation.
According to long term employees, they had long harbored a muted
resentment of the planners who were regarded as interfering with their
traditional responsibilities, but the proposal to set up local field
offices to be staffed by them, escalated the rivalry into open conflict.
Understandably, they were reluctant to be posted to small towns in
remote locations, far away from the amenities of the city of Potosi,
which they and their families depended on.
At about the same time that opponents were marshalling their forces to
quash these proposals, the President of CORDEPO asked the Board of
Directors to ratify his nomination of the planning adviser to the post
of managing director. Somewhat to his surprise, the Board turned down
the nomination, and voted instead to appoint the new director of the
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technical bureau, an engineer well known in Potosi circles, who had
himself previously been a member of the Board.
In retrospect, this incident represented a significant turning point in
the attempt to implement the policies advocated in the Regional Plan,
and to carry out the strategy of integrated regional development. The
President of CORDEPO now found himself faced with what amounted to a
vote of no confidence in his chief planning adviser, and a clear
expression of opposition from a large group of his staff. Not wishing to
provoke further conflict, he decided to withdraw the proposals for
reorganizing the institution.
That in itself might not have been such a calamity, but the President
now had to contend with a sharp division of opinion between his planning
adviser, who was pushing the policies advocated in the Regional Plan,
and his managing director, who was sceptical of the time and effort
devoted to planning, and favored going back to the things that the
Corporation could do best - and that he understood best - namely con-
ventional projects for physical infrastructure. No doubt, influenced by
the turn of events, the chief planning advisor later decided not to
renew his contract when it expired in April 1982. With his departure the
Regional Plan was bereft of its arch proponent, and the stage was left
clear for those who preferred to continue doing things the way they had
been done in the past.
Interagency Coordination: Planned and Actual Spending.
The results of these three proposals for improving coordination both
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within CORDEPO and between CORDEPO and other local agencies are hardly
encouraging for proponents of an integrated approach to development. The
attempt at institutional restructuring and the reallocation of responsi-
bilities within the Corporation illustrates the extreme difficulties of
accomplishing far reaching changes within an organization, while the
efforts to improve collaboration at the local level between agencies
only serve to underline the enormous inertia to be overcome before such
a mechanism can be established, let alone become effective.
Although these attempts to set up formal mechanisms for regional coordi-
nation proved fruitless, there exist a large number of informal and
bilateral agreements between CORDEPO and other local organizations -
such as SENAC, SENDU, IBTA, MACA, IPTK, ENDE, TAP, CORPOAGUAS, INAN,
QUIMBABOL- some of which have been in existence for several years. Have
these been any more successful in achieving effective coordination for
project implementation?
To find out, we will compare planned spending as indicated in the annual
operating budgets with actual spending on specific projects. This is a
somewhat crude indicator, but given the diversity of projects, programs,
and contractual agreements between the actors involved, it does at least
provide a first approximation of relative peformance in terms of getting
things done. The questions we would like to answer include: which pro-
jects move ahead, while others languish, or get stuck; why should this
be the case; and to what extent is it associated with particular forms
of coordination? In the discussion that follows, we will examine a
number of propositions that might be expected to provide the answers to
these questions.
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Total planned and actual spending 1979-81.
The weakness of the Bolivian economy during the period under review,
coupled with the softening in the world price of tin, directly affected
government revenues and thus disbursements to public agencies. Since
promised funds failed to materialize on time, sometimes not until years
later, actual spending by CORDEPO lagged well behind planned spending.
Although the Corporation planned to increase its investment from $b221
million pesos in 1979 to $b315 million in 1981, in practice spending
fell from $b1OO million to $b76 million. (See table 5.1)
What is true for CORDEPO is also true for most other public agencies:
some may fare better, of course, and others worse, but few if any
receive the funds requested or agreed in their annual operating budgets.
Thus, at the most general level, it is obvious that agencies find it
difficult to fulfill contractual obligations when they fail to receive
the income expected.
During the period 1979 through 1981, CORDEPO was involved in over one
hundred and thirty programs and projects, spanning the twelve sectors
listed in table 5.1. Some of these, such as the two referred to earlier
for upgrading the main highway between the city of Potosi and Tarapaya
and rebuilding the airport, accounted for a substantial part of total
investment for the three years. Most of them, however, were small pro-
jects for drinking water and sewage sytems, rural feeder roads and other
urban infrastructure. Due to the perennial funding problems faced by the
Corporation, total actual spending for the three year period amounted to
only 35% of projected spending. Some programs and projects managed
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TABLE 5.1: PLANNED AND ACTUAL SPENDING BY SECTORS 1979-81
(Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
1 9 7 9
Sector planned actual
1 9 8 0
%* planned actual
1979-
19811 9 8 1
%* planned actual
Agriculture
Industry
Tourism
Mining
Commerce
sub total
Energy
Transport
Communications
sub total
Urban works
Water & sewage
Education
Health
Others
sub total
195774 100188 51.18 300160 103102 34.35 315076 79855 25.34 34.91
* Actual spending as a percentage of planned spending.
Source: CORDEPO: Planos Operativos and Cuadros de Evaluacion Financiera for the years 1979 through 1981.
19877
16322
6391
13175
3000
58765
2849
79243
2226
84318
12677
31341
1381
390
6903
52691
6601
7
982
2465
0
10054
2579
52698
1922
57199
10149
20792
985
133
877
32934
33.21
.04
15.36
18.71
.00
17.11
90.53
66.50
86.33
67.84
80.06
66.34
71.30
34.09
12.70
62.50
38667
23907
15930
10434
1170
90108
14433
69611
17518
101561
26180
52904
7480
4981
16947
108491
7732
717
1512
784
0
1,0746
5064
47444
4765
57274
6981
21974
1915
1152
3060
35082
20.00
3.00
9.49
7.52
.00
11.93
35.09
68.16
27.20
56.39
26.66
41.54
25.60
23.14
18.06
32.34
72336
40587
23549
16371
2500
155343
16439
50878
4706
72023
19555
40428
6417
3494
17815
87710
9478
22985
2630
1772
0
36864
3141
8329
0
11470
6971
15047
2784
1646
5074
31521
TOTAL
13.10
56.63
11.17
10.82
.00
23.73
19.11
16.37
.00
15.93
35.65
37.22
43.38
47.11
28.48
35.94
18.19
29.34
11.17
12.56
.00
18.95
31.98
54.31
27.35
48.83
41.26
46.37
37.20
33.07
21.63
39.99
however to do much better than this, while others faltered, petered out,
or never get started. The interesting question to answer is which ones
fared better and why?
Proposition 1: When funds are limited, priority is given to projects
that further the most important regional and national objectives.
A priori we might expect to find that at times when funds are tight,
priority in Corporation spending is given to those projects that further
the most important regional and national objectives. This sounds at
first blush too obvious to merit investigation, almost a tautology:
surely the Corporation would divert available resources to those
projects it perceives to be of highest priority. Similarly, the national
Treasury might also be expected to expedite the release of funds for
those projects seen to be of high priority from a national point of
view. The reality, however, turns out not to be so straightforward.
Let us look first at the figures for overall sectoral spending in table
5.1 again. As was explained before, a conscious effort was being made to
shift the emphasis in Corporation spending away from public infrastruc-
ture to more directly productive activities, especially agriculture.
This is reflected in the figures for planned investment, which more than
doubled for productive sectors, whereas it rose only 66% for the group
of sectors related to urban infrastructure, and actually declined for
the three sectors combined of energy, transport and communications. The
emphasis on productive activities is even maintained when we look at
actual spending, which shows that despite the shortfall in projected
income, investment in these sectors in fact rose from $b1O.Om to $b36.9m
while it fell in the other two groups.
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Does this not then support the proposition that priority is given to
those projects that meet foremost goals? It certainly seems to be the
case, but a closer inspection raises some questions. Looking at the
group of productive activities, we find that actual spending as a
proportion of planned spending is almost always lower than for other
groups of activities, even though the former are supposed to receive
1greater emphasis in later years . If the reinvigoration of agriculture
is regarded as the cornerstone of the Corporation's policy for regional
development, why then does actual spending over the three years amount
to only 18% of that planned, while it is 40% or higher for the other two
major groups of basic and urban infrastructure?
The wide variation to be observed among high priority projects in the
relationship between planned and actual spending is illustrated more
clearly in table 5.2 At one extreme investment in the rebuilding of the
airport runway, which is of little concern to national authorities but a
high profile project for the Corporation, exceeds planned spending over
the three year period by 21%. Another project to exploit a geothermal
energy resource, which is a high priority at both regional and national
levels, gets only 26% of the funds allotted to it, while a third equally
urgent project for surveying the mineral resources of the Department
withers away with only 9% of planned investment. Our first proposition
now begins to look less convincing.
Proposition 2: Projects involving coordination with autonomous local
entities advance more rapidly than those requiring collaboration with
central Ministries.
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TABLE 5.2: PLANNED AND ACTUAL SPENDING FOR PROJECTS OF NATIONAL AND REGIONAL PRIORITY 1979-81
(Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
1979-
1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 1981
Project and agency planned actual 5* planned actual 5* planned actual 5* %*
Airport rebuilding 16093 36775
CORDEPO/AASANA
Potosi-Tarapaya road 27400 13064
CORDEPO
Sevaruyo cement works 0 0
CORDEPO/CORDEOR
Geothermal energy 2744 1617
CORDEPO/ENDE/Min. of Mining/Government
Chemical plant 0 0
CORD EPO/ QUIMBABOL
Minerals survey 5000 41
CORDEPO/FNEM
228.5
47.7
58.9
of Italy
0.8
17500 10245 58.5
25462 21879 85.9
17000
2533
100
1814
606
nd
3.6
0 0.0
nd
5500
4213
245 4.4
729 17.3
22303 22303 100.0
4750
1500
870
350 7.4
500 33.3
510 58.6
* Actual spending as a percentage of planned spending.
nd = no data available.
Source: CORDEPO: Planos Operativos and Cuadros de Evaluacion Financiera for the years 1979 through 1981.
120.9
62.5
58.3
26.2
19.8
9.4
Supposedly it should be easier to make progress on projects which
involve coordination with autonomous local entities, since they can make
their own decisions without reference to central headquarters and larger
national policy. Furthermore, local agencies are more likely to share
the same perspective as the Corporation, than Ministries of the central
government which are more concerned about national priorities. It was
clear, for example, that the lack of support from MACA for agricultural
projects in the Department of Potosi reflects their priority of inves-
ting in those areas with greater economic potential, such as cotton in
Santa Cruz or beef in the Beni. Similarly, CORDEPO has had little
success in persuading COMIBOL to participate in an urgent program to
reduce the pollution of rivers and streams by the many refining plants
attached to nationalised mines. In some parts of Potosi, particularly in
Nor Chichas and Sud Chichas, where conditions are good for agriculture,
the pollution of river water has reached the point that farmers are no
longer able to use it for irrigating their fields.
Table 5.3 compares two groups of projects, one involving Ministries and
other agencies of the central government, usually through their regional
offices in Potosi, the other involving autonomous local entities,
chiefly utility companies. The first group includes such things as
extending the national electricity grid in the north of the Department
in collaboration with the national electricity generating authority,
improving the highways with the National Roads Service, a survey of soil
conditions with the Ministry of Agriculture, and the construction of
marketplaces, schools, and health clinics. The second group includes an
experimental dairy farm run by the local university of Tomas Frias,
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TABLE 5.3: PLANNED AND ACTUAL SPENDING FOR PROJECTS INVOLVING CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND LOCAL
AUTONOMOUS ENTITIES 1979-81. (Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 79/81
Project planned actual %* planned actual %* planned actual %* %*
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A: Projects involving central government agencies.
National electricity
grid - CORDEPO/ENDE
Main roads and bridges
CORDEPO/SENAC
Urban infrastructure
CORDEPO/SENDU
Soils survey
CORDEPO/Min. of Ag.
Construction of clinics
CORDEPO/Min. of Health
Constr. rural schools
CORDEPO/Min. of Ed.
Rural electricity plants
CORDEPO/INER
1027 1087 105.78
44521 13696 30.76
4037 2708 67.07
992 266 26.77
55 29 52.73
1381 445 32.22
1288 553 42.96
1155 132 11.44
43590 33003 75.71
18667 5194 27.82
556
2731
3195
275
0 .00
462 16.92
521 16.31
0 .00
1922 1638 85.25 69.61
17800 2043 11.48 46.02
11854 5849 49.34 39.79
1093 516 47.22 37.49
2787 1465 52.57 35.10
3081
1070
1166 37.84 27.84
2 .14 21.07
70169 39311 56.02 39607 12679 32.01 43.55
00
Group total 53301 18783 35.24
TABLE 5.3: (Continued)
1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1 79/81
Project planned actual %* planned actual %* planned actual %* %*
B: Projects involving local autonomous entities.
Experimental dairy farm 1967 1967 100.00 0 0 .00 0 0 .00 100.00
CORDEPO/Univ.T.Frias
City telephone system 2226 1922 86.33 17518 4765 27.20 4706 0 .00 27.35
CORDEPO/TAP
Rural drinking water 1802 519 28.79 1539 506 32.90 4735 779 16.44 22.33
CORDEPO/CORPOAGUAS
Farm extension service 0 0 .00 168 0 .00 252 38 14.87 8.92
CORDEPO/IPTK
Town electricity grids 200 227 113.35 4433 0 .00 8100 1 .01 1.79
CORDEPO/SEPSA
Group total 6195 4634 74.81 23658 5272 22.28 17794 817 4.59 22.51
* Actual spending as a percentage of planned spending.
Source: Planos ODerativos and Cuadros de Evaluacion Financiera for the years 1979 through 1981.
installation of an automatic telephone exchange by the Potosi Telephone
Company, an agricultural extension service in collaboration with a
farmers association, and other small scale urban works projects, with
the Potosi water corporation and electricity company.
Contrary to expectations, however, we find that with the exception of
the dairy farm, projects involving central Ministries actually do rather
better than those in which local entities participate. To some extent
this is explained by the simple factor of financial security. Even
though Ministries suffer the same funding problems as CORDEPO, once they
commit themselves to a project, there is a far better chance that they
will be able to live up to their part of the bargain in providing
program inputs, thus allowing the Corporation to contribute its share.
Local entities however tend to have more limited resources, be more
vulnerable to economic uncertainties, and thus less able to fulfi],l
their commitments, in which case the Corporation sees little point in
proceeding on its own. Another factor is that local entities are usually
small operations, and lack the breadth of technical skills and manage-
ment expertise to be found in the larger agencies of the central govern-
ment. This inevitably handicaps them when it comes to designing and
implementing new projects.
Proposition 3. Projects funded exclusively by CORDEPO advance more
rapidly than those requiring financial contributions from other sources.
Proposition 4. Projects that can be implemented by the Corporation alone
advance more rapidly than those requiring coordination with other
organizations.
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Two other factors which have an important bearing on the implementation
of projects concern first the source of funding, and second the extent
of coordination required for providing manpower, equipment and other
program inputs. A priori, we might expect that since the disbursement of
funds by the central government is so erratic, this would jeopardise
those projects relying on funds from more than one source, and that
conversely better progress might be made with those projects financed
from a single agency. Secondly, we might expect that projects implemen-
ted solely by the Corporation would be executed more expeditiously than
those involving other agencies, if only because decisions should be
easier to make, and less dependent on negotiation and compromise.
To test these two propositions, we classified projects according to
their source of funding, and the source of other inputs - such as tech-
nical expertise, equipment, and manpower - and then compared the rates
of execution over the three year period 1979-81 as measured by planned
and actual spending. A distinction was made between three sources of
funding: those financed solely by CORDEPO; by CORDEPO together with
other domestic agencies either local or national; and by CORDEPO with
help from international organizations. On the coordination axis, a
distinction was made between projects handled exclusively by CORDEPO,
those which involved both the Corporation and other agencies, and those
where the Corporation merely transfers funds to someone else and is not
concerned with implementation. The results are shown in table 5.4.
From the bottom right hand corner of the table, we see as was indicated
before in table 5.1, that for the three year period as a whole, actual
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TABLE 5.4: PLANNED AND ACTUAL SPENDING FOR PROJECTS CLASSIFIED ACCORDING TO SOURCE OF
FUNDING AND TYPE OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATION. 1979-81.
(Millions of Bolivian pesos.)
Type of interagency coordination Group
------------------------------------ total
Source of Details CORDEPO CORDEPO Transfer
funding only & other to other
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From CORDEPO number of projects: 56 30 20 106
alone planned spending: 254 109 79 442
actual spending: 95 62 36 194
% spent: 37.6 57.0 45.9 43.8
From CORDEPO number of projects: 4 17 0 21
and other planned spending: 36 181 0 217
Bolivian actual spending: 0.3 62 0 62
source(s) % spent: 0.8 34.3 - 28.7
From CORDEPO number of projects: 3 5 0 8
and planned spending: 51 92 0 143
international actual spending: 12 13 0 25
source(s) % spent: 24.6 14.1 - 17.8
Group total number of projects: 63 52 20 135
planned spending: 341 382 79 803
actual spending: 108 137 36 282
% spent: 31.7 35.9 45.9 35.1
Source: CORDEPO: Planos Operativos and Cuadros de Evaluacion Financiera for the years 1979
through 1981.
spending amounted to only 35% of projected investment. Looking down the
right hand column, we find as expected that projects funded solely by
the Corporation achieve the highest level of execution, nearly 44% of
planned spending. Projects funded jointly with other agencies follow
behind with 29%, while surprisingly, those supported by international
organizations come last with only 18%.
a) Pro.ects funded exclusively by CORDEPO.
The vast majority of projects - some 106 of the 135 included in this
analysis - are funded wholely by the Corporation. The highest rate of
execution, 57%, is achieved in the group managed jointly by the Cor-
poration and other agencies. This group of projects consists mainly of
public works programs carried out by CORDEPO in collaboration with
municipal authorities of the largest towns in the region, or on behalf
of smaller towns or other agencies, such as the health and education
units, which lack funds, staff or equipment for capital construction.
Typical of this group of projects are street paving, water and sewer
systems, and buildings for schools and health clinics.
The group of projects scoring the second highest execution rate, 46%,
consists primarily of simple transfers from the Corporation to other
agencies. Typical of these are grants to the university for the experi-
mental dairy farm; a contribution for the construction of a cement
factory in the neighboring Department of Oruro; and transfers to the
local office of the National Institute of Statistics, the Plan Regu-
lador, which is responsible for preparing land use plans for the larger
towns, and the Potosi Telephone company. Since transfers are relatively
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simple to manage, the wonder is that this category of spending does not
score even more highly. Part of the answer lies in the fact that the
recipients are often slow to fulfill their part of the contract before
CORDEPO agrees to release the promised funds.
Not all the projects funded solely by the Corporation, however, are
simple transfers, or public works projects. Many of them are production
oriented projects, especially in agriculture and mining, and these tend
to be managed primarily, if not exclusively, by the Corporation. In many
cases the Corporation winds up being solely responsible for these pro-
jects not through choice - since it often seeks funding from other
sources - but simply for lack of interested partners. Typical of the
projects in this category are crop and livestock projects, food process-
ing plants, and mineral prospecting surveys designed to help the small
mining concern. In this case, the projects are often more complicated,
requiring sustained investments over several years. Understandably,
Corporation staff are cautious about committing themselves to such
projects until they can be reasonably sure of sufficient resources to
keep them going. Projects may appear on the books, yet not get off the
ground for lack of support from other sources. These factors account for
the rather lower execution rate for this group, 37.6%, than for others
funded solely by the Corporation. It would be lower still, but for the
inclusion of the project for modernizing the airport serving the City of
Potosi, which as we saw before is a rare example of actual spending
exceeding its budget.
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b) Pro-iects funded jointly by CORDEPO and other domestic agencies.
Among the projects that are funded jointly by CORDEPO and other domestic
agencies, the largest group are also jointly managed. In terms of
execution, this group comes close to the overall average with actual
spending just over a third of planned spending. At one extreme, this
group includes infrastructure projects such as highways in collaboration
with SENAC (the National Road Service), and market buildings done with
SENDU (the National Urban Development Service), both of which achieve
output levels above 50%. At the other extreme, however, are several
projects for surveying and exploiting natural resources, most of which
are still at an early stage of development, in which very little has
been accomplished. An exception here, is the exploration of geothermal
energy resources in the remote western corner of the region, which
involves the participation of several national agencies, and technical
assistance from the Italian government.
The group of projects that performs worst cf all according to this
criteria, less than 1%, are a small set of industrial projects, where
again the Corporation has so far failed to obtain financial backing from
other investors. These include plants for processing agricultural
produce, and two small factories for manufacturing bricks and other
clay-based building materials.
c) Pro lects funded by CORDEPO with assistance from international donors.
A priori, it might have been thought that projects receiving financial
support from international sources would fare better than those funded
domestically, if only because the former are usually larger, better
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financed, and more reliable in disbursing loans or grants. However, as
was mentioned a moment ago, this turns out not to be the case.
The reasons for this are diverse. Sometimes it has to do with inter-
national relations, as was the case with USAID's rural roads program,
when President Carter froze aid from the United States to Bolivia
following the Garcia Meza coup in July 1980. At other times, the
explanation is found on the Bolivian side. In the case of a food and
nutrition program, funded by the World Food Program through a national
counterpart agency, INAN, CORDEPO failed to replace project personnel
when the original staff were dismissed for their political ties after
the same coup in July 1980. In the case of the feeder roads program
funded by ALDE (Food for Development Program), organizers failed to line
up the expected number of communities willing to contribute their share
of project costs through inputs in kind, such as labor and materials.
But more often than might be supposed, the fault lies squarely with the
international agency itself, rather than the host country counterparts.
In Potosi, three programs of the United Nations failed to receive
promised financial support because of bureaucratic delays and inept
management related to the Bolivian offices of the agencies involved or
their international headquarters.
If we look along the bottom row of table 5.4, we see that the ratio of
actual to planned spending rises as CORDEPO's responsibility for project
management changes from sole to joint to none. On the surface this might
suggest that perhaps CORDEPO itself is the spanner in the works, obs-
tructing the timely implementation of projects. However, a closer
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analysis shows that a large number of the projects for which CORDEPO
retains sole responsibility are essentially proposals in the agri-
cultural, industrial, and mining sectors, for which no joint funding or
partnership arrangements have yet been secured.
In a sense, therefore, the horizontal axis of table 5.4 may be inter-
preted in quite a different way. Many of the projects in the left hand
column may be thought of as proposals for agricultural or manufacturing
projects, initiated by the Corporation, and awaiting financial support
or collaborative agreements with the private sector or other domestic or
foreign agencies. Once these have been secured, the projects move out of
the top left hand corner, either down the table if they secure financial
support, or to the right if the project becomes a collaborative one with
others.
Proposition 5. Effective implementation depends primarily on institu-
tional learning, practice, and accumulated experience.
This brings us back to the question raised earlier from table 5.1. Why
is it that actual spending as a proportion of planned investment is
consistently less in the group of sectors related to productive activi-
ties than for the other two groups of productive and social infra-
structure - only 19% compared with 49 and 40 per cent respectively? This
does not appear to be consistent with the proposition that projects
related to major objectives receive priority in the allocation of the
Corporation's funds. Neither can we find an entirely satisfactory ex-
planation in terms of the project's source of funding or the extent of
inter-agency coordination required. However, the foregoing analysis has
suggested some clues.
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In the first instance, there is a qualitative difference between the
activities in the first group and those in the second and third groups.
In the latter case, the Corporation is not involved in the ongoing
administration or provision of any services - such as drinking water,
electrical energy, or schooling - but merely the construction of
buildings or physical infrastructure, which are then handed over to the
relevant local authority responsible for day to day operations. Projects
in these sectors, therefore, tend to be one time actions, rather than
ongoing concerns. This is not the case, however, with the first group of
productive activities, where the Corporation is involved not only in
setting up the projects, which may take several years, but also in many
instances in running them. In theory, it is the Corporation's intention,
wherever possible, to hand these projects over to the private sector
once they are a going concern, but in practice few ever seem to reach
that point.
This qualitative difference, therefore, which may be characterized as
the difference between public works construction jobs and ongoing
management programs, would seem to go a long way towards explaining the
wide difference in levels of execution, and can be related once again to
the Corporation's evolution from a public works committee to a region-
wide development agency. As a public works organization, CORDEPO has
acquired considerable experience over the years in the design and imple-
mentation of projects for drinking water, sewage systems, local feeder
roads, and other urban infrastructure. Many of the steps involved in
these operations are repetitive, and to a large extent procedures can be
standardized. Furthermore, it is evident that with constant practice
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over the years CORDEPO has evolved effective working arrangements with
counterpart agencies, such as SENAC, ENDE, SENDU, CORPAGUAS, and many
municipalities.
On the other hand, it is only in the past few years that the Corporation
has become involved in more complex agricultural and manufacturing
projects, which require quite different skills and knowledge. Generally
speaking, each project requires a unique approach, demanding special
studies tailored to the characteristics of the project, which cannot
easily be standardised since the activity concerned is never quite the
same, and needs different data and technical expertise. Furthermore,
agricultural and manufacturing projects rarely involve the same set of
participants twice. This means the Corporation has to establish new
agreements each time with a different set of actors, some of whom may
not know each other, and new channels for communication and project
administration.
In short, we are talking here of the need for learning, not just at the
2
level of individuals, but at the level of the institution as a whole
CORDEPO has learnt well how to deliver public works programs, but it is
evidently still learning how to manage projects related to agricultural
and industrial production. Understandably, it takes time for an
institution to acquire and develop the necessary expertise.
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Footnotes.
1. The exception of industry in 1981 is a somewhat special case, since
most of this represents a direct transfer payment to another agency,
rather than spending on actual project execution.
2. The idea of learning as the basis of policy implementation is
explored by Moris (1981), ch 2.
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PART III:
THE NATURE OF PLANNING
-131-
CHAPTER 6: PLANNING AS SCIENCE AND AS POLITICS
This enquiry started with two questions: are strategies for integrated
development viable in poor countries with a limited capability for
administering multi-sectoral programs; and how can planning be made more
effective under such adverse conditions? The answers we get to these
questions, however, will depend to a large extent on the way we perceive
the nature and tasks of planning. Before continuing, therefore, with
this examination of a spatially integrated approach to development in
the Department of Potosi, we must first clarify the underlying concep-
tual model of the planning process which we propose to adopt in order to
evaluate and interpret the material presented in the previous chapters.
As evaluators, this will colour the conclusions we draw, and as practi-
tioners this will shape our understanding of our role as planners, and
hence our behaviour, actions, and expectations.
In this chapter we will discuss several views of the planning process
which are implicit in the literature on the subject. Friedmann has made
a useful distinction between two kinds of planning theory: deductive
theories derived from the logic of rational decision making; and induc-
1
tive theories inferred from empirical observation . Tracing the
evolution of planning theory in the literature since the 1950s, it is
clear that deductive theories predominated in the early stages, but that
inductive theories have gradually gained the ascendant. However, there
is a curious paradox to be observed: on the one hand theory based on
empirical observation has slowly evolved towards a pluralistic
interpretation of the process, while on the other hand the classical
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rational model is still to be found firmly entrenched among practi-
tioners, especially among international development agencies, and in
2
many less developed countries .
The deductive school of planning theorists treats planning primarily as
a scientific exercise, although later variants recognised that it should
allow for the intervention of "extraneous" considerations during the
course of implementation. The inductive school of theorists has now
largely eclipsed earlier formulations, proliferating in many directions.
Initially, critics were quick to point out the gap between rational
theory and common practice; they challenged the assumptions underlying
the technocratic model, and argued that planning is better defined as a
process of disjointed incrementalism. A third group rejects the nor-
mative implications of this incrementalist model and places greater
emphasis on the factors which intervene in the formulation of policy.
This view regards planning primarily as a political process, and sees
the role of the planner as an intermediary or facilitator of decision
making.
We find none of these formulations entirely satisfactory for the pur-
poses of this enquiry into an application of an integrated approach to
development in the Potosi region of Bolivia. Drawing from many of the
writings reviewed here, and mindful of the characteristics of planning
in poor countries, we have therefore reformulated an alternative model
which views planning as a decision making process, in which decisions
are molded by technical criteria, by political concerns, and equally if
not more importantly by institutional considerations.
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The Rational or Scientific Model of Planning
Early theories viewed planning as an exercise in logical, rational deci-
sion making, based on objective and scientific enquiry. In this view,
the emphasis was on producing a plan as an end product, and little
attention was paid to its implementation. The role of the planner was to
be objective, non-partisan, primarily a technician or scientist, a
dispassionate analyst.
Numerous formulations of this approach may be found in the literature,
pertaining not only to the planning of public policy but also the
3planning of business enterprises . A typical example, provided by Alden
and Morgan, starts with the definition of objectives and goals, which is
followed by the collection of data, an exploration of policy alter-
natives, an evaluation of those alternatives, the selection of the
preferred course of action, and usually concludes with its implemen-
4
tation . Occasionally, an additional stage is added covering monitoring
and evaluation to provide feedback to earlier stages. Almost invariably,
this cycle is presented as a sequential process, in which each stage is
completed before the next one begins.
Critics were quick to point out, however, that this rational prescrip-
tive approach to planning was almost impossible to achieve, and bore
little relation to the real world 5. As Lindblom has observed, policy
analysis is hobbled in the first instance by the difficulty of defining
6
the problem, which often resists scientific analysis . When the problem
is unclear, goals and objectives are hard to set, and only become clear
as planning advances, sometimes not until close to the end of the
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7project . Furthermore, only the most vaguely defined goals are likely to
be agreed on, since the many participants in any policy issue inevitably
seek diverse ends.
Next, the rational model requires what economists call "perfect infor-
mation". Almost always, however, crucial data is lacking, which res-
tricts the analyses that can be undertaken. More importantly, as Rittel
and Webber have observed, planning problems are "wicked": there is no
definitive formulation of the problem; solutions are not true or false,
8
but good or bad, and that depends on one's standpoint . Further, our
theoretical and empirical knowledge of society is still primitive. As
Webber has added: "the sad truth is that we simply do not yet know
enough about the workings of social systems to be able to say what can
be done to 'engineer' them into more desirable states" 9 . Not only that,
but the complexity of social interventions means that consequences are
largely unpredictable. Finally, the evaluation of alternative policies
cannot be determined without reference to priorities, implying relative
10
values, which technical or scientific planning says nothing about1. As
any observer of the real world can show, policies are ultimately deter-
mined by many other factors apart from strictly technical considera-
tions. Moreover, as Moris adds, choices are often limited by prior
commitments, and planners in most poor countries have weak control over
11
the execution of policies
In light of these widespread criticisms, many theorists have attempted
to patch up the logical model with increasingly sophisticated inter-
pretations of the planning process, based now on what is referred to as
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"bounded rationality" 12. Many of them draw heavily on systems app-
roaches, which were particularly popular during late 1960s and early
1970s. These stress a comprehensive perspective of the planning environ-
ment, seeking to capture a wider range of factors impinging on the
planning process. Some of the more ambitious versions attempt to accom-
modate so-called "extraneous" non-technical considerations arising from
13
cultural, political and institutional sources
McLoughlin, for example, regards a plan as a "trajectory through which a
system is reguired to pass", and talks about implementation in terms of
control: "the essence of (which) is to regulate those disturbances so
that the system's actual trajectory matches intention as closely as
14
possible" . Chadwick regards operations research and planning as the
same thing, "optimising the performance of a system", although he grants
15
that planning deals with more complex systems . In an attempt to
resolve the recognised differences that inevitably arise in regional
planning between national and regional authorities, Garcia Ayaviri has
proposed a method derived from Tinbergen for selecting investment pro-
16jects based on weighted priorities1. All these latter day variants,
however, still maintain questionable assumptions about the nature of
planning: that decisions concerning choices can be reached based on
rational criteria; that planners are dominant in decision making; and
that outcomes can be molded to match plans.
Within this rubric of comprehensive rational models of the planning pro-
cess, we can also include the subset of policy approaches based on inte-
grated regional or rural development. The integrated approach emphasises
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inter-sectoral coordination, and the orderly concerted implementation of
a related set of actions within a defined target area or sub-region.
Weitz provides a sophisticated example of this approach, which stresses
the human element of development, the need for involving the target com-
munities or population groups in decision making, and also for vertical
coordination between national and local agencies, and horizontal
17
coordination among line agencies operating in the same locality
While in principle one cannot but agree with the desirability of coor-
dination and participation, there lurks a hint of contradiction and
potential conflict. The more numerous the parties to decision making,
the more surely there will arise differences of opinions, priorities and
goals. As Rein and Rabinovitz observe, greater participation slows
implementation, and increases the risk of inaction1 8.
This rational model of the planning process is not merely confined to
academics and theorists, but underlies current practice among prac-
titioners and planning agencies everywhere. Furthermore, this model is
implicit in numerous ex post evaluation studies of planning experience
which judge performance by comparing plans with outcomes. Time and again
such studies conclude that a planning exercise was ineffective, or more
bluntly was a failure, because actions did not appear to bear much
resemblance to the original plans. Such conclusions imply that non-
technical interventions in decision making are extraneous disturbances
which merely distort planners' intentions, rather than representing real
world interests of people and institutions other than planners.
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Sceptics and anti-planners.
Not surprisingly, the scientific planning model has drawn heavy fire
from many quarters. Sceptics point to the wide discrepancy between the
prescriptive logical model and empirical reality. In an influential
paper, Hirschman and Lindblom advanced the notion of disjointed incre-
mentalism as being a more accurate representation of planning and deci-
sion making in the real world 19 In this view, policy making is more
often remedial, serial, and fragmented, constantly subject to revision
and correction. A more extreme reaction has been articulated by Wil-
davsky in a number of articles, in which he has systematically attacked
20
the sacred cows of rational planning2. In a book written together with
Caiden, on planning in poor countries, he eventually reached the point
of calling for "the abolition of comprehensive multi-sectoral planning",
21
advocating instead more emphasis on budgetting and project selection
Although these criticism are valid in that planning in the real world
rarely approximates the pristine consistency of the logical model, com-
mentators have questioned the normative implications which these authors
have drawn. Decision making may often be remedial and fragmented, but
does that necessarily mean it ha. to be that way? In the case of Caiden
and Wildavsky, one might agree that comprehensive multi-sectoral plan-
ning is often problematic, yet shifting the onus to budgetting is
illusory, since some broader perspective is essential to avoid making
arbitrary decisions.
The Pluralistic Model of Planning
Another school of planning theorists which has gradually gained ascen-
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dancy in recent years, sees the making of public policy as first and
foremost a political process, in which solutions are not so much planned
as a resultant of pluralistic decision making, which involves competing
22
interests and pressure groups2. In this view the focus of interest is
not so much the plans as the process of plannning, while the planner is
viewed as an intermediary among competing factions, or as a facilitator
of discussion and decision making. Rondinelli, for example, sees plan-
ning as "adjunctive", or: "A process of facilitating adjustment among
competing interests within a multinucleated ..... structure to encourage
conditions of marginally better quality than under the status quo" 23. A
similar view is expressed by Webber, who regards the role of the planner
as a facilitator of debate, and argues: "An effective style of planning
calls for procedures which might help plural politics reach decisions in
acceptable ways"
However, there are several problems with this pluralistic model of
planning. In the first instance, just as earlier critics questioned the
assumption of a planner's objectivity in the rational-deductive model,
so too it is difficult to imagine that a planner can maintain a neutral
role as an intermediary or interlocutor among disputing interest groups.
In the course of debating the problem, and learning the positions of the
parties affected, a planner is more likely to reach conclusions about a
preferred solution, and would almost inevitably be more interested in
furthering that course of action, than in facilitating pragmatic
compromises.
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Secondly, by emphasising the process of planning and decision making,
this model tends to downplay the relevance of conventional technical
studies, and the role of longer term policy perspectives, while diver-
ting attention from the crucial issue of implementation. There is a
danger that in stressing planning as a process, the skills of facili-
tating adjustment and compromise may be perfected without yet producing
action: to use Rodwin's metaphor, planners, like a basketball team,
might "excel in passing, cutting, ballhandling, and teamwork, but not in
25
scoring"2. Furthermore, by stressing the political dimensions of plan-
ning, this model tends to underestimate the role of planning institu-
tions in swaying policy formulation by setting the initial agenda. As
Friend & Jessop put it, politicians may take decisions, but it is the
planners who usually make them26
Planners' perceptions in Potosi
These different interpretations of the nature of the planning process
are not merely of academic interest, but have a direct bearing on the
way practitioners interpret their role as planners, which in turn
affects their choice of actions, their expectations, and ultimately the
outcomes which result. In Potosi, the leadership for the project came
essentially from three people: the senior author of the original UFRD
concept paper, CORDEPO's director of planning, and the long term
resident adviser. Each of them had their own understanding of the goals
of the project, and their own perception of the nature of the planning
process in which they were engaged. In retrospect, this significantly
affected the way they viewed their tasks, the scope of work they
undertook, and the direction they gave to planning activities.
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In the first instance, the senior author's chief interest in the project
was as a field test for the concepts and methods embodied in the UFRD
approach as part of a larger ongoing effort to improve it for wider
dissemination in other countries of the world. More significantly,
however, he was a leading critic of the rational deductive model of
planning described above, and an advocate of what we refer to as the
pluralist model, in which as he puts it: "planning is the process of
facilitating decision making"2 7
Accordingly, the UFRD approach to integrated development as conceived by
its authors really contained two agendas. The first of these was ex-
plicit: it was designed as a strategy for integrated regional develop-
ment, stressing the spatial articulation of the urban-rural system. The
second agenda, however, was never really addressed directly in the pro-
ject documents for practitioners. This agenda, which was intended to be
incorporated implicitly in the form and content of the methodology, con-
ceived UFRD as an attempt to redirect planning efforts away from the
traditional obsession with final definitive plans, towards the concept
of planning as a process. The main goal was seen to be the setting up of
an ongoing mechanism to provide decision makers with better information
to guide their decisions, emphasising in this case the spatial dimen-
sions of the region's economy.
This second agenda, however, was never properly grasped by the other two
leaders of the project. CORDEPO's director of planning had a very dif-
ferent perspective on both the goals of the UFRD project and the nature
of the planning process. As has been pointed out before, CORDEPO was in
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the process of trying to make the adjustment from a public works agency
for the City of Potosi to a development corporation with responsibility
for the entire Department. The planning director had joined the Cor-
poration in the spring of 1979 on a two year contract - later extended
for a third - with the specific mission, defined by himself, of pro-
viding the organization with a clear statement of direction and a better
sense of how to get there.
His main task, as he saw it, was to oversee the preparation of a medium
term regional development plan. For him, the UFRD project with the
promise of a resident long term adviser was an excellent opportunity to
further this task. As an economist, he was well versed on development
problems from a national perspective, though less familiar with the
rural or regional implications, and still less with theories of plan-
ning. In October 1980, he attended a two month course in Israel at
Rehovot, and returned freshly inspired by their approach to integrated
28
rural development . Thereafter, he was better able to understand the
spatial concepts implicit in the UFRD approach, and added his own con-
tribution by stressing the importance of agriculture as the economic
base of area development projects. But he never really began to recog-
nize the second agenda behind the UFRD methodology which was oriented to
the process of planning itself.
To some extent, this was because the resident adviser also failed to
recognize it too, even though he was a regional planner, was familiar
with the literature on planning theory, and knew the work of the author
of the UFRD approach. However, this was his first assignment as a prac-
titioner of regional planning, and he was initially more concerned with
understanding what others required of him, than with introducing more
esoteric concepts of planning. He took as his brief the plan of work
prepared by the Office of Urban Development of USAID, which stressed
field surveys, spatial analyses, assistance with the preparation of
development plans, the training of personnel, and the preparation of
29
workshop materials
In the process of evolving a working relationship with the director of
planning, the resident adviser accepted the notion that the primary pur-
pose of the UFRD studies was to feed into the preparation of a medium
term development plan. Consequently, he interpreted the methodology as
an example of the rational deductive model of planning, stressing a
sequential relationship between analysis, plan making and implemen-
tation. Furthermore, in the course of preparing training materials and
elaborating CORDEPO's Regional Plan, he introduced several revisions,
aimed at resolving what he perceived as defects in its structure,
notably the lack of emphasis on plan execution. Only after his return to
the United States, and working on two reports for USAID in Washington
recording the experiences of the Potosi project, did the difference of
perceptions between him and the senior author of the UFRD approach
finally come to the surface.
To reiterate, both the director of planning at CORDEPO and the resident
adviser essentially adopted a technocratic and sequential view of
planning. They saw their main task initially as one of producing a
regonal development plan, and only after this was completed, did
-143-
they intend to turn their attention to the issues of implementation.
True the director of planning had initiated a number of steps which he
considered would be necessary to facilitate implementation, but he
envisaged no detailed collaboration and consultation with other local
entities until the first draft of the Plan had been completed. The
resident adviser, being an outsider, was less familair with the internal
decision making procedures of the Corporation, and the relationships
between CORDEPO and other local institutions. He regarded his task as
concentrating on the technical aspects of planning, and was content to
leave implementation to his counterpart, who clearly understood the
local network far better. In retrospect, the lack of forethought given
to how the Plan was to be carried out was clearly a major facto
contributing to the problems which arose later during its execution.
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CHAPTER 7. PLANNING AND DECISION MAKING
In the last chapter, we introduced several theories of the planning
process, some of them empirical, others normative. In this chapter we
look at a number of assumptions which underlie many of these views of
planning, and compare them with our observations of what took place in
Potosi. Given our reservations about the models discussed earlier, we
propose instead an alternative interpretation of the nature of planning,
which sees it as a decision making process, influenced by technical
criteria, political concerns, and the institutional characteristics of
the organizations involved.
In looking back over the experience in Potosi, we address two main
questions: what is the nature of this decision making process; and what
is the relative importance of the three factors in shaping decisions
concerning policy, and the execution of programs and projects? In the
concluding chapter which follows, we return to our original question
concerning the viability of integrated approaches to development, and
discuss the implications for practitioners.
A conventional view of planning and decision making.
A source of much confusion in discussions of the planning process arises
from underlying notions of the relationship between planning, decision-
making, and implementation. Conventionally, the relationship is often
represented as in figure 7.1, which is based on four broad assumptions:
that the three activities are sequential; that they are discrete; that
decisions are followed by corresponding actions; and that decisions are
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FIGURE 7.1: A CONVENTIONAL VIEW OF THE PLANNING PROCESS.
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(or should be) based solely on objective technical criteria. Judging by
empirical analysis of planning practice and behaviour in Potosi, not one
of these assumptions proves to be valid.
The picture represented by this figure implies, first of all, that the
three elements take place sequentially. The planning process is supposed
to start with a statement of goals, an analysis of the problem, and the
preparation of plans or policy recommendations. These are reviewed by
some group of decision makers, and once adopted are then carried out or
put into practice.
But a quick review of events in Potosi shows that this is demonstrably
false: programs and projects were already being implemented long before
the new leadership assumed power at CORDEPO and the planning of an
integrated approach to development got under way. Preliminary findings
and policy conclusions reached in the course of the analytical studies
started to feed into the annual operating plans and program designs long
before the Regional Plan was officially released for circulation, or any
formal decision was taken concerning it. Similarly, it is hard to
pinpoint any one moment at which a "decision" was made that initiated
the implementation of the new policy for integrated development, or any
one component of it. It would be more accurate to say that all three
activities were going on contemporaneously, in parallel.
This representation also suggests that planning, decision making and
implementation are discrete and separate activities, involving different
sets of people. Planning is thought of as a self-contained scientific
exercise, devoted to evaluating alternative approaches to a problem.
Decision making is treated as the realm of some outside body uninvolved
in the day to day activities of planning and implementation, for example
a council of elected representatives, a board of directors, or other
superior authority. Implementation, on the other hand, is regarded as a
totally separate operation, which is no longer the responsibility of
planners, but of some separate department, or even a quite different
organization.
Once we look more closely, however, at the way things were done in
Potosi, it becomes extremely difficult to maintain any such clear dis-
tinction between these three activities. Decisions were clearly being
made during the preparation of plans and budgets, concerning the selec-
tion, location, and timing of programs and projects, and continued to be
made during what might normally be thought of as the implementation
stage, to reflect changing conditions and circumstances.
Furthermore, when we try to define when planning stops and implemen-
tation starts, we find it is not as easy as it might seem. Does it begin
when the first sod is lifted from the ground; when a contractor is hired
to start construction; when the funds are raised to finance the program
and pay the contractor; or when feasibility studies are started to jus-
tify the project and raise the funds? It might be said that implementa-
tion begins when a decision is made to go ahead with the project. But
again which decision at what stage? It begs the question since for any
project there is never a single decision, but many along the way from
initial conception to the cutting of the ceremonial ribbon. In short, we
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find the distinction between the two activities to be unhelpful, and
misleading.
To treat planning and implementation as separate activities is not only
misleading, it would seem from the evidence in Potosi to be the reason
why so much planning goes awry, and contributes to the oft mentioned
tendency among planners to ignore what is to happen to their plans after
they have been neatly bound between smart covers . Instead, it would be
more accurate to say that these three activities are not distinct or
separate, but overlapping and interwoven. This has significant implica-
tions for planning practice, which are explored in the next chapter.
Another assumption or common misunderstanding which arises from the
above formulation is that once decisions are made, they are carried out;
that the actions which follow a decision 'necessarily conform to the
intentions behind it. This assumption is often implicit in the arguments
of those who prefer to treat planning as a political process, in which
the main issue is the resolution of competing interests in formulating
policy, or choosing actions. By focussing so intently on the debate
surrounding the making of policy, most of which takes place outside the
planning institution, and which involves factions represented on the
decision making body, commentators often forget or overlook what happens
afterwards. Yet,, as is all too clear in Potosi, there is a world to
travel between making a key decision and translating it into concrete
actions. At the end of the day the sum of the actions carried out may
look very different from the policy originally intended.
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Perhaps the most misleading aspect of the conventional picture outlined
here is the idea that decisions are based exclusively on supposedly
objective technical criteria presented by the planners in their studies
and plans. This is certainly the assumption that many make when they
point to the so-called failure of much planning, because outcomes or
actions do not resemble the intent expressed in the original documents.
They ignore or overlook other considerations that enter into the making
of decisions, many of which have little or nothing to do with technical
criteria or the viewpoint of planners.
Planning as decision-making.
Given the limitations of this representation of the planning process, we
propose instead an alternative interpretation, based on our observation
of events in Potosi, which have been outlined in previous chapters. We
start by rejecting the notion that planning, decision making, and imple-
mentation are distinct from each other. Instead, it would seem more
helpful to focus on the activity of decision making itself, as the key
process which explains how outcomes materialize the way they do. In
particular we want to know what is the substance of decisions; who makes
them; what form do they take; and most importantly, what are the factors
which influence those decisions? For the purpose of discussion we will
adopt a model of decision making represented by figure 7.2.
In this model, we can think of decisions as requiring inputs, and pro-
ducing outputs. The inputs are the factors taken into account in order
to make or reach a decision, and derive from three sources. The tech-
nical criteria are the conventional studies and analyses which planners
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FIGURE 7.2: PLANNING AS DECISION MAKING
-152-
prepare to understand the situation with which they are dealing, here
described in chapter 3. The political concerns refer to the interests of
the parties affected by the actions contemplated, or the groups partici-
pating in the making of the decisions. In countries with functioning
democratic institutions these are of course likely to be far more
prominent than was the case in Bolivia. The third factor refers to the
characteristics of the institutions and organizations participating in
the planning process. These are often overlooked by policy analysts, yet
as is evident from Potosi they exert a pervasive influence in shaping
outcomes.
The substance of decisions
The outputs that interest us are the decisions which relate to the
activities of the institutions involved in planning and implementation,
in this case CORDEPO and other agencies responsible for development of
the Potosi region. These can be discussed at the level of the planning
process to which they refer, for example the overall goals or objectives
to be achieved, the policies or strategies adopted to reach these goals,
the programs around which activities are organized, or the individual
projects that make up these programs.
The substance of these decisions essentially concerns the nature, form,
and content of the activities being planned and implemented. In Potosi,
at the level of objectives, this involved a choice between stressing
national goals for economic growth or a more equitable form of develop-
ment favoring poor people in rural areas. At the level of policy, the
decision referred to a strategy of development based on mining and the
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processing of raw materials, versus one based on agriculture and manu-
facturing related to farm products. At the level of programs, decisions
typically concerned which areas of the region should be given priority,
and which sectoral programs should be funded. Finally, at the level of
projects decisions dealt mainly with more detailed questions of
location, timing, and cost.
The people who make decisions.
Conventionally, as was mentioned before, we often think of decisions as
being made by people who are not planners themselves, but an elected
council, a board of directors, or perhaps some higher body of Ministers
in the central government. In this scenario, planners are supposed not
to have much to say in the making of decisions, since their role is seen
as little more than providing technical advice and information to guide
others. Alternatively, in a latter day variant of this view, their role
is to act as arbitrators or intermediaries between competing factions,
with the purpose of facilitating discussion and decision-making.
Certainly, this is the way it was envisaged that decisions would be made
under the law setting up the regional development corporations. This
requires CORDEPO to submit its plans and budgets to the Ministry of
Planning and Coordination for their approval before funds are released,
and vests authority to make decisions in the President of the Corpora-
tion and its Board of Directors. The Board, which meets once or twice a
month, is headed by the President, and made up of both ex officio
members - such as the Prefect of the Department, the commander of the
military garrison, the head of the university, and the director of the
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regional office of the Ministry of Agriculture - as well as nominated
representatives of selected civic groups. Specifically excluded from the
Board, however, are the planners and other professional staff of the
Corporation itself.
The Law envisaged that the Board would concern itself with formulating
regional development objectives and ensuring their compatibility with
national plans. In practice it acts as a channel for bringing proposals
and problems to the attention of the Corporation, and for resolving
operational difficulties with other arms of the government. Most of its
decisions are related to approving budgets, and solving issues arising
from ongoing activities of the Corporation. These typically include
administrative and personnel matters, and those pertaining to the
2
management and direction of major projects
Board members, however, were certainly not the only ones involved in
making decisions at CORDEPO. Take the the annual operating budgets as an
example. These were prepared and formulated essentially by the staff of
the Corporation, through a process of negotiation and compromise among
the heads of each sectoral department - such as agriculture, mining,
industry, tourism, and transportation - as well as the director of
planning, the financial controller, the managing director, and of course
CORDEPO's President. The Board's role in this process was marginal,
confined primarily to approving or amending what the staff, under the
guidance of the President and his advisers, had already prepared.
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Elsewhere, we find that decisions affecting the course of events were
being made at all levels of the Corporation, particularly in the
selection of individual projects within larger programs, for rural roads
or drinking water for example, and in the ongoing execution of them. At
one level, partly in response to political pressure from their
constituents, members of the Board were frequently urging the inclusion
of one project or another in the annual budget 3 . But at another level,
the officers of the Corporation were closest to events on the ground,
and when revenues were cut back or were late arriving, it was they who
had to determine which projects needed funds most urgently, and which
could be postponed or suspended. As such, decisions made in one place
were for ever being reviewed, reversed, overridden, or superseded by
decisions made elsewhere, often relating to another program or project.
The form of decisions
When we talk about a planning decision concerning the activities of an
institution, we tend to have in mind some formal document that records
the decision. Typically, this might be the minutes of Board meetings,
the resolutions of an elected body, contracts between the parties to a
project or program, development plans, or annual operating budgets. But
there are also many other more informal kinds of decisions made by
officers or staff of the organization which may be nothing more than
verbal agreements, orders, or instructions.
It would be wrong, however, to imagine that decisions made at a more
formal level necessarily carried more weight in determining the outcome
of events. Looking over the story told in the previous chapters, we can
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find copious examples of formal decisions which were not followed by
corresponding actions, or which were subsequently contradicted by other
events. The Regional Plan for example, which was the subject of so much
time and effort, was in a sense a formal statement of intent, even if it
was never officially sanctioned or adopted by CORDEPO's Board of direc-
tors. Nevertheless, it is quite clear from the discussion in chapter
4that the policies advocated in it were seriously compromised, if not
torpedoed, by the separate decision to devote the major share of limited
resources to two expensive projects which bore little relation to the
priorities expressed in the Plan.
At another level, the annual operating budgets were supposed to rep-
resent the basis of agreement between CORDEPO and the Ministry of
Planning and Coordination on the level of funding for the year in
question. Yet, time and again the promised funds failed to materialize,
due to ad hoc informal decisions by the Treasury and other senior
officials of the central government. Similarly, formal contracts,
between CORDEPO and other organizations laying down the terms of each
one's participation in joint projects, were constantly being violated,
sometimes because of the same funding troubles, but also because of
informal unilateral decisions by project managers or field staff. The
formal decision to establish a region-wide advisory commission in 1980
was later quietly dropped, it seems, by mutual agreement among some of
its members, while the initial decision to set up field offices for
area-based programs was very effectively quashed by the protests of the
staff involved.
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Factors which influence decisions.
A common assumption, referred to before, is that planning decisions are
made solely on the basis of supposedly scientific and objective cri-
teria examined in the studies and plans prepared by planners. As was
only too clear from the previous chapters, the reality is quite dif-
ferent. We have suggested in our representation of planning as decision
making in figure 7.2, that three considerations enter into the picture.
Certainly technical criteria are not to be discounted, but two other
factors should also be taken into account when trying to understand how
outcomes evolve. These are political issues of concern to the formal
decision making body of the organization, in this case CORDEPO's Board
of Directors, and a set of issues arising from the characteristics of
the institutions involved in planning and implementation.
A) Technical criteria.
Whereas it is assumed that technical considerations ought to influence
decisions, political and institutional considerations are often treated
as extraneous interventions which merely serve to distort the objective
evaluation of alternative courses of action. In terms of our represen-
tation of decision making in figure 7.2, the question then becomes: to
what extent did the technical criteria influence decisions concerning
the elements represented along the bottom of the diagram - namely goals,
policies, programs, and projects?
In Potosi, the issue of goals and objectives was never seriously dis-
cussed. Staff were frequently urged to give it thought in the prepara-
tion of the sectoral components of the Regional Plan, but the discussion
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never advanced beyond a few platitudes of "balanced" growth, taken to be
a code word for a more equitable pattern of growth aimed not just at the
urban population but rural residents too. Alternative goals of outright
economic growth, for example, may have been favored by some individuals,
but the equity line was more or less adopted from the outset by the
director of planning, and few challenged it. Some tentative studies were
done exploring alternative scenarios at the macro-regional level, but
the lack of information made it difficult to reach any reliable or
meaningful conclusions.
At the level of formulating policy directions, however, technical
considerations entered more forcefully into decisions. As was shown in
chapter 4, they made a measurable impact on the direction of events, and
the reorientation of the Corporation's de facto priorities. At least
initially, spending swung away from the traditional emphasis on infra-
structure towards more directly productive activities, and the earlier
concentration of resources in and around the city of Potosi was reduced
in favor of other parts of the region. In addition, the initial assump-
tion of basing development on traditional mining activities and related
industrial processing plants was dropped in favor of a strategy oriented
to agriculture and the rural sector.
Technical considerations also played a significant role at the program
level. The studies analysing the spatial dimensions of the region's
economy in part prompted the notion of organizing development efforts on
the basis of functional economic areas, which in turn spurred a marked
surge of interest among international agencies and induced them to
become involved in area-based programs in the Department.
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Nevertheless, at the point where technical methods are supposed to play
an important role, namely in the evaluation and selection of progams and
projects, they were largely ignored. Once it was decided to go ahead
with the idea of area-based packages of projects, the resident adviser
attempted to introduce a method of evaluating these packages and ranking
them in order of priority. This included a simplified cost-benefit anal-
ysis to represent efficiency considerations, indicators of development
levels to represent equity concerns, as well as a geo-political factor
often stressed by the central government, reflecting a long felt
preoccupation with populating sparsely settled frontier zones. In
practice, however, the program packages were evaluated only in the most
rudimentary manner. The selection of areas to be included in the budget
was determined primarily by the preferences expressed by the prospective
funding agencies.
Evaluation studies and other technical considerations played an equally
marginal role in determining which projects should be included in annual
budgets. The strategy for area-based development enabled staff to gen-
erate numerous proposals for projects in agriculture and small scale
manufacturing, while the assignment of towns and villages to function as
rural and local service centers provided clear guidelines for choosing
projects for urban infrastructure and rural roads. Nevertheless, with
the exception of the energy sector, these guidelines were more or less
ignored in practice.
Even where more detailed feasibility studies had been prepared, the
findings rarely influenced funding deliberations. In the agricultural
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sector, for example, CORDEPO planners proposed to the administrators of
the PL480 program two projects for stock breeding, one for llamas, the
other for sheep. Even though studies commissioned from outside consul-
tants indicated in both cases that net benefits would be negligible,
CORDEPO staff and the funding administrators were keen to proceed with
the projects. Eventually both of them received the go ahead, partly
because PL480 funds had already been allocated to CORDEPO and these
proposals were the best submitted.
Apart from other issues, one reason why evaluation studies are heeded
little is that no one has much confidence in them. The data needed to
estimate demand, or calculate costs and benefits, are often hard to find
or collect. Methods are not standardised, and staff are rarely well
versed in them. This leads to such a diversity of assumptions and tech-
niques that it becomes virtually impossible to compare projects in any
14
meaningful way .
Political factors impinging on planning decisions.
In many countries commentators have argued that public policy is shaped
primarily by political factors. In Bolivia, partly perhaps because
democratic institutions were suspended under the military government, we
find this not to be the case. Rather than shaping decisions, political
considerations tended if anything to deter CORDEPO's Board of Directors
from taking a stance on broad policy matters.
The national planning system, set up under the military dictatorship of
General Banzer, paid little consideration to the relationship between
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the planning system and democratic institutions for policy making. The
absence of this link is even more pronounced at the regional level,
since even under a civilian government no provision exists in the con-
stitution for an elected assembly to represent the people of the Depart-
ment, or any of its cities and towns. The Prefect of the Department, the
Sub-Prefects of the provinces, and the mayors of all the towns are nom-
inated, not elected, as are members of their corresponding councils or
committees, and the same is true of CORDEPO's Board of Directors.
Recent efforts to establish formal structures for public participation
have not endured. During the period of civilian government following the
resignation of General Banzer in 1978, a new organization, the Civic
Committee of the South, was set up comprising representatives of
political parties, labor unions, and other community groups from the
three Departments of the south - Potosi, Chuquisaca and Tarija. Its goal
was to facilitate debate of important common issues facing the three
Departments, to articulate perceived needs, and to press for appropriate
actions by the relevant public agencies. For a while the organization
flourished, and made some progress in formulating an ambitious platform
of policy proposals for furthering the economic and social development
of that part of the country. However, after the Garcia Meza military
coup of July 1980, all such organizations were proscribed and most of
their leaders hounded down or chased out of the country. In Bolivia,
where political instability is the norm, and government is by dictator-
ship more often than not, the status of such bodies is fragile, and they
are easily dismantled by martial law or Presidential decree.
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The absence of democratic institutions to participate in the making of
public policy leads to a number of far reaching implications for the
behaviour of the Corporation. In the first place, since it is not
accountable to any elected assembly, it receives no mandate, no direct
legitimation of its actions. Instead the onus of responsibility and
accountability falls on the Board of Directors. Secondly, by the same
token, the Corporation can turn to no elected assembly for political
support in fighting for its interests. To argue its case convincingly in
the centers of power and influence in the government, it needs to be
able to make a credible and legitimate claim that it speaks for all the
people of Potosi. This means that it has to rely instead on maintaining
a widespread base of popular support throughout the region.
This induces a pattern of behaviour calculated to minimise public criti-
cism and controversy, and to emphasize the Corporation's ability to get
things done. First, the Board avoids taking a public stance on policy
directions, for fear of alienating particular factions or community
5groups . But the Board's aversion to public pronouncements also means
that it tends to shy away from explicit decisions on broader policy
guidelines altogether, even privately within the Corporation, preferring
instead to deal with more limited decisions confined to specific
projects.
The Board's reluctance to commit itself to specific policies may be
judicious politics, but it seriously handicaps the ability of CORDEPO
leaders to ensure a consistent line of action among their own depart-
ments, let alone to secure the collaboration of other agencies in
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pursuing a common approach to regional development. The absence of clear
policy directives in part explains the ambiguity and inconsistencies to
be found in the annual operating plans, since the competing factions
within the leadership are constantly vying for limited funds for their
own priorities.
In the case of the Regional Plan, for example, the Board never formally
adopted it, nor pronounced it official Corporation policy. Without this
commitment, the policies articulated in it were treated essentially as
those advocated by the planners, and were not supported with the same
level of conviction by all members of staff. Some were sceptical of the
time and energy spent on planning, others preferred to stick to familiar
procedures, or to concentrate on project design within their sector,
rather than concerning themselves with larger issues which they did not
always understand, and which they often felt were irrelevant.
Another consequence of the need to maintain wide public support is
CORDEPO's inbuilt tendency to prefer "safe" project-oriented engineering
activities, rather than "riskier" people-oriented social programs. For
example, the Corporation was quite willing for a while to provide funds
for the construction of buildings to house schools or health clinics,
but was much less enthusiastic about proposals to become involved in the
running of social programs such as a literacy campaign, or farmers'
cooperatives. In part, this was due also to the longer term cost impli-
cations, the existence of other institutions ostensibly responsible for
such activities, and perhaps most of all CORDEPO's lack of experience in
such matters.
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CORDEPO's preoccupation with its public image as the foremost develop-
ment agency in the region, also helps to explain its otherwise question-
able decisions to embark on certain high-profile projects. This appears
to have been the principal motive behind the Corporation's involvement
in 1979 in the launching of a passenger airline providing service
between the City of Potosi and La Paz. It is hard to argue that such a
service was needed, since others already existed, and it certainly made
little sense from any cost-benefit point of view. It might have in-
creased tourist traffic slightly, but only a tiny proportion of the
local population (and visiting foreign consultants) could afford to pay
the price of a ticket. Nevertheless, it proved an immense success with
the public, perhaps as a token of the region's economic advancement. The
person credited with launching it, the then President of the Corpo-
ration, was later honored by the local newspaper, . Siglo, as the
Imperial City's Esteemed Citizen of the Year.
The concern with maintaining a popular base of support throughout the
region also colours CORDEPO's dealings with rural communities. Until
quite recently, there had been a long history of hostility and conflict
arising out of the exploitation of the campesinos by townsfolk6. Al-
though this traditional enmity has lessened in recent years, partly as a
result of the reforms brought about since the revolution of 1952, it
still surfaces from time to time, especially during periods of political
upheaval and economic hardship.
In the absence of a provision in the constitution for elected assemblies
at the regional level, rural communities have developed their own chan-
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nels for expressing demands to the Board of the Corporation. Despite the
handicap of often having to travel several days to reach the city of
Potosi, a ceaseless stream of deputations from all corners of the
Department arrived at the offices of the Corporation with pleas for
infrastructure, or aid with farming, mining, or marketing ventures.
Such requests were treated circumspectly, and passed along to the tech-
nical staff of the department concerned, to be added to the list of
proposals to be investigated. Though progress might be accelerated with
the help of influential connections, most demands were usually examined
and, if appropriate, were eventually entered into the budget. The reluc-
tance to drop many small projects for urban infrastructure and rural
feeder roads, in favor of others which met the criteria of policies for
the spatial articulation of the urban-rural system, was due in part to
the Corporation's concern not to provoke old sores and animosity among
their rural constituencies by reneging on earlier commitments, even if
only informal verbal agreements.
Institutional factors influencing planning decisions.
As was mentioned in the last chapter, many planning theorists and policy
analysts stress the importance of political factors in determining the
outcome of planning decisions, but tend in the process to overlook or
underplay the role of institutional characteristics. On the other hand
those who have focused on the implementation of policy stress the
importance of factors arising from the environment .in which implementa-
tion takes place in explaining the divergence between intended policy
and actual outcomes . Looking back over the evidence presented in the
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previous chapters, four institutional characteristics stand out as being
important in shaping decisions: the source of the Corporation's income;
its legal powers, or rather the lack of them; the internal structure of
the organization; and particularly the origins of the Corporation as a
public works committee for the City of Potosi.
The law creating the regional development corporations intended that
they should assume primary responsibility for coordinating development
efforts within each Department, yet it failed to provide them with the
financial or legal means to fulfill this role. One of the most serious
impediments is the lack of an independent source of income, which means
that most Corporations are totally dependent on the national Treasury.
Even though budgets are approved by the Ministry of Planning and Coor-
dination and the Ministry of Finance, this carries little significance
since the parlous state of the country's economy means that disburse-
ments frequently fall short of the sums agreed in the annual operating
budgets.
In CORDEPO's case, their income derives almost entirely from a single
source, royalties on minerals (see table 7.1). If these are exported as
raw materials, the royalties are levied directly through either the
national mining company, COMIBOL, or the Mining Bank, which purchases
the output from private sources. Alternatively, if the minerals are
processed, the royalties are collected through the state refining
enterprise, ENAF. In the first case the revenue is passed first to the
Treasury, before being forwarded to CORDEPO. When the government starts
running short of cash, these funds tend to be diverted to other more
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TABLE 7.1: SOURCES OF CORDEPO'S PROJECTED INCOME 1978-1981.
(Thousands of current Bolivian pesos.)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 9 7 8 1 9 7 9 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 1
Source B$ % B$ 5 B$ 5 B$
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
National:
Own resources 1200 .5 1800 .6 1150 .3 30750 7.9
Transfers:
Banco Minero 29480 12.7 24000 8.5 47702 11.5 35506 9.1
ENAF (Min. Med) 0 .0 4800 1.7 6000 1.4 0 .0
COMIBOL 107520 46.2 90000 32.0 67504 16.3 30925 8.0
ENAF (COMIBOL) 19500 8.4 48000 17.1 143447 34.7 124222 32.0
Sales tax 0 .0 0 .0 1000 .2 0
Others:
Previous years 73074 31.4 109678 39.0 141227 34.2 160400 41.3
------------------ --- ------
Sub-total 230774 99.3 278278 98.9 408030 98.7 381803 98.4
External:
UNICEF 1728 .7 3000 1.1 2510 .6 5000 1.3
UNESCO 0 .0 0 .0 2805 .7 0 .0
USAID (PL480) 0 .0 0 .0 0 .0 1302 .3
Sub-total 1728 .7 3000 1.1 5315 1.3 6302 1.6
TOTAL 232502 100.0 281278 100.0 413345 100.0 388105 100.00
Source: CORDEPO: Planes Operativos for 1978 through 1981.
urgent purposes. As a result, CORDEPO's annual budget invariably
includes an accumulated backlog of unpaid entitlements.
When times are particularly bad the Corporation may only receive a small
fraction of the amount projected in its budget. (See table 7.2.) In
1981, for example, revenues amounted to a mere 30% of what was expected.
In the case of current royalties, which were projected to yield half the
Corporation's income for the year, only a niggardly one seventh was
actually transferred. Some efforts have been made to generate local
revenues, but the capacity of the region to generate these is minimal.
Instead, administrators have to rely mainly on back payments of royal-
ties from previous years.
Since the shortfall in projected income is virtually a perennial event,
the Corporation has adapted its behaviour accordingly. Financial con-
trollers become much more wary about releasing funds, since they know
they cannot count on receiving payments from the Treasury as projected
in the budget. This creates a constant struggle between project needs
and available resources. When funds are so tight, priority clearly has
to be given to those projects or ventures that simply cannot be post-
poned or suspended. Typically these include ongoing activities in which
the Corporation's own work crews are involved, such as building roads,
drinking water and sewage systems. This handicaps other projects which
require sustained investments over a longer time frame - effectively
most productive activities - since the President and financial con-
troller are understandably anxious to avoid getting into commitments
beyond assured foreseeable resources. Stalled or abandoned projects are
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TABLE 7.2: CORDEPO INCOME PROJECTED AND RECEIVED FOR 1981.
(Thousands of Bolivian pesos.)
Source Projected Received As % of
Projected
National
Own resources 30750 24648 80.2
Bus terminal 500 287 57.4
Forrestry 50 19 38.0
Beer tax 12000 2689 22.4
Sales tax 600 370 61.7
Other 17600 21283 120.9
Transfers 190653 27127 14.2
Banco Minero 35506 5988 16.9
COMIBOL 30925 0 0.0
ENAF (Med/chica) 0 0 -
ENAF (COMIBOL) 124222 21139 17.0
From previous years 160400 66149 41.2
Banco Minero - 3519 -
COMIBOL - 0 -
ENAF(Med/chica) - 815 -
ENAF (COMIBOL) - 61815 -
Sub-total national 381803 117924 30.9
External
UNICEF 5000 0 0.0
USAID PL480 1302 0 0.0
Sub-total external 6302 0 0.0
TOTAL 388105 117924 30.4
Source: CORDEPO: "Control Presupuestario de Ingreso al 31 de diciembre
de 1981", staff document.
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bad publicity, and undermine the Corporation's image of being able to
get things done.
A second impediment to the Corporation's ability to fulfill its role as
chief coordinator of development activities in the Department is the
lack of any corresponding legal authority over other agencies working in
the region. This is no accident, since the national Ministries are
clearly anxious that the regional development corporations not be given
too much power, otherwise freedom to make their own decisions in the
region might be jeopardized.
This is not to say that the Corporation is reduced to a solo act, work-
ing in isolation from all other public agencies. On the contrary, as was
shown in the last chapter, CORDEPO has bilateral agreements and con-
tracts with many entities: both regional offices of central Ministries,
as well as local utility companies and quasi public national institu-
tions involved in economic development. These agreements cover a wide
variety of activities including resource surveys, road building, elec-
tricity generation and distribution, and extension services for farmers.
But it can hardly be claimed that these form part of any overall plan of
multi-sectoral coordination. Rather they would appear to be the outcome
of piecemeal decisions made as the need and opportunities arise.
Undoubtedly one of the main institutional factors impinging on the
behaviour of the organization, and the decisions it makes, stems from
its origins as a public works committee for the City of Potosi. In that
guise, it was staffed primarily with civil engineers. The transition to
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a development agency with responsibility for the entire department, was
obviously not accomplished overnight merely by the introduction of the
Law in 1978. It is bound to be a slow process, involving a fundamental
reorientation of corporate thinking, and the gradual absorption of a new
consciousness of purpose. This requires not merely changes and additions
in personnel, but also strong leadership with a clear sense of direc-
tion. It is clear from the way events have unfolded at CORDEPO, that
this transition has still not been completed even today.
These origins as a public works committee help to explain two prominent
features of the pattern in planned and actual spending: these concern
the selection of projects, and CORDEPO's performance in executing them.
Despite the new tasks assigned to the Corporation as a broad-based
development agency, the selection of individual projects still shows a
clear preference for public works activities, especially evident in the
decisions concerning the big-budget high-profile projects for the air-
port and the highway from Potosi to Tarapaya. It also goes a long way to
explain why CORDEPO is more efficient at executing infrastructure pro-
jects than those related to productive activities such as agriculture
and manufacturing. The staff of the Corporation, and the institution as
a whole, have simply accumulated far more experience and practice in
doing these things.
The process of evolving from a public works agency to a development
corporation is reflected in the organizational structure which was
introduced in 1979. (See fig 7.3) This more or less followed the
guidelines put out by the Ministry of Planning and Coordination to
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FIGURE 7.3: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF CORDEPO, 1979 - 1981.
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complement the Law of 1978, which suggested an organizational framework
appropriate for a regional development corporation. In line with the
conventional view of the planning process, represented by figure 7.1,
this framework made a clear distinction between planning and implemen-
tation, establishing separate departments for the two activities.
At CORDEPO, the existing staff of engineers concerned with public works
was regrouped as the technical bureau responsible for the execution of
programs and projects, chiefly roads, water, sewage, and other urban
works. Meanwhile a nascent planning bureau was beefed up by incor-
porating the department of agriculture, and by assigning it responsi-
bilities for the survey of the natural resources of the region, the
identification of development opportunities, and the design and evalua-
tion of programs and projects. Broadly speaking, the bureau in charge of
implementation was staffed predominantly with engineers, while the
bureau of planning was filled with social scientists, especially
economists.
The division of responsibilities between departments of planning and
implementation is of course consistent with the rational deductive model
of the planning process. But, as we pointed out before, it gives rise to
much confusion and muddled thinking about the nature of planning. Con-
sequently, % at CORDEPO it became a source of frequent problems, since it
reinforced the tendency to think of the two activities as sequential and
totally distinct. Furthermore, despite the reorganization in name, many
functions properly thought of -as planning - such as the selection and
location of projects - were retained by the sectoral teams in the
technical bureau.
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Inevitably this gave rise to differences in perception and priorities.
Many infrastructure projects require long lead times for field surveys,
engineering designs, and in some cases for organizing community inputs
of labour and materials. This investment of time and energy means that
those involved in executing them were reluctant to drop a project they
have been working on, simply because it happened not to match some
abstract policy for articulating the spatial system dreamed up by the
planners.
In addition to being a source of confusion, this organizational division
between planning and execution only served to exacerbate the underlying
tension between the older faction associated with the Corporation's
earlier role as a public works agency, and the newer group brought in to
make the transition to a development corporation. One member of staff
represented the tension as deriving from the different perceptions and
perspectives of engineers and economists. Certainly, engineers have
traditionally filled the two most senior positions of the Corporation,
as President and managing director, while an economist was appointed the
director of planning. Eventually, as we saw, this tension broke out into
open rebellion by the engineers over the decision to introduce a new
organizational framework, which set off a series of events which effec-
tively torpedoed much of the progress that had been made up until then.
The nature of planning as decision making.
If we were asked to identify the main features of the planning process
as we have observed it in Potosi, we would point to four. First of all,
decision making is not centralised but dispersed. Contrary to the notion
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that the reins of power are held in the hands of a central directorate,
we find that decisions affecting the direction of the Corporation's
activities are made not only by the Board of Directors, but by officers
and staff at all levels of the institution, as well as those belonging
to other agencies collaborating with CORDEPO. This makes it difficult to
monitor events, let alone to ensure that all decisions are consistent
with policy directives. Given the multitude of exogenous factors that
planners and other staff have to respond to, coordination becomes
largely impossible to achieve except among small groups, or within broad
outlines.
Secondly, decisions are not made in sequence but iteratively. In an
orderly world, we might expect decisions to be made sequentially, which
in terms of figure 7.2 would mean starting with the setting of goals,
and proceeding to the fomulation of policy, which in turn would deter-
mine the outlines of programs, and hence finally to the details of
specific projects. While those in charge of planning at CORDEPO cer-
tainly intended to proceed in this manner, the reality was often quite
different. For example, the policy statement outlining a strategy of
integrated rural development as part of the Regional Plan was only
released in the spring of 1982. This was supposed to guide among other
things the location of projects for urban infrastructure, yet nearly a
year before, in the summer of 1981, the Corporation signed a new agree-
ment with CARE for the provision of drinking water systems in rural
areas, and for several years before that had already been building such
systems all round the Department.
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Thirdly, decisions are not based on a fixed goal but shifting goals.
Again, in an ideal world, we might suppose that once key policies had
been determined, this would provide clear directions for subsequent
decisions concerning more detailed aspects of development activities.
But in Potosi we find that policy directions evolved through several
iterations, even though the overall objective of improving income levels
and standards of living remained constant. When the planning director
first arrived in the spring of 1979, the CORDEPO leadership declared the
intention of basing development policy on mining and related industries.
A year later, this was redefined in favor of agriculture and manufac-
turing related to farm produce, and one year after that planners had
come around to the conclusion that a necessary prerequisite for agri-
cultural development was a massive program for improving the network of
rural roads. A more accurate description, then, would be to say that
decision making can be thought of as a series of successive approxima-
tions, based on best judgements at any given moment in light of current
knowledge and understanding of the situation.
Finally, we would say that the implementation of policy does not occur
through the application of a consistent set of coordinated decisions,
but rather as the cumulative outcome of numerous, successive, often
contradictory decisions, made by the multitude of people involved in its
formulation and execution. Sometimes, the cumulative effect of informal
decisions, made by those assigned the task of executing policy, effec-
tively nullified its intent. This was the case, for example, with the
rural roads program which was intended to strengthen the links between
rural centers and their hinterlands. At other times, policy makers
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appear to have been more successful in achieving their intentions, par-
ticularly at the macro level in the budget allocation of funds, for
example between agriculture and transportation, or over the deconcen-
tration of investments in the city of Potosi. To use Lipsky's metaphor,
there were times when policy was shaped by the cop on the beat, but also
times when the captain held sway .
Footnotes.
1. The tendency among planners to ignore the issue of implementation
has been the subject of frequent commentary; see for example
Waterston (1965), pp 332-350; and more recently Bromley (1983).
2. This observation is inferred from conversations with Board members,
and senior planning staff, since the agenda and proceedings of Board
meetings are confidential.)
3. Compare Bromley's remarks on planning in Ecuador; Bromley (1977b), p
71.
4. This problem was by no means unique to CORDEPO. See for example
Irwin (1977), which reviews project evaluation procedures at the
national level.)
5. Rodwin has made a similar observation on the behaviour of the
Corporacion Venezolana de Guayana, the agency responsible for the
development of Ciudad Guayana in Venezuela; Rodwin (1969), p 474 .
6. Preston (1978), ch 1.
7. Rein and Rabinovitz (1978).
8. Lipsky (1978), p 393.
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PART IV:
CONCLUSION
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CHAPTER 8. IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTITIONERS
Let us return to the question with which this enquiry began: are
integrated approaches to rural and regional development a snare and
delusion? It is quite obvious from this account of events in Potosi that
such policies, calling for complex interagency coordination for the
programmed implementation of inputs, are most unlikely to be realised in
the neat and orderly way envisaged. Not only are the external conditions
in the larger planning environment far too volatile and unstable to
permit such orderly behaviour, but it is also evident that institutional
characteristics shaping the behaviour of the organizations involved are
prone to exert a strong influence in diverting initial plans from their
intended course.
Such policies, then, may be a snare, but they need not be a delusion.
Despite the substantial obstacles confronting such an approach, we do
not conclude that it is impractical, inappropriate, or that it should be
abandoned. Looking back over the evidence presented in the previous
chapters, it is clear that even though the actions carried out often
bore little relation to the intentions expressed in the Regional Plan,
nevertheless planners were able to exert a measurable impact on the
larger policy directions of the Corporation.
Furthermore, the analysis of the spatial dimensions of the region's
economy proved to be a source of valuable information not only for the
directors and staff of the Corporation, but also for other local
agencies, and not least for those international organizations now
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becoming involved in area-based projects in the region. In the terms of
the authors of the original UFRD approach, the exercise did achieve what
it set out to do; namely, to provide decision makers with the kind of
useful and practical information they need to make better informed
decisions.
Nevertheless, these modest achievemnets fall a long way short of what
migh be considered an effective application of a spatially integrated
approach to development. If we are to argue that integrated development
strategies should not be abandoned, then we must instead reconsider how
they can be executed more expeditiously.
What then can we learn from this enquiry which might be helpful for
practitioners? Many authors have commented on the conditions which are
necessary before planning can become effective . Indisputably, the con-
ditions under which planners have to operate in Bolivia are woefully
short of what might be desirable or conducive to orderly and consistent
planning. Nevertheless, most planners will long have met their maker
before such conditions are likely to materialise, and in the meantime as
Bromley has pointed out planning goes on even under the most difficult
2
circumstances . Given this truism, the more pertinent question to answer
is: how can practitioners plan more effectively under existing
conditions?
We have a number of suggestions.
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a) If planning is better represented as a decision making proces, then
the planner should become a strategist.
If planning is a technical process, then practitioners would be justi-
fied in focusing their efforts on technical analyses and the preparation
of blueprints for action. But the fate of the carefully crafted Regional
plan in Potosi is just one more example of so many other similar
stories: planning simply does not stop with the completion of a set of
plans. This is a time worn cliche, although unfortunately it seems that
most planners only learn this through their own experience.
If, on the other hand, as some commentators would have it, planning is
predominantly a political process, then it would be legitimate for
practitioners to focus their efforts on building a consensus among the
factions most intimately involved in the issues at hand. However, there
are difficulties with this interpretation. In Potosi, it is true that
important political issues colour decision making behaviour - witness
for example the Corporation's obsession with its public image, and the
Board's total aversion to committing itself to an explicit policy direc-
tion. Nevertheless, in countries like Bolivia where military dictator-
ship is the norm and where channels and instititutions for democratic
participation are weak, suspended, or non-existent, this interpretation
of planning as a political process is not entirely satisfactory. More-
over, the emphasis on the political process focuses on the policy
component of planning and decision making, and underplays what follows
after. As is amply illustrated in Potosi, deciding policy is only a
small part of the issue, and is no guarrantor of what is actually
implemented. Thus, the implications of this view for practitioners would
seem to be only partially relevant.
-182-
If, however, we think of planning as a decision making process, with the
characteristics described in the previous chapter, then the planner
should become a strategist. If decisions are not made sequentially but
iteratively, then practitioners should seek to identify the points of
maximum leverage in this process, which may not always be in the most
obvious places. At CORDEPO, it can be argued for example that the
meetings of the Board of Directors were of secondary importance to the
preliminary business of preparing the agenda for discussion. Certainly
the Regional Plan proved to be of far less significance than the annual
operating budgets, and as we have seen, the cumulative impact of
subordinate decisions in selecting small projects for rural roads and
other urban infrastructure ultimately makes or breaks the larger
strategy of articulating the spatial structure of the region.
If further, as we maintain, the activities of planning, decision making
and implementation are not distinct but overlapping and interwoven, then
practitioners should reassign responsibilities among their staff to
dissolve this artificial distinction. Instead they should be encouraged
to think about programs and projects in terms of the complete cycle of
conception, design, evaluation, through to execution and monitoring. In
CORDEPO, the division of labour between the planning bureau and the
technical bureau in charge of project execution only served as a source
of misunderstanding and divergent perceptions and objectives.
At the same time, any attempt to implement a spatially integrated app-
roach to development has to break down the inherent tendency among
sectoral groups to narrow their focus to their own activities at the
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exclusion of others. Given the specialised technical skills required,
and the need to communicate with related line agencies, it is probably
inevitable that those concerned with the planning and execution of
development activities will have to be organised around agriculture,
manufacturing, transportation, and other such sectors. Parallel to this,
however, staff should also be organised along a second dimension, accor-
ding to areal planning units. Thus, in addition to sectoral teams or
groupings, there should also be spatial teams, responsible for specific
areas, districts, or other sub-divisions of the region.
A further observation to be made in light of our enquiry into practice
in Potosi, is that decisions are not necessarily sequential or linear,
proceeding from the whole to the detail as a logical model might lead
one to expect. On the contrary, decision making can best be charac-
terised as iterative, a process of successive approximations, attempting
to move more closely to the perceived objective as circumstances change
and new information becomes available. At CORDEPO, for example, policy
may be defined in one way in the Regional Plan, but emerge in another
form when translated into the annual operating plans; it is constantly
being revised further in the course of adjusting budgets to new pro-
jections of income and spending, and only takes on final concrete shape
after a multitude of micro decisions in the course of project execution.
Given that decisions are based not on a fixed goal, but shifting goals,
it would also seem appropriate to abandon the idea of a formal medium
term development plan, and to concentrate instead on more modest partial
statements, revised and updated periodically as new circumstances and
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fresh insights dictate. Planners should think not of definitive declara-
tions, but successive approximations, which reflect current thinking,
and inputs from other local entities as they evolve.
Some diehards might object that this is no way to conduct planning:
constant revisions to statements and plans would only add to confusion,
since other departments and agencies rely on such outputs to make their
own decisions. Perhaps, but there is certainly no virtue in sticking to
a document that is supposed to be definitive, yet almost invariably
becomes obsolete the moment it appears. Change is in the nature of
planning, and while planners obviously need to make the best judgements
possible to minimise the revisions and changes required, it has to be
recognised that these are unavoidable.
b) If outcomes are molded primarily by institutional factors, then the
planner should become an educator.
Perhaps the most striking factor accounting for much of the Corpora-
tion's behaviour and especially the divergence between intent and
action, as represented by the annual operating budgets and actual
spending, lies with its origins as a public works agency. As was pointed
out, CORDEPO has long experience as a provider of urban infrastructure,
has learnt well how to design and implement such projects, and has
established effective ongoing operational procedures with other public
organizations for this purpose. However, the Corporation has evidently
not yet learnt how to be equally effective in carrying out projects and
programs in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. This is clearly
not merely a question of appointing the necessary technical staff, but
also a matter of institutional learning.
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In introducing new concepts of planning such as those related to spa-
tially integrated development, the planner therefore needs to think of
himself as an educator and disseminator of the new ideas and concepts.
First it is necessary to diffuse these new ideas as widely as possible
among all those involved in the planing process, including both depart-
ment chiefs - who may be reluctant to accept them - as well as to the
middle and junior level staff involved in both planning and implemen-
tation. This might be done through seminars, workshops, and working
papers reporting interim results of the studies as they are completed.
In short the planner should employ whatever means is available and
appropriate to explain and make known what it is that they are trying to
accomplish, the purpose of it all, and how it fits into the ongoing work
of the organization and its activities. An essential part of this
education will of course be the training through practice of a selected
team of people in the more detailed methods and techniques of the
approach in question.
The story in Potosi, however, suggests that it is not enough merely to
train a cadre of techicians and to have them carry out the spatial
component of planning. While such studies may be perfectly self-
contained, adequate from the point of view of those concerned with the
spatial element of planning, it will not enter into the mainstream of
institutional thinking until or unless staff can demonstrate its utility
and direct applicability to the ongoing problems and programs of those
concerned with sectoral planning.
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This means that once the initial spatial studies have been completed,
outlines have been prepared for the spatial strategy, and perhaps
preliminary designs have been sketched out for area-based program
packages, then those in charge of spatial planning have to relate their
ideas directly to the plans and policies of each sectoral team. They
should explain their initial findings and proposals with those concerned
with agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and so forth, and work
with them to demonstrate how these spatial analyses can be applied to
solving sectoral problems. Within CORDEPO, this could have been done
most effectively in the sectors of transportation and urban infra-
structure. In each case, the spatial problems are essentially ones con-
cerned with locating suitable sites for new facilities, or prioritizing
proposals for rural roads, drinking water, sewage and other urban works.
In the same way, the spatial planners can disseminate their ideas
outside the organization in which they are working to the regional
offices of central government line agencies and other local entities. In
a recent follow up evaluation of the UFRD project in Potosi, it emerged
for example that both the Unidad Sanitaria, responsible for providing
health care in rural areas, and the SNDC, charged with providing infra-
structure among farming communities, were in the process of preparing
what was referred to as a "regionalization" plan, concerning the spatial
3distribution of theiP projects and services In each case, it was clear
that the spatial planning unit at CORDEPO would have been able to pro-
vide them with valuable assistance, and in the process would have been
able to go a long way towards coordinating their activities with those
of the Corporation.
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In a subsequent application of the UFRD approach in the Department of
Oruro in Bolivia, planners from the Oruro development corporation,
CORDEOR, actually worked together with those from the Unidad Sanitaria
to arrive at a plan for rationalizing the location and distribution of
health facilities in the Oruro region . In Potosi, and we suspect in
other similar situations, most local offices of line agencies lack suit-
ably trained staff to cope with location problems, and would welcome
assistance from spatial planners, providing an excellent opportunity for
bilateral collaboration.
To reinforce the adoption of planning methods for spatially integrated
development, ways need to be found to incorporate the new concepts and
methods into the more permanent adminstrative procedures and practices
of the institution concerned. During the preparation of the Regional
Plan for Potosi, an elaborate three-dimensional budget matrix was
devised to facilitate project identification and selection, and inter-
sectoral coordination of activities within each area of the region. This
represented investments by years, by projects grouped according to
sectors, and by areal planning units, allowing planners a clear picture
of the relative distribution of funds among different parts of the
region. With foresight, it would have been a relatively simple matter to
adopt this tool for the preparation of the annual operating plans.
Unfortunately this was not done, with the result that despite the
elaborate attention given to such matters in the Regional Plan, the
annual budgets continued to be produced exactly as before, with no
recognition given to the criteria of spatial allocation of resources.
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The use of simple administrative measures could be used to resolve one
of the weakest links in the planning process, namely the selection of
projects for inclusion in the annual budgets. Time and again, as was
pointed out earlier, the operating plan would include projects that were
either inconsistent with larger development policies, or that had not
been discussed with the relevant agency responsible for its subsequent
operation. This situation could largely be avoided by introducing an
administrative requirement that all projects proposed for the following
year's budget should be accompanied by a simple evaluation form, which
specifically indicates whether the project conforms with longer range
plans, and / or has the support of other agencies involved. By itself,
this would not of course ensure that non-conforming projects were elimi-
nated, but at least it would signal the misfits to those responsible for
evaluating and approving the budget, and would require some convincing
explanation.
In short, the practitioner needs to think through the implications of
introducing new concepts of regional planning into the organization, and
to figure out what needs to be done to educate not just the staff as
individuals, but also to teach the institution as a whole how to perform
effectively. Ultimately, of course this extends beyond the bounds of the
immediate organization to other agencies whose cooperation is required
for the implementation of the programs and projects proposed.
c) If multi-lateral coordination among implementing agencies is
unworkable, then policies for integrated development should be dis-
aggregated into replicable components, and the planner should become an
entrepreneur.
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It is quite clear from the experience in Potosi that integrated
approaches to rural or regional development that require extensive
inter-agency coordination are unlikely to be implemented in the neat and
orderly manner envisaged. Given the widespread uncertainties of planning
in poorer countries like Bolivia, and the dispersed nature of decision
making, it is simply not feasible to count on program inputs from many
different agencies all falling into place at their allotted point in the
schedule. There are far too many imponderables and potential difficul-
ties along the route that may serve to deflect plans from their intended
course. McLoughlin's dictum that "a plan is a trajectory through which
the system is required to pass" is indeed a delusion in such a country,
5if not everywhere
Nevertheless, we should not conclude that all forms of coordination are
necessarily unworkable: multi-lateral coordination may be difficult or
impossible to accomplish, but as we saw in Potosi, bilateral collabora-
tion between CORDEPO and other local entities is alive and in some cases
doing quite well. Through agreements with SENAC for highways, ENDE for
electricity, and SENDU for market buildings, for example, CORDEPO has
become remarkably proficient at delivering urban infrastructure to towns
and small villages throughout the region.
There is a valuable lesson to learn here. These projects are for the
most part small, low budget, easily replicable, and amenable to standar-
dized procedures for design, budgetting, and implementation. They re-
quire small teams of technicians and field workers, and for the most
part depend on collaboration between CORDEPO and only one other agency.
-190-
Once the necessary administrative machinery has been set up, and staff
have acquired experience of working together as a team, and more impor-
tantly have had the chance to learn from cumulative practice, then these
units can become surprisingly effective at delivering the goods, even in
the adverse conditions encountered in a place like Potosi.
Does this imply, therefore, as some might be tempted to argue, that
integrated programs should be dropped in favor of the more conventional
practice of sectoral planning - a practice in which each sectoral team
all too of ten tends to go its own way regardless of the activities of
others? Our reply is an emphatic no. The overall perspective of an
integrated approach is still valid, and indeed essential for effective
regional planning. As the Potosi exercise amply demonstrated, the stud-
ies and policy recommendations that emerged, though not necessarily
carried out as conceived, nevertheless did make a significant contri-
bution in providing that larger perspective which is so often absent
from regional development efforts.
What this lesson does suggest, however, is that once the overall picture
has been constructed, then strategies for integrated development should
be disaggregated into small replicable components that can be managed in
a similar manner. Instead of attempting to start from scratch with new
contractual arrangements, the planner should wherever possible take
advantage of existing bilateral agreements with other local agencies.
Working in collaboration with the staff of each office concerned, the
planner should aim to reorient- ongoing programs and activities in line
with the thinking and priorities of an integrated approach to
development.
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In a few cases, new agreements may be needed to set up special units for
the express purpose of delivering just one kind of input for the larger
ongoing program of integrated development being applied throughout the
region. Most agricultural projects, for example, can be broken down into
replicable components - irrigation works, storage facilities, credit,
technical assistance, distribution services for seeds and fertilisers,
and marketing networks for produce. In Potosi, there already exist a
number of organizations for some of these functions, such as the agri-
cultural bank for farmers' credit, and IBTA for extension services. In
the past CORDEPO has approached each agricultural project on a piecemeal
basis, and efforts at coordination with other agencies have been largely
frustrated, mainly it seems because there has not been the opportunity
to learn from continuing practice. Instead, however, each of these
components could feasibly be handled by special purpose units, similar
to those which are already operating for the provision of urban
infrastructure.
If this interpretation is correct, then the planner should become an
entrepreneur in seeking out opportunities to set up these special task
micro-units in collaboration with whatever group possesses the necessary
skills or expertise. These collaborative ventures need not, indeed
should not, be restricted to public agencies, but should involve as wide
a spectrum of organisations as possible - non-profit groups, coopera-
tives, and especially the private sector.
Too often, public development agencies tend to take on far more than
they can manage or have the expertise to handle; CORDEPO was guilty in
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this respect in some of its efforts to launch commercial enterprises
which have yet to show a profit. The complaint is often voiced that
entrepreneurs are in short supply in poorer countries, but more likely
they are not given adequate support to pursue their ventures. By their
very nature, strategies for integrated development include many activi-
ties that could, with the right approach, be undertaken more effectively
by the private sector.
To conclude, strategies for spatially integrated development should not
be abandoned. Too often evaluations of integrated applications have con-
cluded that they failed or were largely ineffective on the superficial
evidence that outcomes showed little resemblance to original intentions.
This may be the case, but such an evaluation is based on a faulty
premise, an inadequate model of the planning process, one that misunder-
stands the nature of decision making and the diverse way in which an
organization's behaviour can be changed. True, such approaches may in
the past have overstressed the need for multi-sectoral activities and
inter-agency coordination, and thus have invited judgements of failure
when this did not occur. The failure, however, is not so much in the
concept, but in the application of it. We need to revise our under-
standing of how spatially integrated planning can be accomplished, and
more importantly we need as practitioners to redirect our attention and
energies to finding ways to make it work under conditions that are often
far from optimal.
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Footnotes.
1. Friedmann, for example, suggests four conditions or principles:
planning must be joined to power; political commitment must be
sustained; use of policy instruments must be concerted; and a
national balance in inter-regional development must be maintained.
Friedmann (1972).
2. Bromley was commenting specifically on the problems of planning
under political instability and economic dependence. Bromley (1983).
3. Personal communication with officials of the Unidad Sanitaria and
the SNDC in Potosi, August 1983.
4. Personal communication with officials of CORDEOR and the Unidad
Sanitaria in Oruro, August 1983.
5. McLoughlin (1969), p 281.
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APPENDIX: THE BOLIVIAN NATIONAL PLANNING SYSTEM.
Regional planners in Bolivia face a frustrating paradox. On paper the
country possesses an unusually well defined planning system, which
potentially provides the government with a powerful instrument to guide
development in a coherent and rational manner. Yet in practice this
machinery has so far proved incapable of formulating a regional plan,
still less of implementing one.
This lack of central guidance means that the initiative for regional
planning passes to the Regional Development Corporations. However,
these are not supported by effective representation in the central
government, with the result that each pursues its own interests, often
at the expense of another. Since some have better technical expertise,
or stronger political clout, funds tend to be distributed not according
to any a priori plan, but according to who is most adept at playing the
system. The de facto national policy of regional development which
results, favors the so-called "central axis" consisting of the three
main urban conglomerations around La Paz, Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz, at
the expense of other more "peripheral" regions such as Potosi.
This appendix provides a brief description of the component institutions
of the Bolivian national planning system, their allotted role and
responsibilities, and explains the procedure that is laid down for the
preparation of development plans and annual operating plans. We will
then compare what is supposed to happen with what tends in practice to
happen.
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The Actors.
Bolivia was one of the first countries in Latin America to introduce
national economic planning, beginning with early attempts following the
revolution of 1952. The machinery for the present system was set up
under President Banzer during a rare period of political stability in
the 1970s. In October 1974 three laws were introduced which established
the Ministry of Planning and Coordination (MPC), the National System of
Planning, and a National System of Projects, followed by a decree in
March 1976 setting up a National Projects Committee, and finally in
February 1978 a further law formally defining the Regional Development
Corporations.2
The principal actors in this scenario are CONEPLAN, the National Econ-
omic Planning Council, whose task is to determine national policies for
economic growth and development; the Ministry of Planning and Coordina-
tion, which provides the technical inputs necessary for formulating
policies and implementing them; followed by the line agencies or Mini-
stries in charge of each sector, for example agriculture, transporation,
health, and education; and finally the regional development corporations
which are responsible for planning and coordinating development activi-
ties in each of the nine Departments of the country.
fJ.nan jnii This is headed by the Mini-
L_ a National Economic Plannin& Council.ThsiheddbteMn-
ster of Planning and Coordination, and includes representatives from the
main public bodies concerned with production, such as the Ministries of
Agriculture, Industry, Mining, Energy and Hydrocarbons. Other Ministers
participate in CONEPLAN's deliberations when appropriate, but the formal
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nominations of the Council reflect an intentional emphasis on economic
planning. The Council's task is to translate the national objectives
determined by the Council of Ministers into goals and strategies, and to
ensure that annual operating plans and longer range development plans
prepared by line agencies and departmental corporations conform to these
guidelines.
.. .The Ministry (2f Planning .and. Coordination. This is the technical arm
of CONEPLAN, and, as its name implies, is the agency primarily respon-
sible for the preparation of plans and the coordination of activities
within the government. The MPC comprises three divisions - for
planning, for coordination, and for legal and administrative affairs -
each headed by a Sub-Secretary. The largest and most important of these
is the division for planning, which in turn has departments for global
or macro-economic planning, sectoral pianning, regional planning,
integration, and project analysis. The staff of these departments are
responsible for reviewing the plans prepared by Ministries and regional
development corporations, and ensuring that proposed activities do not
duplicate or conflict with one another. The department of project
analysis reviews detailed proposals for individual projects and makes
recommendations to the National Projects Committee which includes
representatives from organizations concerned with development finance.
The department in charge of regional planning - recently renamed spatial
planning - is charged with the responsibility of drawing up a national
strategy for regional development, providing guidelines for the regional
development corporations, and assessing the plans prepared by them.
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Having a regional rather than a sectoral perspective, it has drawn
attention to the persistent concentration of resources in a few selected
areas of the country, and has constantly argued in favor of a more
equitable allocation of funds - so far, however, with little success.
C. Ib Ministries. Sectoral planning is the responsibility of the
various Ministries and other semi-autonomous entities linked to them.
Of most importance are those related to productive activities such as
agriculture, industry, and above all mining, particularly the state
mining corporation, COMIBOL. Given the importance of this sector in the
national economy, COMIBOL assumes a powerful role and functions almost
as an independent fiefdom, largely impervious to outside influence.
With few exceptions, however, most Ministries are weak at planning, and
instead tend to concentrate their limited resources of money and trained
manpower on solving the widespread problems of administering existing
programs. Some thought is given to designing new projects, but rela-
tively little attention is given to more comprehensive longer range
planning. There is a tendency to follow conventional development
models, recommended by international agencies, especially if accompanied
by financial assistance, rather than thinking through alternative
solutions which might be better matched to the specific conditions and
constraints in Bolivia.
D. I A Regional Development Corporations. The other major component of
the national planning system is the group of regional development
corporations - sometimes referred to as departmental development
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committees (or DDCs) - there being one for each of the country's nine
political sub-divisions or Departments. Most of these corporations were
originally set up in the late 1960s or early 1970s as public works
committees to provide infrastructure for the capital city of the depart-
ment, and hence were linked to the central government through the Minis-
try of Housing and Urban Affairs. With the introduction in 1978 of the
law for Regional Development Corporations, their role and functions were
broadened, and their responsibilities were defined more explicitly as
the social and economic development of the Department. To reflect their
new status, they were formally incorporated into the national planning
system, and are required to prepare annual operating plans and longer
range regional development plans for review by the Ministry of Planning
and Coordination.
The regional corporations are funded from several sources, and the mix
varies from case to case. The departments of Potosi, Oruro, and Santa
Cruz, obtain most of their income from royalties on the extraction of
minerals or petroleum. Pando receives revenue from a tax on imports to
the department, while Cochabamba and the Beni rely mainly on transfers
from the national treasury. Funding for all corporations is supple-
mented by grants from INALPRE, an agency for financing pre-investment
studies, and loans and donations from bilateral and international
development agencies. Although the corporations have no authority to
levy their own taxes, most benefit from revenue derived from a sales
tax.
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The Planning Sequence.
The planning machinery established under President Banzer was designed
to strengthen the central government's ability to steer public agencies
towards defined objectives, and to harness their collective resources in
attacking specific problems. The planning sequence is intended to start
with the Council of Ministers, whose role is to identify national objec-
tives for social and economic development. Once defined, it is the task
of CONEPLAN, aided by its technical advisers in the Ministry of Planning
and Coordination, to translate these objectives into broad goals and
policies, which ostensibly provide guidelines and a reference framework
for executive agencies. The Ministries, regional development corpora-
tions, and other public organizations, are then supposed to prepare
medium term plans in light of these guidelines, from which to derive
annual operating plans.
Sometime in the fall each year, these operating plans are submitted to
the Ministry of Planning and Coordination, who ensures that they are
broadly compatible with larger goals and policies, and do not duplicate
or compete with each other. The MPC, together with the Ministry of
Finance, then review the financial aspects of the plans in light of
anticipated resources and other needs. Meanwhile, the projects division
of the MPC evaluates preliminary feasibility studies for individual
3
projects, and makes recommendations to the National Project Committee
On the basis of these submissions, the MPC finally aggregates individual
agency proposals into a single national operating plan, which is
submitted to CONEPLAN for its ratification.
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The Regional Planning System in Practice.
Needless to say, the tidy rationale of the national planning system is
considerably untidier in practice, especially when it comes to regional
planning. First, due in part to the widespread shortage of appro-
priately trained personnel - at the departmental level and at the
national level - the system has with few exceptions proved incapable of
generating meaningful regional plans or strategies. Second, in the
absence of such plans, coordination between Ministries of the central
government and the regional development corporations is rare, and where
it has been attempted has frequently been undermined by the unpredic-
table disbursement of funds which makes it difficult for one party or
the other to fulfill its obligations. Third, due to the absence of plans
and the lack of inter-agency coordination, the ultimate distribution of
resources among different regions of the country - one of the key
factors affecting growth and development - is subject only to nominal
control from the center, being determined mainly by the cumulative
decisions of many public bodies acting for the most part independently
of one another.
To start with there has been no effective regional planning at the
national level. The government of the day occasionally reiterates a
commitment to a strategy of "development poles", or alternatively calls
for a national policy for rural development, but the motive in both
cases would appear to have more to do with securing the political
support of key constituencies than with any serious study of the issues.
Not that there has been a lack of study - on the contrary considerable
effort was expended on the topic in the late 1970s. But no one seems to
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be able to decide what a national strategy for regional development
really is, or might be, or how it could be implemented.
Neither has there been much serious regional planning at the depart-
mental level. Despite the MPC's requirement that the regional corpora-
tions should prepare longer range development plans as a framework for
justifying individual projects in annual operating budgets, few have
been prepared, and fewer still have taken account of the spatial dimen-
sions of the local economy. With the exception of the corporations for
the departments of Santa Cruz, and more recently Cochabamba, both of
which have benefitted from a technical aid mission from the government
of Germany, the MPC and the development corporations have tended to
sidestep the planning of regions in favor of identifying and designing
projects - an activity which is more tangible, more easily understood,
and one in which they have more experience.
None of this is so surprising given the origins of the regional develop-
ment corporations as public works agencies focusing mainly on engineer-
ing problems, such as highway construction, water supplies, airports and
other public buildings. Although they have now broadened their activi-
ties to include agriculture and industry, few have yet made the diffi-
cult mental transition from a construction company to a fully fledged
development corporation.
Planning at the regional level, therefore, is mainly concerned with the
preparation of annual plans, which show estimated operating expenses and
capital investment needs for new and continuing projects to be funded in
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the following year. These plans are reviewed by the MPC, and are
usually approved with few or no changes, except in the case of projects
which duplicate or compete with others elsewhere. Supposedly these
budgets form the basis for the Treasury's disbursement of funds to the
corporations, although due to the country's perennial economic crises
actual payments are usually much less. These annual plans, however,
tend to be little more than a collection of sectoral proposals, exhibit-
ing perhaps some coherence within a particular sector, but little or no
relation to projects in other sectors, and are rarely supported by
rigorous feasibility studies.
A second major problem of the regional planning system concerns the lack
of coordination between units of the central government and the regional
development corporations. True there have been several instances of
joint agreements or projects between the two, as for example between
CORDEPO and SENAC (National Roads Service), IBTA (Bolivian Institute for
Agricultural Technology), and the Ministry of Agriculture. But these
tend to be for specific operations, such as shared funding for roads,
drinking water systems, electricity generation, and experimental farms.
Though these arrangements seem to be mutually satisfactory - or else
presumably they would not be continued in subsequent years - it is not
uncommon that one party fails to fulfill its part of the contract, due
o a lack of funds, manpower, or other resources. Often the root of the
problem is once again the delay in disbursing funds, or even outright
budget cuts.
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On the other hand, examples of concerted planning at the regional level
between the central government and the departmental corporations are
rare. As the USAID Mission in Bolivia points out: "one of the major
defects of the present planning system is that sectoral ministries and
regional committees do not consult to any extent in the selection of
projects and the development of their respective plans". This is
partly because there are few precedents for this kind of joint planning,
but also because it is of course far from easy to accomplish. Minis-
tries have their own interests and priorities, which do not necessarily
coincide with those of the regional corporations. Apart from the
problems of identifying projects of mutual interest, there is also a
certain reluctance or inertia to be overcome: Ministries tend to prefer
to keep a project in-house rather than to involve others, in order to
maintain closer control and to avoid magnifying the risk of admini-
strative and mangement problems. But perhaps the single most obvious
reason is simply the lack of experience with more complex projects
involving collaboration between several agencies in programs for
integrated development.
The lack of coordination between line agencies and the regional corpora-
tions means of course that the latter are obstructed from fulfilling
their role of chief coordinator with overall responsibility for develop-
ment activities at the Departmental level. Most corporations are
directly responsible for only a small part of total public spending in
their region, and when they are unable to participate in decisions
concerning investments by other agencies their role is reduced to little
more than a spectator. The lack of consultation also means that develop-
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ment efforts tend to be fragmented and piecemeal, sometimes even at
cross purposes. Most significantly, the absence of effective machinery
for communication and joint planning between the departmental corpora-
tion and regional offices of central Ministries represents a major ob-
stacle to be resolved if broader programs of integrated area development
are to be attempted.
The void in regional policy at the national level and poor coordination
at the departmental level leads to a third weakness in the planning
system: the regional distribution of public investment - a key deter-
minant of growth and development - is not given explicit consideration,
but is the incidental outcome of decisions made within each agency. In
the absence of clearly defined objectives for regional development, the
spatial allocation of resources is determined primarily by institutional
and political considerations.
First, sectoral concerns have clearly taken. precedence over regional
concerns, which means that the regional distribution of investments is
ultimately determined as the by-product of decisions made according to
sectoral priorities. Although these decisions taken one by one may be
quite rational and defensible from the perspective of the agency
concerned, taken collectively the outcome in terms of regional distri-
bution is certainly not equitable, and may not even be efficient. By
focusing on what are thought to be potentially the most promising
activities, Ministries tend to concentrate their activities in a few
Departments, largely ignoring others. The Ministry of Agriculture, for
example, invests heavily in the fertile areas of Cochabamba, Santa Cruz,
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and the Beni, while the regional office in Potosi barely has enough to
pay its own staff.
Second, there are institutional rigidities to be overcome. Entrenched
funding patterns built up as a result of past practice cannot be changed
quickly, and ongoing programs cannot be cut easily. Even in the absence
of a practising democracy with elected representatives, there are still
powerful interest groups pressing for the maintainance or expansion of
particular programs, not least the administrators of those programs
themselves.
Third, there are always competing needs for scarce public resources.
Though the regional corporations may be entitled to certain royalties,
taxes, or duties, they usually do not collect these themselves, but
receive them instead from the Treasury or other central government
agencies. Given the severe financial crises confronting the central
government in recent years, the Treasury has sometimes been forced to
meet other priorities, before the corporations receive their entitle-
ments. In practice it is common for payments to be postponed, in certain
cases resulting in a massive backlog of unpaid but ever promised dues.
Finally, whether a corporation receives its payments in a timely fashion
or not also depends on the leverage it exercises among the executive
offices of the Presidency, which in turn may depend on the relationship
between the incumbent and the president of the regional corporation.
Certain regions have traditionally exercised strong political or mili-
tary influence in the making or breaking of Presidents, particularly
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those from the armed forces. Not surprisingly these regions are some-
times able to turn their influence to advantage, not least in the timely
payment of transfers. Other regions, without such muscle, have to wait
their turn, which always seems to be behind someone else.
Footnotes.
1. For a more detailed account of national planning in Bolivia, see
USAID: "Bolivian Planning Experience", Annex E of Bolivia Proiect
Paper: Rural Development Planning. USAID, Washington, 1978.
2. See "Ley Organica del Ministerio de Planeamiento", and other laws
in Gazeta Oficial de Bolivia, Ministerio de Planeamiento y
Coordinacion, La Paz, 1979.)
3. The problems of evaluating projects were touched on in chapter 8.
The task of the projects division of the MPC is severely hampered
by the lack of any standardised evaluation techniques, or agreed
parameters such as shadow prices. Instead, it tends to rely more on
simple financial analyses. See Irwin (1977) for a more detailed
account.
4. USAID, op. cit., Annex E, p 5.
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